Zalman Enav: Drawing the Lines in Sinai
Many of the people involved in the peace talks with Egypt in 1977-1979 were well-known figures in Israeli public life. But our latest project on the peace treatyintroduced us to someone less renowned: Zalman Enav, a civilian volunteer who drew up the lines for the Israeli withdrawal in Sinai. His story shows how paradoxically, the Egyptian and Israeli generals, who had been fighting each other a short time before, understood one another better than the politicians quibbling over every legal point. It seems that the soldiers had a healthy respect for the other's military capacity, and wanted to do everything possible to prevent another round of fighting.
Mr. Enav is a Tel Aviv architect who planned many important building projects in Israel and abroad, especially in Africa and in Egypt (after the treaty). He joined the Palmach in 1946, and later advised the IDF on planning of army and air force bases. Zalman Enav built the homes of Arik Sharon at the Shikmim Farm and of Ezer Weizman in Caesariya and is still active today. We came across his name while looking for maps to illustrate the negotiations on withdrawal in Sinai, and later we read an account of his involvement in the peace process. In a telephone interview, Mr. Enav confirmed that account and added other fascinating details.
Zalman Enav's work on peace with Egypt began in the last stages of the Yom Kippur war, when he was serving at the advance command post of Arik Sharon. General Avraham Tamir, who was about to become the head of the IDF Planning Branch, took him from the front to Tel Aviv to start preparing for peace talks. At thetalks with the Egyptians at the KM. 101 marker on the Cairo-Suez road Enav met General Taha Magdoub, the assistant of General Gamasy, the Egyptian chief of staff. He told Magdoub: "Bring me to Cairo and we'll soon finish the business" of preparing the maps. Magdoub replied: "It's too soon". They met again in Geneva to work on the Interim Agreement signed in September 1975. The Egyptians thought that Enav worked for the security services, as they could not understand what a volunteer was doing in such a post.
In January 1978, after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Enav did arrive in Cairo as a member of the Israeli delegation to the military talks with Egypt and met Magdoub again. The joint work of the military delegations continued over many months of ups and downs, crises and solutions and led to agreement on Israeli withdrawal in two stages and the division of Sinai into areas including demilitarized zones and limitation of forces.
Enav was not at Camp David, but in October 1978 he was called to Washington "for a few days" to help prepare the final lines of the peace treaty on maps presented by the Americans. The talks dragged on for months due to disagreements caused by political pressure on the Egyptian and Israeli governments. Nevertheless, after a dramatic visit to the Middle East by US president Jimmy Carter, the treaty was signed 35 years ago last week.
Enav, who by now enjoyed the confidence of all parties, drew up the lines for all of them, watched by an Egyptian and an American officer. The maps were signed by Tamir and Magdoub in the State Department one day before the signing of the treaty on 26 March 1979. At the last minute, after Prime Minister Begin had agreed to advance the date of Israel's handing over the Alma oilfield as a gesture to Sadat, one of the maps had to be re-drawn and Enav had to work all night …In the ISA's digital publication on "Making Peace" in Hebrew you can see copies of the maps, including the most important one – Annex II, the international boundary between Egypt and Israel, which was fixed for the first time. In signing this map Egypt formally recognized the border and the state of Israel.
Mr. Enav is a Tel Aviv architect who planned many important building projects in Israel and abroad, especially in Africa and in Egypt (after the treaty). He joined the Palmach in 1946, and later advised the IDF on planning of army and air force bases. Zalman Enav built the homes of Arik Sharon at the Shikmim Farm and of Ezer Weizman in Caesariya and is still active today. We came across his name while looking for maps to illustrate the negotiations on withdrawal in Sinai, and later we read an account of his involvement in the peace process. In a telephone interview, Mr. Enav confirmed that account and added other fascinating details.
Zalman Enav's work on peace with Egypt began in the last stages of the Yom Kippur war, when he was serving at the advance command post of Arik Sharon. General Avraham Tamir, who was about to become the head of the IDF Planning Branch, took him from the front to Tel Aviv to start preparing for peace talks. At thetalks with the Egyptians at the KM. 101 marker on the Cairo-Suez road Enav met General Taha Magdoub, the assistant of General Gamasy, the Egyptian chief of staff. He told Magdoub: "Bring me to Cairo and we'll soon finish the business" of preparing the maps. Magdoub replied: "It's too soon". They met again in Geneva to work on the Interim Agreement signed in September 1975. The Egyptians thought that Enav worked for the security services, as they could not understand what a volunteer was doing in such a post.
In January 1978, after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Enav did arrive in Cairo as a member of the Israeli delegation to the military talks with Egypt and met Magdoub again. The joint work of the military delegations continued over many months of ups and downs, crises and solutions and led to agreement on Israeli withdrawal in two stages and the division of Sinai into areas including demilitarized zones and limitation of forces.
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| The Israeli military delegation headed by Ezer Weizman, Chief of Staff Mordecai Gur and Tamir meets the Egyptian delegation headed by General Gamasy in Cairo, January 1978 (Photograph: Yaa'cov Sa'ar, Government Press Office) |
Enav, who by now enjoyed the confidence of all parties, drew up the lines for all of them, watched by an Egyptian and an American officer. The maps were signed by Tamir and Magdoub in the State Department one day before the signing of the treaty on 26 March 1979. At the last minute, after Prime Minister Begin had agreed to advance the date of Israel's handing over the Alma oilfield as a gesture to Sadat, one of the maps had to be re-drawn and Enav had to work all night …In the ISA's digital publication on "Making Peace" in Hebrew you can see copies of the maps, including the most important one – Annex II, the international boundary between Egypt and Israel, which was fixed for the first time. In signing this map Egypt formally recognized the border and the state of Israel.
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| Zalman Enav at the White House, March 26, 1979 (Photograph: Zalman Enav) |
Thursday, March 27, 2014
Menachem Begin: "With Heavy Heart, But Head Held High"- Special Publication by the Archives to Mark the 35th Anniversary of the Peace Treaty with Egypt
Yesterday the ISA launched a publication in a new format on the negotiations with Egypt leading up to Camp David, the conference itself, and the talks before the signing of the peace treaty in Washington on March 26, 1979. The publication includes 67 documents, 18 of them in English, photographs, caricatures, video clips, maps and other audiovisual material, all presented in an app for download for tablets and also available on the Internet.
This was a very exciting project for the Archives, and the aim was to make our materials available to a wider public in a more dynamic and attractive form. The publication is in Hebrew only, but an English version with a selection of illustrations can be seen on our English website.
The new format allows us to give the well known events of the peace process a deeper dimension, as we see the pictures and hear the voices of the actors in the drama. It focuses on the less well known personalities, as well as the "Big Three" leaders, Prime Minister Begin, Egyptian President Sadat and US President Carter. It shows how the distrust which characterized relations between the former enemies was gradually overcome, convincing them that genuine peace was possible and making it possible for Moshe Dayan to reverse his famous saying and to declare from the Knesset rostrum: "Peace without Sharm el Sheikh is better than Sharm el Sheikh without peace."
Monday, March 18, 2013
The Rabbi and the Goat: How the Peace Treaty was Saved, March 1979
Yesterday we published a series of documents here about US President Jimmy Carter's visit to Israel and the crisis in the peace talks with Egypt, which nearly derailed the treaty at the last minute. The media in Israel took great interest in the publication and especially in the clashes between Carter and Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Yet the treaty was signed in the end. What happened?
The heroes of the last ditch rescue were Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, and a lesser known collection of Israeli ministers. The talks broke down over Egypt's demand to send liaison officers to implement Israel's autonomy plan in Gaza, and Israel's demand to include an Egyptian commitment to sell it oil in the peace agreement. The Egyptians were willing to sell the oil--they just didn't want to say so. On March 12, after yet another fruitless meeting, Vance had an idea. "You have got two issues that were not rooted in Camp David … one of them is the Gaza issue. One is the question of oil. Suppose one drops both of those issues, and inasmuch as oil is a more weighty kind of issue, that could be taken care of". The US was willing to give a guarantee that if Egypt let Israel down, America would supply Israel's oil requirements.
Yigael Yadin, the deputy prime minister, said that Vance's suggestion reminded him of the old joke about the rabbi and the goat. The rabbi was asked by a poor Jew to solve the problem of an overcrowded house. He told the Jew to put in a goat as well. When he took it out there was much more room. Vance was suggesting taking out the two "goats" of Gaza and the oil. However, Yadin did not see how Israel could drop the demand for oil which was part of normalizing relations with Egypt. Begin agreed: Israel would accept 50% of Vance's proposal and drop Gaza (See the record of this meeting, Document 7).
The meeting ended. Exhausted after an all-night Cabinet meeting and feeling ill, Begin went home to rest. Vance went back to his hotel. Carter had agreed to stay till the next day, but his press secretary was already briefing the press on the failure of the president's mission. Ezer Weizman, the defense minister who was close to Sadat, accused his colleagues of missing the chance for peace and hinted at resignation.
The ministers were determined not to allow further erosion of Israel's position in the negotiations, but the prospect of the president leaving empty-handed was grim. A group of ministers stayed behind, apparently asked by Yadin to find a way out--Dayan, Eliezer Shostak, Gidon Patt, Josef Burg, Ariel Sharon (yes, Sharon the "extremist"), Aharon Abuhatssira, Shmuel Tamir and Yadin himself. It was this group which brought about the breakthrough. They proposed a formula on oil, which Dayan thought the Americans might accept. He phoned Begin, who authorized him to go back to Vance. Vance agreed to ask the Egyptians not to mention Gaza in the treaty, if the oil issue was settled. (Egyptian access to Gaza already appeared in the agreement on normalization). Dayan said that Israel would accept a general commitment by Egypt to sell oil to Israel like any other country and an American guarantee for twenty years. They eventually settled on fifteen years. After calling the president, Vance and his staff drafted a clause to be added to Annex III of the treaty on trade relations. Carter invited Begin to breakfast at Dayan's suggestion.
The following morning Vance and Dayan joined Carter and Begin at breakfast. Carter presented the clause as his proposal, and Begin said he would bring it to the government. Carter also requested some gestures towards the Palestinians, and Begin agreed to consider them. Before he left for the airport, Carter proposed to Begin that the question of Gaza be dropped, and Begin accepted gladly. Sadat still required some persuasion, but Carter made it clear that this was the best offer he would get. He wrote to Begin that Sadat had agreed (Document 8). Begin and Carter may not have seen eye to eye, but they could not let slip the chance for peace with Egypt.
The heroes of the last ditch rescue were Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, and a lesser known collection of Israeli ministers. The talks broke down over Egypt's demand to send liaison officers to implement Israel's autonomy plan in Gaza, and Israel's demand to include an Egyptian commitment to sell it oil in the peace agreement. The Egyptians were willing to sell the oil--they just didn't want to say so. On March 12, after yet another fruitless meeting, Vance had an idea. "You have got two issues that were not rooted in Camp David … one of them is the Gaza issue. One is the question of oil. Suppose one drops both of those issues, and inasmuch as oil is a more weighty kind of issue, that could be taken care of". The US was willing to give a guarantee that if Egypt let Israel down, America would supply Israel's oil requirements.
_-_Begin_and_Yadin%5B1%5D.jpg) |
| Yigael Yadin and Menachem Begin Photograph: Chanania Herman, Government Press Office |
The meeting ended. Exhausted after an all-night Cabinet meeting and feeling ill, Begin went home to rest. Vance went back to his hotel. Carter had agreed to stay till the next day, but his press secretary was already briefing the press on the failure of the president's mission. Ezer Weizman, the defense minister who was close to Sadat, accused his colleagues of missing the chance for peace and hinted at resignation.
The ministers were determined not to allow further erosion of Israel's position in the negotiations, but the prospect of the president leaving empty-handed was grim. A group of ministers stayed behind, apparently asked by Yadin to find a way out--Dayan, Eliezer Shostak, Gidon Patt, Josef Burg, Ariel Sharon (yes, Sharon the "extremist"), Aharon Abuhatssira, Shmuel Tamir and Yadin himself. It was this group which brought about the breakthrough. They proposed a formula on oil, which Dayan thought the Americans might accept. He phoned Begin, who authorized him to go back to Vance. Vance agreed to ask the Egyptians not to mention Gaza in the treaty, if the oil issue was settled. (Egyptian access to Gaza already appeared in the agreement on normalization). Dayan said that Israel would accept a general commitment by Egypt to sell oil to Israel like any other country and an American guarantee for twenty years. They eventually settled on fifteen years. After calling the president, Vance and his staff drafted a clause to be added to Annex III of the treaty on trade relations. Carter invited Begin to breakfast at Dayan's suggestion.
The following morning Vance and Dayan joined Carter and Begin at breakfast. Carter presented the clause as his proposal, and Begin said he would bring it to the government. Carter also requested some gestures towards the Palestinians, and Begin agreed to consider them. Before he left for the airport, Carter proposed to Begin that the question of Gaza be dropped, and Begin accepted gladly. Sadat still required some persuasion, but Carter made it clear that this was the best offer he would get. He wrote to Begin that Sadat had agreed (Document 8). Begin and Carter may not have seen eye to eye, but they could not let slip the chance for peace with Egypt.
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| Begin, Carter and Sadat in Washington, March 1979 Photograph: Ya'acov Sa'ar, Government Press Office |
Sunday, March 17, 2013
Now or Never: US President Jimmy Carter's Visit to Israel, March 1979
The Last Lap of the Peace Negotiations with Egypt
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| Prime Minister Begin, President Jimmy Carter and Israeli President Yitzhak Navon, March 10, 1979. Photograph Government Press Office |
In February 1979, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Egyptian Prime Minister Mustapha Khalil met again at Camp David, but it was clear that Dayan did not have the authority to break the impasse. Carter asked Begin to come to Camp David but he refused. Instead he flew to Washington for talks with Carter himself. After some progress, Carter decided to take the plunge and go to the Middle East himself. He planned to meet with Sadat, to present the latest proposals agreed with Begin and to finalize the details of the treaty, so that it could be signed during his visit.
In Israel, many wondered if Carter's visit was not too big a gamble, in view of the gap between the sides. However, Dayan told senior staff at the Foreign Ministry that Carter's decision was not a gamble but a political necessity, in view of the latest developments in the Middle East and the fall of the pro-American regime in Iran. (See Document 1)
Carter stayed in Egypt for three days and met with Sadat, but the Egyptian president rejected the proposals. On March 10, Carter came to Jerusalem to meet with the Israeli leaders and to give them the message that it was "now or never." Carter's visit was marked by tense and dramatic meetings between the president, accompanied by his top advisers--Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Defense Secretary Harold Brown--and the Israeli delegation. The Israelis strongly opposed Egypt's latest demands and at the height of the argument, Begin said bluntly to Carter: "Mr President, we shall sign only what we agree to and we shall not sign anything to which we do not agree" (SeeDocument 5). At the last minute, when it seemed that Carter would return to Washington empty-handed, a breakthrough was achieved which enabled him to return to Cairo and to obtain Sadat's agreement to the treaty. "That is the best news of my life, wonderful news," said Carter when Begin called to tell him that the Israeli government too had approved the latest proposals and the way was clear for the signing ceremony (See Document 9).
These documents mark three stages in the dramatic story of the last lap of the peace negotiations, when the president of the United States took the unprecedented step of holding direct talks with the entire government of Israel. They are part of a collection of eleven documents presented by the Israel State Archives in honor of President Barack Obama's visit to Israel and to mark the 34th anniversary of President Carter's visit. The documents were chosen from the Prime Minister's Office and the Foreign Ministry collections and form part of an ongoing project on the peace negotiations with Egypt, in which the US played a vital role. (See also the ISA's publication on President Sadat's visit to Israel in November 1977.)
A. Introduction: What was the argument about?
In mid-October, talks on an American draft of the peace treaty began in Washington. After the initial euphoria of Camp David, the differences between the parties again began to emerge. The angry reaction of the Arab world forced Sadat to prove that he was still committed to the Palestinians and to an overall peace treaty. Begin, under attack by his friends and supporters for abandoning all of the Sinai, was determined to make no more concessions. Although agreement was quickly reached on most of the treaty, several issues remained in dispute:
· Diplomatic relations: Israel feared that Egypt might get all or most of its territory back before the exchange of ambassadors, while Egypt wanted to link the exchange to the elections for a self-governing Palestinian authority. Israel wanted to make it clear that there was no "linkage" between the peace treaty and the agreements on autonomy, by means of Article VI (2) of the treaty, which says that the parties will carry out their obligations without reference to any other agreement.
· The timetable for autonomy: The Egyptians were afraid that Israel would not carry out the autonomy plan, in view of Begin's refusal to freeze settlement activity in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza "during the negotiations". Carter was sure that he had agreed to a freeze until the end of the negotiations on autonomy, but Begin insisted that he had agreed to three months only. Israel accepted an Egyptian proposal that Begin and Sadat should sign a joint letter to accompany the treaty, committing them to hold negotiations on autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. However it did not want to set a target date for the establishment of autonomy.
· Autonomy in Gaza first: After it became clear that King Hussein of Jordan would not co-operate, Egypt proposed to implement autonomy first in Gaza, where it had more influence, and to allow it a special role there. Israel was opposed.
· Priority of obligations: Another problematic article was Article VI (5) which deals with a possible clash between the peace treaty and other treaty obligations. Egypt did not want to say in public that the peace treaty counted for more than its obligations to other Arab states.
· Oil supply: Israel was concerned about its oil supply after withdrawal from the oilfields in Sinai and wanted a long term Egyptian commitment to sell oil to Israel. Egypt saw special treatment for Israel as an infringement of its sovereignty in Sinai.
During the talks in Washington, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman offered to speed up the first stage of withdrawal and to hand over El Arish within two months. Carter pressed the Egyptians to agree to an exchange of ambassadors one month later. But Begin rejected earlier withdrawal and refused to accept a target date for the autonomy talks, in view of the danger of Jordanian non-cooperation or PLO disruption. He also demanded agreement with the US on financial aid to cover the costs of the evacuation.
On November 21, the Israeli government approved the final US version of the treaty, but rejected a target date. After Jordan and Saudi Arabia attacked him at the Baghdad Arab summit, Sadat demanded revision of Articles VI and IV (on security arrangements in Sinai) and refused to send an ambassador to Israel as agreed. A compromise arranged by Vance was rejected by Israel. Confrontation between Israel and the US seemed imminent. But the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran in January 1979 led Carter to seek a foreign policy success. Egypt's role as a moderate force in the region became even more important and Israel needed a substitute for Iranian oil. Carter decided on a final effort to wrap up the talks.
B. "A new mission in the service of the oldest of human dreams – the dream of peace": Carter's visit to Egypt
Before leaving for Egypt Carter made a statement saying: "I leave today on a new mission in the service of the oldest of human dreams – the dream of peace. Nowhere is the hope of peace more fervent, more alive, than in the Middle East. Nowhere is the path to the realization more difficult, nowhere might the price of failure be more terrible…" He was convinced that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, and the peoples of Egypt and Israel, shared his determination to see these negotiations bear fruit.
On March 7, Dayan gave an assessment of the factors which had prompted Carter's visit to senior staff of the Foreign Ministry (Document 1). Yeshayahu Anug asked if Carter's move was a "gamble" or if his success was virtually assured. Dayan answered "I think that for Carter this is a political necessity. The United States has a major need to stabilize the situation in the Middle East after Iran … It is not a "gamble" either way, even if nothing comes out of it." Even if an agreement was not reached, the US would need Egypt, but it would be much easier to obtain assistance from Congress if there was peace with Israel. Dayan said that his talks with Khalil at Camp David were inconclusive because Begin and Sadat were not there. He did not know why Sadat had not come, and the president himself was being forced to "shuttle" between Cairo and Jerusalem (as Secretary of State Kissinger had done after the Yom Kippur War).
On the same day, a report from Cairo (Document 2) suggested that the Egyptian reaction to the new proposals was generally positive, although the signing of the treaty was not yet ensured. Later, the Israelis learned from Carter that Sadat had demanded changes in the text of Article VI which Begin and Carter had agreed in Washington and additions to the joint letter. Sadat proposed that if the details were settled he would come to Jerusalem to sign and afterwards Begin would come to sign in Cairo.
C. Now or never: Carter in Jerusalem
Carter arrived in Israel on Saturday night, March 10, 1979, and met with the prime minister. Begin said that the treaty could not be signed during the president's visit, since Begin was committed to hold a government meeting on the autonomy plan first, as well as to present the treaty to the Knesset. This news surprised and angered the president. In his diary he wrote: "I couldn't believe it. I stood up and asked him if it was actually necessary for me to stay any longer." Carter asked Begin if he really wanted peace. The prime minister insisted that he did, but Carter was convinced that he was trying to block a treaty. His only hope was to appeal above Begin's head to the government, the Knesset and the Israeli public.
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| Aliza and Menachem Begin at dinner with Rosalynn and Jimmy Carter at the Prime Minister's Residence, March 10 1979. Photograph: Government Press Office |
After a visit by Carter to the president of Israel, Yitzhak Navon, to the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial, and to Mt. Herzl, the talks began. The Israeli delegation consisted of Begin and a group of ministers, together with Attorney-General Yitzhak Zamir and other top aides. Begin insisted that Carter should chair the meeting, since a president outranked a prime minister. Carter described his talks with Sadat and the "outpouring of sentiment" in Egypt for peace. He presented the situation as "now or never": if the treaty was not concluded during his visit, it would be very difficult to do so later. He mentioned the Egyptian request to change the word "derogate" in Article VI. Begin emphasized that this article was vital to prevent Egypt joining in a war between Israel and Syria. Nevertheless, he agreed to try to find another word. To prove that Egypt had not abandoned its hostility to Israel, Begin quoted from slanderous attacks on Israel and the Jews in the Egyptian official press.
Sadat's proposal for an addition to the joint letter--to send Egyptian liaison officers to Gaza--aroused bitter opposition in Israel. Carter said that Egypt had only made the suggestion on "Gaza first", which did not appear in the Camp David Accords, in order to be helpful, after Jordan and the Palestinians had refused to take part. Much suspicion was felt in the Arab world, which he shared, that Israel wanted to delay implementation of the autonomy plan, especially in view of Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon's plans to settle a million Jews in Judea and Samaria. Begin and Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Yadin insisted that autonomy was an Israeli initiative and the government stood behind it (Record of the meeting, Document 4).
Summing up the talks that afternoon, Carter said that he could not devote any more time to the Middle East. He would like the treaty "not to be just a piece of paper that both sides have signed reluctantly … with remnants of animosity and distrust" but to revive the atmosphere of genuine friendship and mutual trust of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David summit. He believed that the problems of oil supply and the exchange of ambassadors could be solved, especially if Israel would reconsider a commitment for early withdrawal in Sinai. He asked the government to be "forthcoming and generous".
A late night government meeting was called to approve new formulations. Before this Vance met with Dayan to tell him what the Egyptians might accept. Dayan argued that the subject of liaison officers should be postponed to the autonomy talks. It would be much easier to persuade the government without it. The government meeting, which lasted till 5 a.m., approved the new formulations on Article VI and agreed that Israel would reconsider early withdrawal from Sinai. But it remained adamant in opposition to an Egyptian presence in Gaza and demanded a permanent Egyptian guarantee to sell a fixed amount of oil to Israel. The Israeli side did not realize that, in effect, Carter had full authority from Sadat to negotiate as he saw fit. They expected Vance to go to Cairo to receive a reply.
D. "We shall not sign anything to which we do not agree": Crisis in the talks
At 10:30 the following morning, after receiving the government's decisions, Carter again met with Begin, this time with the entire government present (Document 5). He admitted that they had indeed "been forthcoming, in some instances very generous" but asked for more concessions. He argued that the request to omit all reference to Gaza in the joint letter undermined the US commitment, as a signatory to the Camp David accords, to ensure that autonomy was implemented. He asked for details of the stages of the withdrawal and insisted that the US guarantee of Israel's oil supply was sufficient. Begin demanded that the phrase on liaison officers be removed. After normalization there would be free access to Gaza for the Egyptians. Carter was insistent: "To me it is a very crucial issue and your response has not been adequate". This was the first time in all the negotiations that the US had taken a position that it considered important to its own integrity. "[And] unless there is some assurance that the [Egyptian] negotiating team can have access to the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, I do not feel that I can carry out my commitment to the American people nor to you nor to the Palestinian Arabs nor to Egypt. It is a crucial issue to us and I think it is something you will have to decide."
Begin replied: "Mr. President, we shall sign only what we agree to and we shall not sign anything to which we do not agree." Israel would carry out every word of the Camp David agreement but it could not be forced to accept an addition to it. He agreed to call another government meeting. After Vance said that he had tried and failed to persuade Egypt to give Israel a guaranteed supply of oil, Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir argued that Egypt was perpetuating the Arab boycott. Israel had made great sacrifices for peace, but Egypt refused to give this assurance of good faith. (Record of the meeting, Document 5)
The meeting was cut short as it was time for Carter and Begin to speak in the Knesset. In Carter's speech he said pointedly: "The people of the two nations are ready now for peace. The leaders have not yet proven that we are also ready for peace enough to take a chance." Begin's speech was interrupted repeatedly by members of the right and the Communist party, and MK Geula Cohen was removed from the chamber.
Carter believed that Begin took pleasure in showing him the strength of Israeli democracy. However, in the government meeting which followed Begin was angry and upset, and complained that the Americans too did not appreciate Israel's sacrifices, which had led his opponents to call him "Petain" (the French collaborationist president In World War II). Begin had now realized that Carter was negotiating on behalf of the Egyptians, and would not discuss any proposals which he thought they would not accept. Begin regarded the demand for details about the stages of the withdrawal as Egyptian effrontery, backed by the Americans. The ministers voiced suspicions that Egypt wanted a foothold in Gaza in order to restore Egyptian rule or to encourage the establishment of a Palestinian state. Most of them called for a determined stand against further concessions.
However several ministers, among them Health Minister Eliezer Shostak, Housing Minister Gideon Patt and Finance Minister Simha Ehrlich, felt that some of Israel's demands were unreasonable. Shostak said they should not insist on specific quantities of oil and long term arrangements. On Gaza and Carter's suspicions of Israel's intentions over autonomy: "they have a right to suspect us and it is a very sensitive point". Like Dayan, he wanted to postpone the discussion to the autonomy talks. He did not reject the possibility of liaison officers, to which Sharon objected: "That means a Palestinian state within the month." Ehrlich was also willing to compromise on oil, although he said no more concessions should be made that day. He rejected suggestions for another meeting with Carter, which would only end in offending the president.
The meeting took place in an atmosphere of confusion and despondency. Patt complained that no one was listening and Religious Affairs Minister Aharon Abuhatssira said that it was impossible for a group of thirty people to conduct negotiations. According to the schedule, Carter was supposed to leave, and roads and Israeli air space had been closed in preparation for his departure. Eventually, the government decided not to change its decisions and to ask Carter to transmit them to the Egyptians (Record of the meeting, Document 6).
At 4:45pm, the delegation met with Vance and went over the same ground. At the end of the meeting Vance proposed an idea: "You have got two issues that were not rooted in Camp David … one of them is the Gaza issue. One is the question of oil. Suppose one drops both of those issues, and inasmuch as oil is a more weighty kind of issue, that could be taken care of, that we are prepared to give our guarantee". Yadin replied that the suggestion reminded him of the old joke about the rabbi and the goat (the rabbi solved the problem of a crowded house by putting in a goat as well. When he took it out there was much more room). However, he did not see how Israel could drop the demand for oil which was part of normalization. Begin concurred: Israel would accept 50% of Vance's proposal and drop Gaza (Record of the meeting, Document 7).
After the meeting, exhausted from lack of sleep and feeling ill, Begin went home to rest. Vance went back to his hotel. Carter had agreed to stay till the following day, but his press secretary was already briefing the press on the breakdown of the talks and the failure of the president's mission.
E. Last minute solution
The government was determined not to allow further erosion of their stand, but the prospect that the president of Israel's most important ally would leave empty-handed was a grim one. According to his memoirs, Weizman accused his colleagues of missing the chance for peace and hinted at resignation. A group of ministers remained, apparently asked by Yadin to try to find a way out--Dayan, Shostak, Patt, Burg, Sharon, Abuhatssira, Tamir and Yadin himself. It was this group, several of them little known to history, which brought about the breakthrough. The meeting was not recorded, but it seems that they proposed another formula on the oil question, which Dayan thought the Americans might accept. Dayan telephoned Begin, who authorized him to discuss it with Vance. The two met again and Vance agreed to propose to the Egyptians not to mention Gaza in the treaty, if the oil issue was settled. (Egyptian access to Gaza was already promised in the normalization agreement.) Dayan said that Israel would accept a general commitment by Egypt to sell oil to Israel in the peace treaty and a long term American guarantee. He asked for twenty years, and they eventually agreed on fifteen. After calling the president, Vance and his staff drafted another clause in the peace treaty, which was added to Annex III on trade relations. Carter invited Begin to breakfast at Dayan's suggestion.
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| Working breakfast at the King David Hotel to settle the final details of the agreement, March 13. 1979. Photograph: Government Press Office |
Carter telephoned Begin from Cairo to tell him that Sadat had agreed to the new proposals. That same day, Carter sent Begin a letter summing up their agreements (Document 8, see also Document 11 in Hebrew). If Israel reinstated its proposal on phased withdrawal, Sadat would renew his agreement to the exchange of ambassadors. Sadat had agreed to the addition on oil to Annex III and even offered to construct a pipeline from the oil wells to Eilat. Carter added that he looked forward to seeing him and Sadat in Washington, where the treaty would be signed.
Begin read out the letter at another government meeting on March 14 and presented the understandings. The new formulations were approved and Begin called Carter to tell him of the government's decision (Record of the conversation, Document 9). Carter responded "That is the best news of my life, wonderful news." Begin congratulated Carter on the speech he had made on his return in which he said "risk of failure should never deter us from a worthy end. No goal is higher than that of genuine peace"
We can see Carter's own view of the talks in a briefing to leaders of Congress on March 14. According to a report by Zvi Rafiah of the Israeli embassy (SeeDocument 10), he praised Sadat, Begin and Dayan, but noted that it was much easier to deal with Sadat, who could settle the knottiest problems in half an hour and left the details to his foreign minister. Begin was a "semanticist" who wanted to check everything. (Senator Daniel Moynihan tried to explain that Begin was a lawyer, and when he wrote something he really meant it.) In Jerusalem, Carter had learned with horror about the delays Begin wanted, because Sadat could not wait any longer for an agreement. Carter was also worried about Arab opposition. Sadat said that he would deal with the Arabs if Carter would take care of Israel. Carter added with a smile "I don't know who got the better deal". Egypt needed massive economic and military aid; Israel too would receive large sums.
After a stormy debate which lasted 28 hours, the Knesset approved the peace treaty on March 21. Begin flew to Washington for the signing ceremony which took place on March 26, 1979. In Begin's speech he paid tribute to the efforts of President Carter who had never accepted defeat. Begin also joked at his own expense about Carter's impatience at his fondness for legal details and his "intransigence": "Our friend, President Sadat, said that you are the 'unknown soldier' of the peace-making effort. I agree, but, as usual, with an amendment. A soldier in the service of peace you are; you are, Mr. President, even, mirabile dictu, an intransigent fighter for peace. But Jimmy Carter, the President of the United States, is not completely unknown. And so is his effort, which will be remembered for generations to come."
 |
| Prime Minister Begin and President Carter applaud the speech by President Anwar Sadat during the peace signing ceremony in Washington. Photograph: Government Press Office |
AcknowledgementsHistorical editing: Louise Fischer, Hagai Tsoref
English translation and editing: Louise Fischer
Internet content editing: Oranit Levi
Scanning: Shlomo Mark
Tuesday, November 6, 2012
1979: What Are the Settlements For?
Last month, we published a collection of documents pertaining to the decision of the High Court of Justice to dismantle the settlement of Elon Moreh, in October 1979. We also blogged about it, here, here, here, here, here, and also here. Enough already, huh?
We're almost finished. [As an aside, if you think seven blogposts on one topic are too many, you should see this.]
The two longest documents in our collection were the stenograms of the two cabinet meetings that discussed the matter. The first, on October 28, focused on what the government should say in response to the court's ruling. Prime Minister Menachem Begin wished the cabinet to declare that it would respect the ruling and move immediately to find an alternative location for the settlement. A majority of the ministers changed his mind: Of course the government would respect the court ruling, they said, so there's no need for a declaration; since an alternative site had not yet been identified, why tie the two together, and create the mistaken impression that without an alternative, the government might, in fact, not dismantle the settlement?
On the first of November the cabinet held a special meeting (normally cabinet meetings are held Sunday morning). This one was rather long, and as unstructured discussions can be, it was sort of muddled. It began - and eventually also ended - with the need to decide where to put the dismantled settlement, and also whether to request a temporary stay of execution from the court until the alternate site was ready. Since there was as yet no nearby hilltop the lawyers were certain was not privately owned, that decision was relegated to a subcommittee; since there was no alternative, the minsters decided they'd have to remove the settlement on time no matter what, and not risk being slapped down by the court for appearing to drag their feet.
There was also the usual amount of personal needling between the participants, such as when Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon introduced his criticism of Deputy Minister of Defense Mordechai Zippori by saying how much he respected him, then aggressively poking holes in his position; Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman then noted dryly "but you respect him greatly none-the-less". There were some lighthearted moments, such as when Sharon compared a recent ministerial report to the infamous British White Paper of 1939, and Weizman suggested the cabinet call his (deceased) uncle Haim Weizman to participate in the meeting. Later on, Sharon told about how when he was younger and thinner he used to have no trouble climbing fragile watchtowers.
As the meeting stretched on, however, it morphed into a basic discussion about the settlement project. One needs to be careful not to read too much into this particular document, which can't on its own sum up the full comlplexity of the issue, but it is an important document.
All of the participants, every one of them, accepted that the settlements must be created legally. They all accepted that settlements not be created on private Palestinian property, and that the Elon Moreh case had been a mistake: at the time of its creation they had thought the land wasn't private. They were united in claiming there was no contradiction between building settlements and achieving peace; though many of them also felt that the impending Palestinian autonomy, agreed upon at Camp David with Egypt, would seriously hamper Israel's ability to construct additional settlements. Almost all were convinced that the settlements were permissable even in international law, since they were being constructed for security purposes.
Yet there were significant differences of opinion amongst them. At one pole stood Ezer Weizman and his deputy Mordechai Zippori. Weizman noted that there were 750,000 Arabs on the West Bank, and finding an acceptable mode of coexistance with them was itself an important componant of security; more so than the settlements. He emphasized his party credentials and his committment to its values, but then added:
On the opposite side of the discussion were Education Minister Zevulun Hammer, and Ariel Sharon, who were not, however in full agreement with one another. Hammer gave a long speech-like statement full of vague allusions, but eventually seemed to be saying that creating settlements was the most important thing the government could do and decrying that they weren't at the top of the budgetary agenda. He also hinted that security considerations shouldn't be the guiding principle for their creation. Hammer, from the National Religious Party, was the closest speaker in the cabinet to the positions of Gush Emunim, which at the time was the central organization of the settlers (it was disbanded many years ago, but that's a different story).
Sharon's position was the mirror image of Weizman's. Where Weizman spent a chunk of his time reminding everyone of his solid political credentials as a leader of Likud (and its previous iteration Herut), Sharon apologized that he had grown up in the opposite political camp, that of the Socialists. "I come from the camp that built most of the settlements upon which the State of Israel is based", he said; "from the tradition that facts on the ground create reality. Seen from that perspective and as time is running out because of the near advent of the Palestinian autonomy, the most important thing to do right now is to sprinkle as many tiny settlements throughout the West Bank as possible. One they're there, they can later be expanded; but if they're not even there, quite soon it will be impossible to create them in the first place".
Most of the other ministers were somewhere between these two extremes. Some of them complained that the discussion had become far more strategic than they had been told in advance, and hadn't been prepared properly: for such a discussion it was critical to have more data, and see maps of private versus public land on the West Bank.
No general decisions were made.
We're almost finished. [As an aside, if you think seven blogposts on one topic are too many, you should see this.]
The two longest documents in our collection were the stenograms of the two cabinet meetings that discussed the matter. The first, on October 28, focused on what the government should say in response to the court's ruling. Prime Minister Menachem Begin wished the cabinet to declare that it would respect the ruling and move immediately to find an alternative location for the settlement. A majority of the ministers changed his mind: Of course the government would respect the court ruling, they said, so there's no need for a declaration; since an alternative site had not yet been identified, why tie the two together, and create the mistaken impression that without an alternative, the government might, in fact, not dismantle the settlement?
On the first of November the cabinet held a special meeting (normally cabinet meetings are held Sunday morning). This one was rather long, and as unstructured discussions can be, it was sort of muddled. It began - and eventually also ended - with the need to decide where to put the dismantled settlement, and also whether to request a temporary stay of execution from the court until the alternate site was ready. Since there was as yet no nearby hilltop the lawyers were certain was not privately owned, that decision was relegated to a subcommittee; since there was no alternative, the minsters decided they'd have to remove the settlement on time no matter what, and not risk being slapped down by the court for appearing to drag their feet.
There was also the usual amount of personal needling between the participants, such as when Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon introduced his criticism of Deputy Minister of Defense Mordechai Zippori by saying how much he respected him, then aggressively poking holes in his position; Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman then noted dryly "but you respect him greatly none-the-less". There were some lighthearted moments, such as when Sharon compared a recent ministerial report to the infamous British White Paper of 1939, and Weizman suggested the cabinet call his (deceased) uncle Haim Weizman to participate in the meeting. Later on, Sharon told about how when he was younger and thinner he used to have no trouble climbing fragile watchtowers.
As the meeting stretched on, however, it morphed into a basic discussion about the settlement project. One needs to be careful not to read too much into this particular document, which can't on its own sum up the full comlplexity of the issue, but it is an important document.
All of the participants, every one of them, accepted that the settlements must be created legally. They all accepted that settlements not be created on private Palestinian property, and that the Elon Moreh case had been a mistake: at the time of its creation they had thought the land wasn't private. They were united in claiming there was no contradiction between building settlements and achieving peace; though many of them also felt that the impending Palestinian autonomy, agreed upon at Camp David with Egypt, would seriously hamper Israel's ability to construct additional settlements. Almost all were convinced that the settlements were permissable even in international law, since they were being constructed for security purposes.
Yet there were significant differences of opinion amongst them. At one pole stood Ezer Weizman and his deputy Mordechai Zippori. Weizman noted that there were 750,000 Arabs on the West Bank, and finding an acceptable mode of coexistance with them was itself an important componant of security; more so than the settlements. He emphasized his party credentials and his committment to its values, but then added:
I appologize for being personal for a moment, but when my son Shaul went down to the [Suez] Canal he didn't know what he was going to face there, but I did, because I was in the government. I wrote to him at the time: you are going into battle. When you were born I told your mother I hoped you'd never have to go to war. Now that you are, I ask myself what we did wrong [Shaul was seriously injured in the War of Attrition and never fully recovered].Mordechai Zippori presented the practical face of his boss' position. He brought maps, and showed that plans had already been authorized to build thousands of apartments in a number of large settlements such as Maaleh Adumim. Why build dozens of tiny settlements all over the West Bank, he asked, and risk additional mistakes such as at Elon Moreh, when the decisions already made were not being fulfilled?
On the opposite side of the discussion were Education Minister Zevulun Hammer, and Ariel Sharon, who were not, however in full agreement with one another. Hammer gave a long speech-like statement full of vague allusions, but eventually seemed to be saying that creating settlements was the most important thing the government could do and decrying that they weren't at the top of the budgetary agenda. He also hinted that security considerations shouldn't be the guiding principle for their creation. Hammer, from the National Religious Party, was the closest speaker in the cabinet to the positions of Gush Emunim, which at the time was the central organization of the settlers (it was disbanded many years ago, but that's a different story).
Sharon's position was the mirror image of Weizman's. Where Weizman spent a chunk of his time reminding everyone of his solid political credentials as a leader of Likud (and its previous iteration Herut), Sharon apologized that he had grown up in the opposite political camp, that of the Socialists. "I come from the camp that built most of the settlements upon which the State of Israel is based", he said; "from the tradition that facts on the ground create reality. Seen from that perspective and as time is running out because of the near advent of the Palestinian autonomy, the most important thing to do right now is to sprinkle as many tiny settlements throughout the West Bank as possible. One they're there, they can later be expanded; but if they're not even there, quite soon it will be impossible to create them in the first place".
Most of the other ministers were somewhere between these two extremes. Some of them complained that the discussion had become far more strategic than they had been told in advance, and hadn't been prepared properly: for such a discussion it was critical to have more data, and see maps of private versus public land on the West Bank.
No general decisions were made.
Tuesday, October 23, 2012
The Attorney, the Minister, and the Insinuations
Continuing our reading of the documents about the High Court of Justice's ruling to disband the settlement of Elon Moreh in 1979 and the government's response:
One of the discussions on the margins of the main event was about how the government lost the case. In a number of the cabinet meetings (we'll talk about them later) Ariel Sharon muttered, and later said outright, that the Attorney General's staff hadn't prepared the case correctly, and they were to blame that the government had lost the case and was now forced to dismantle the settlement.
Each time Sharon said this, Yitzhak Zamir, the Attorney General, objected. Eventually, on January 6th 1980, Zamir sent a letter of protest to Menachem Begin. The allegations, he said, were never true and even had the specifics they were based on been true, there was nothing in them to change the court's decision. Since the minister kept on repeating them, however, he asked the Solicitor General to look into the matter. Zamir attached the result of that investigation to his letter. He also suggested that politicians might wish to be considerate of civil servants doing their jobs.
A few comments come to mind. First, politicians the world over, from all political camps and ideological stripes, sometimes like to propagate sloppy versions of events which subsequently become urban legends. Israeli politicians are as human as any others in this respect. Second, sometimes such fibs can be shot down early in their flight, but most of them can't, and sending a letter documenting the truth is not a particularly effective way of doing the shooting. Third, eventually the archives can reveal what was actually going on, and historians, unlike politicians, journalists and bloggers, can be expected to relate to the facts, not only the myths. (Assuming anyone still cares.)
Finally, on a totally different note: the three legal types involved in this particular exchange - Zamir the Attorney General, Gabriel Bach the Solicitor General, and the young department head in the Ministry of Justice who carried out the actual investigation and reported on her findings, one Dorit Beinish - each eventually ended up as a justice on the Supreme Court. Beinish was even the Chief Justice until she retired earlier this year. Israel is a small place, but not so small that by heaving a single brick you're likely to hit three future Supreme Court justices. Rather, it's a place where sometimes talent concentrates in specific corners, and once there is propelled forward as far as it can go.
Just as in other countries, I expect.
One of the discussions on the margins of the main event was about how the government lost the case. In a number of the cabinet meetings (we'll talk about them later) Ariel Sharon muttered, and later said outright, that the Attorney General's staff hadn't prepared the case correctly, and they were to blame that the government had lost the case and was now forced to dismantle the settlement.
Each time Sharon said this, Yitzhak Zamir, the Attorney General, objected. Eventually, on January 6th 1980, Zamir sent a letter of protest to Menachem Begin. The allegations, he said, were never true and even had the specifics they were based on been true, there was nothing in them to change the court's decision. Since the minister kept on repeating them, however, he asked the Solicitor General to look into the matter. Zamir attached the result of that investigation to his letter. He also suggested that politicians might wish to be considerate of civil servants doing their jobs.
A few comments come to mind. First, politicians the world over, from all political camps and ideological stripes, sometimes like to propagate sloppy versions of events which subsequently become urban legends. Israeli politicians are as human as any others in this respect. Second, sometimes such fibs can be shot down early in their flight, but most of them can't, and sending a letter documenting the truth is not a particularly effective way of doing the shooting. Third, eventually the archives can reveal what was actually going on, and historians, unlike politicians, journalists and bloggers, can be expected to relate to the facts, not only the myths. (Assuming anyone still cares.)
Finally, on a totally different note: the three legal types involved in this particular exchange - Zamir the Attorney General, Gabriel Bach the Solicitor General, and the young department head in the Ministry of Justice who carried out the actual investigation and reported on her findings, one Dorit Beinish - each eventually ended up as a justice on the Supreme Court. Beinish was even the Chief Justice until she retired earlier this year. Israel is a small place, but not so small that by heaving a single brick you're likely to hit three future Supreme Court justices. Rather, it's a place where sometimes talent concentrates in specific corners, and once there is propelled forward as far as it can go.
Just as in other countries, I expect.
Monday, October 22, 2012
The Minister and the Settler, Part II
Yesterday we posted the contents of two letters written by Daniela Weiss, a leader of the settlers, telling Ariel Sharon, then Minister of Agriculture, how very wrong he was to remain in the cabinet which was about to dismantle the settlement of Elon Moreh (November 1979).
This morning one of my colleagues, who was involved in the publication about the governments' response to the court decision against Elon Moreh, told me he recently contacted Ms. Weiss. He asked her if Sharon ever responded to either or both of her letters. (Politicians usually respond to letters from constituents.) She said he never did.
Perhaps not surprising, but an interesting historical tidbit worth being recorded.
This morning one of my colleagues, who was involved in the publication about the governments' response to the court decision against Elon Moreh, told me he recently contacted Ms. Weiss. He asked her if Sharon ever responded to either or both of her letters. (Politicians usually respond to letters from constituents.) She said he never did.
Perhaps not surprising, but an interesting historical tidbit worth being recorded.
The Lawyer and the Prime Minister
Yesterday I wrote about Daniela Weiss and her letters to Ariel Sharon in November 1979, which offered us an interesting glimpse into the frame of mind of a leader of the settler movement in its heyday. Today, let's look at the response of the government's top lawyer, to the decision of the High Court of Justice to dismantle the settlement of Elon Moreh (based upon our publication last week on how Israel's government dealt with the court's order).
The Attorney General of the day was Prof. Yitzhak Zamir. On November 23, 1979, as the cabinet was seeking a precise formulation with which to accept the court's order but also to protect the settlement project, Zamir wrote a classified letter to Prime Minster Menachem Begin presenting his legal position. The proposed draft formulation included the statement that "the government will use legal tools to prevent harm to any Jewish settlements anywhere in the Land of Israel and will work to preserve them." Zamir was wary of this statement, for a number of reasons:
A few days later Zamir sent Begin another letter about Elon Moreh, this one not classified (December 26, 1979 - and keep in mind that Israelis don't celebrate Christmas, so it was a perfectly normal work week). On November 18, the cabinet had decided to accept the court's order and dismantle Elon Moreh within "four, or at most six, weeks." As always happens with government timetables, the final date was going to be missed, and Zamir had been asked to go back to the court with a request for a delay. He felt this was a bad idea:
The Attorney General of the day was Prof. Yitzhak Zamir. On November 23, 1979, as the cabinet was seeking a precise formulation with which to accept the court's order but also to protect the settlement project, Zamir wrote a classified letter to Prime Minster Menachem Begin presenting his legal position. The proposed draft formulation included the statement that "the government will use legal tools to prevent harm to any Jewish settlements anywhere in the Land of Israel and will work to preserve them." Zamir was wary of this statement, for a number of reasons:
1. Such a declaration, while essentially being of a political and not a legal nature, has problematic legal implications.
2. One could interpret the statement as an attempt to save Elon Moreh, and that, of course, cannot be done in light of the court's order to dismantle it.
3. The declaration says the government will work to defend any settlements, and this would seem to include future settlements, which do not yet exist. What if such settlements are clearly illegal? Obviously the government can't take upon itself to defend illegal settlements!
4. Further, a government proclamation to defend all settlements has far-reaching implications, including even the interpretation that the government is effectively annexing the territories, or takes upon itself to pass legislation which has not yet been formulated. This may contravene international law, and it may appear to contradict the Camp David Accords [which Israel had recently signed with Egypt]. Furthermore, it's not clear what gain such a proclamation will generate. On the one hand, there may be no need for it [if no further settlements need to be dismantled], and on the other, if circumstances arise which do call for such legal action, those actions may prove ineffective [as the in present case in which the government lost the Elon Moreh case and had accepted the obligation to dismantle it].Based upon all these considerations, Zamir suggested the government not make any such far-reaching and broad proclamation.
A few days later Zamir sent Begin another letter about Elon Moreh, this one not classified (December 26, 1979 - and keep in mind that Israelis don't celebrate Christmas, so it was a perfectly normal work week). On November 18, the cabinet had decided to accept the court's order and dismantle Elon Moreh within "four, or at most six, weeks." As always happens with government timetables, the final date was going to be missed, and Zamir had been asked to go back to the court with a request for a delay. He felt this was a bad idea:
1. The court order dealt specifically with part of the land on which Elon Moreh was built, and those specific plots have already been evacuated. Thus the government has already complied with the direct order of the court, and there's no need to request a delay of execution.For all these reasons, Zamir summarized, the settlers should be evacuated soon and without delay.
2. The court found the entire settlement to be illegal, as it was set up on private land, and the government must desist as soon as possible from being a party to an illegal act.
3. The cabinet assumed, when it made its decision, that the settlers would announce their intention to comply with the evacuation order, and thus it was reasonable to allow them a delay so that they could move in an orderly way. In the meantime, it's not at all clear they're going to move out of their own accord, so the cabinet's assumption may have been wrong [and the justification for the delay, weakened].
4. Should the cabinet now announce its intention to delay the evacuation further, it is to be expected that the owners of the currently occupied plots, who themselves didn't sue, will do so. The government cannot expect to win such a case, and indeed should avoid even getting into the situation of such a case being initiated against it.
Sunday, October 21, 2012
The Settler and the Minister
Last week we published a number of previously classified documents from the early days of the settler project in 1979. We put up an English-language synopsis of the documents, which are all in Hebrew. Over the next few days we'll describe some of them in greater detail for our Hebrew-challenged readers.
The first two documents were written by Daniela Weiss to Ariel Sharon. Weiss was one of the most vocal and well-known of the settlers; Ariel Sharon was in his first ministerial position, Minister of Agriculture, after an illustious and sometimes controversial military career. Where Prime Minister Menachem Begin was openly in favor of settling Jews on the West Bank - which he now insisted be officially called Judea and Samaria - Sharon was the person in charge of making it happen. Most days of the week Weiss and Sharon were partners in a project they were both committed to. On November 22, 1979, however, after the High Court of Justice had decreed that the settlement of Elon Moreh had to be dismantled for having been constructed on land owned by local Arabs--with the government having accepted the ruling and begun preparations to move the setlers elsewhere--Weiss had no patience for the politicians, not even for Ariel Sharon. So she wrote him two irate letters, one short official one, and the other five pages long.
The first, addrssed to "Mr. Ariel Sharon, Minister of Agriculture," called upon him to resign. "Dismantling Elon Moreh will be a surrender to the PLO. We must protect Israel's honor. Everyone knows the last moment to achieve benefits from the Camp David Accords is now, before we hand over the oil fields [in the Western Sinai] to the Egyptians. The PLO and the Egyptians understand that dismantling a settlement is like desecrating Israel's honor, and that must be prevented. Israel's government dare not desecrate Israel's honor. If the government can't change the legal status of the settlements then you must resign and salvage Israel's honor." (underline in the original)
In an 8-sentence letter Weiss referred to Israel's honor no less than four times.
The second letter, addressed simply to "Arik," went into greater detail, and is far more interesting, for all that the themes of both letters are similar. Unlike the first, it has no file number and no Gregorian date. This was Daniela writing to her friend, or at least close aquantance and political accomplice. The first was probably leaked to the press; the second wasn't. It reflected what the writer really thought, and in a tone she expected the recepient to understand and respect. She numbered her points, at least until her emotions took over:
Daniela Weiss is still alive, though it has been some years since anyone turned to her for an opinion. Even the settlers today use different terminology--but that's one of the fun things in archival documentation, that it offers a window into the minds of past actors in earlier historical contexts.
The next post in this series will look at the top lawyer in the story, who saw the world in very different terms.
The first two documents were written by Daniela Weiss to Ariel Sharon. Weiss was one of the most vocal and well-known of the settlers; Ariel Sharon was in his first ministerial position, Minister of Agriculture, after an illustious and sometimes controversial military career. Where Prime Minister Menachem Begin was openly in favor of settling Jews on the West Bank - which he now insisted be officially called Judea and Samaria - Sharon was the person in charge of making it happen. Most days of the week Weiss and Sharon were partners in a project they were both committed to. On November 22, 1979, however, after the High Court of Justice had decreed that the settlement of Elon Moreh had to be dismantled for having been constructed on land owned by local Arabs--with the government having accepted the ruling and begun preparations to move the setlers elsewhere--Weiss had no patience for the politicians, not even for Ariel Sharon. So she wrote him two irate letters, one short official one, and the other five pages long.
The first, addrssed to "Mr. Ariel Sharon, Minister of Agriculture," called upon him to resign. "Dismantling Elon Moreh will be a surrender to the PLO. We must protect Israel's honor. Everyone knows the last moment to achieve benefits from the Camp David Accords is now, before we hand over the oil fields [in the Western Sinai] to the Egyptians. The PLO and the Egyptians understand that dismantling a settlement is like desecrating Israel's honor, and that must be prevented. Israel's government dare not desecrate Israel's honor. If the government can't change the legal status of the settlements then you must resign and salvage Israel's honor." (underline in the original)
In an 8-sentence letter Weiss referred to Israel's honor no less than four times.
The second letter, addressed simply to "Arik," went into greater detail, and is far more interesting, for all that the themes of both letters are similar. Unlike the first, it has no file number and no Gregorian date. This was Daniela writing to her friend, or at least close aquantance and political accomplice. The first was probably leaked to the press; the second wasn't. It reflected what the writer really thought, and in a tone she expected the recepient to understand and respect. She numbered her points, at least until her emotions took over:
1. Dismantling Elon Moreh will be a victory for the PLO. The day the court's decision was published mayors of West Bank towns were interviewed in the media and they all said they expected the decision would cause the dismantling of all the settlements.The term honor, interestingly, appeared only once in the second letter, in its final line.
2. Sadat has a seismograph in his head, and he constantly measures our national strength [she may have meant something closer to national fortitude]. He understands perfectly well that whichever side has the upper hand in this contest of national wills will write an important page in his nation's history. What I don't understand is how you don't understand this. Now, at the last moment before we hand over the Sinai oil wells to Sadat, is the time to snatch a national achievement and legalize the settlements.
3. Following your recommendations, we've been concentrating on capturing strategic points step by step. Yet in the face of the approaching Palestinian autonomy [agreed upon between Israel and Egypt in the peace treaty of 1979] it is doubtful if such an incremental policy has much of a future. The Palestinian autonomy will lead to a Palestinian State, and we won't be able to create any additional settlements.
4. Most important of all: the power of ideas. Jewish history is motivated by ideas. Powerful ideas inculcate physical [or political] power, not the other way around. As we wonder how we'll explain to our children how we left Elon Moreh, it seems to us that the problem was simple: Israel's government lacked the courage to say that Judea and Samaria are part of our homeland and we'll build there just as we build elsewhere in the homeland. Any child will respond that in such a case, the government is bad.
Of course, you'll respond that a child doesn't have the ability to see the full picture, such as for example the fact that a different government would be worse. But this isn't so. If the government is worse we'll have clarity, and we'll struggle against it.
I assume I won't live long enough to see the fulfillment of the settlement project, but I know that since we've done the correct thing in educating our children it will go on until fulfillment. That's why a change of course and its resulting conceptual weakness is so dangerous to the process.
Finally, were the government to act cannily it would extend its law over Judea and Samaria, and thus enable creation of many more settlements. If instead the government decides to confront us, following the dictums of "Peace Now," we will know that our historic task is to resist. We hope the government will come to its senses, but if it doesn't I will take my daughters to Elon Moreh and we'll demonstrate our physical attachment to the land; the strength of our determination will thus be branded into the minds of our children, and they'll spend their lives determined to return to Elon Moreh, and they'll restore Israel's honor.
Daniela Weiss is still alive, though it has been some years since anyone turned to her for an opinion. Even the settlers today use different terminology--but that's one of the fun things in archival documentation, that it offers a window into the minds of past actors in earlier historical contexts.
The next post in this series will look at the top lawyer in the story, who saw the world in very different terms.
Thursday, October 18, 2012
Elon Moreh: Menachem Begin and the Rule of Law
The material in our latest publication on the Elon Moreh verdict comes from one of the Archives' current projects on Menachem Begin, Israel's sixth prime minister – a collection of his letters and papers which we hope to publish in 2013, as a volume in the series of commemorative volumes about Israel's late presidents and prime ministers.
Biographers of Begin have noted that a main element in his worldview was the belief that the entire biblical Land of Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people, and they are entitled to settle in any part of it by right. He saw no contradiction between this belief and another strand of his ideology – his devotion to democracy and the rule of law. The Israel State Archives published several documents on this subject on our website in March 2012, to mark the 20th anniversary of Begin's death.
In the photograph below you can see Begin and Minister of Finance Simha Erlich with the Attorney-General, Prof. Yitzhak Zamir. Under Begin, the Attorney-General sat in on most government meetings.
Begin's response to the Elon Moreh verdict is another striking example of his devotion to democracy and the rule of law. Many supporters of the settlement movement believed that the High Court decision ordering the evacuation of Elon Moreh should not be carried out. But although Begin must have been disappointed with the verdict, which contradicted the court's earlier decision on the Beit El settlement (which had caused him to exclaim "There are judges in Jerusalem!") there was no doubt in his mind that the decision had to be respected. In the first government meeting on the issue, on October 28 1979, he said: "Naturally we shall not make any announcements, which are completely unnecessary, saying that the Supreme Court's decision should be respected. They are unnecessary, because this goes without saying."
At the same time, he was anxious to find another site for the settlement on government land, which would be approved by the legal authorities. Eventually the Elon Moreh settlement group moved to its new site at Mt. Kabir.
Biographers of Begin have noted that a main element in his worldview was the belief that the entire biblical Land of Israel is the homeland of the Jewish people, and they are entitled to settle in any part of it by right. He saw no contradiction between this belief and another strand of his ideology – his devotion to democracy and the rule of law. The Israel State Archives published several documents on this subject on our website in March 2012, to mark the 20th anniversary of Begin's death.
In the photograph below you can see Begin and Minister of Finance Simha Erlich with the Attorney-General, Prof. Yitzhak Zamir. Under Begin, the Attorney-General sat in on most government meetings.
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| Photograph: Chananiah Herman, Government Press Office |
At the same time, he was anxious to find another site for the settlement on government land, which would be approved by the legal authorities. Eventually the Elon Moreh settlement group moved to its new site at Mt. Kabir.
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| The new settlement, 10 January 1980 Photograph: Chananiah Herman, Government Press Office |
Tuesday, October 16, 2012
Dismantling the Settlement of Elon Moreh
Offhand I'd say at least half a billion people have an opinion on the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Thousands, at the very least, are convinced they know the story, can tell how the settlements came to be there, and who did what and why.
As usual in such matters, what "everybody knows" is based on all sorts of things, but it's not based on familiarity with the documentary evidence, since most of that has never been made public.
So today we published seven documents, most of them newly declassified, from the period 33 years ago before and after the Supreme Court ordered Menachem Begin's government to dismantle the settlement of Elon Moreh. The documents themselves, all in Hebrew, can be found here. Over the next week or so I'll try to write about some of the specifics, which, frankly, I find to be fascinating.
As usual in such matters, what "everybody knows" is based on all sorts of things, but it's not based on familiarity with the documentary evidence, since most of that has never been made public.
So today we published seven documents, most of them newly declassified, from the period 33 years ago before and after the Supreme Court ordered Menachem Begin's government to dismantle the settlement of Elon Moreh. The documents themselves, all in Hebrew, can be found here. Over the next week or so I'll try to write about some of the specifics, which, frankly, I find to be fascinating.
Initiating a Large Settlement
How much does the public know about the history of the settlement project? Precious little, actually, in spite of the endless talk about it in the media and in political and diplomatic discourse. (Google "West Bank Settlements" and you get more than 9,000,000 results.) Just about none of this verbiage, however, is based upon the documentary records created by the officials who did the job; we can say this since we're the ones doing the declassification, and we haven't declassified much of the relevant stuff yet. Not as a pattern of concealment, either, simply a matter of declassification priorities.
Recently, we went looking for the origin of the E-1 moniker, and came up with this post. Today we'd like to share a few earlier documents from the same file (גל-15482/11).
The first document (pp. 7-8) is a memorandum sent on Dec. 1, 1980 by Z. Barkai, the head of the Programs Division in the Ministry of Construction and Housing, to A. Tayar, head of the Jerusalem region in the ministry. Barkai summarizes recent discussions at the top civil-servant level of the ministry - which Tayar probably also participated in - about strategic planning for the Jerusalem region:
Recently, we went looking for the origin of the E-1 moniker, and came up with this post. Today we'd like to share a few earlier documents from the same file (גל-15482/11).
The first document (pp. 7-8) is a memorandum sent on Dec. 1, 1980 by Z. Barkai, the head of the Programs Division in the Ministry of Construction and Housing, to A. Tayar, head of the Jerusalem region in the ministry. Barkai summarizes recent discussions at the top civil-servant level of the ministry - which Tayar probably also participated in - about strategic planning for the Jerusalem region:
1. By early 1983, the ministry will have exhausted its current construction capacity in Gilo, Ramot, and East Talpiot (all in what's called East Jerusalem).We'll talk about the next stage in this process tomorrow...
2. Manchat and Givat Masua (West Jerusalem) are being planned, and will enable about two years of construction.
3. South Neveh Yaacov is in planning. We forsee construction there for about 5-6 years after 1982. (Presumably this means what is now called Pisgat Zeev.)
4. Giv'on is being planned. Should be available for construction in 1982.
5. In Maaleh Adumim, we forsee construction of 1,000 housing units annually for the next 5-6 years.
Goals:
1. Accommodating the master plan for Jerusalem calls for 5,000 new units annually, of which 3-3,500 need to be built by the ministry.
2. Ministry construction must bolster the stature of Jerusalem (as an Israeli city, he implies).
Conclusions from the above:
1. Priority should go to construction which promotes the political goals. Ergo, Masua and Manachat (in West Jerusalem) are less important than elsewhere.
2. Giv'on needs to be promoted.
3. Since the current options will be exhausted before the end of the decade, we must identify new ones now.
4. A planning group is to be set up to find large-scale construction potential north of Jerusalem, which will operate along the following guidelines:
a. Easy daily commuting.
b. At least 2,000 units, so as to justify development of local services.
c. State-owned land will be preferred where possible.
d. Reasonable development costs.
e. Easy access to Jerusalem but also Ramle-Lod in the west or Maaleh Adumim in the east.
Scope: Assuming an east-west line through the center of Jerusalem and looking north, the area is to be identified between 09:00-15:00, up to a radius of 12-15 km.
A steering committee will be set up with myself as chair and yourself as director. The General Manager will send out a letter of accreditation. This document will serve as the launching document.
Tuesday, October 23, 2012
The Attorney, the Minister, and the Insinuations
Continuing our reading of the documents about the High Court of Justice's ruling to disband the settlement of Elon Moreh in 1979 and the government's response:
One of the discussions on the margins of the main event was about how the government lost the case. In a number of the cabinet meetings (we'll talk about them later) Ariel Sharon muttered, and later said outright, that the Attorney General's staff hadn't prepared the case correctly, and they were to blame that the government had lost the case and was now forced to dismantle the settlement.
Each time Sharon said this, Yitzhak Zamir, the Attorney General, objected. Eventually, on January 6th 1980, Zamir sent a letter of protest to Menachem Begin. The allegations, he said, were never true and even had the specifics they were based on been true, there was nothing in them to change the court's decision. Since the minister kept on repeating them, however, he asked the Solicitor General to look into the matter. Zamir attached the result of that investigation to his letter. He also suggested that politicians might wish to be considerate of civil servants doing their jobs.
A few comments come to mind. First, politicians the world over, from all political camps and ideological stripes, sometimes like to propagate sloppy versions of events which subsequently become urban legends. Israeli politicians are as human as any others in this respect. Second, sometimes such fibs can be shot down early in their flight, but most of them can't, and sending a letter documenting the truth is not a particularly effective way of doing the shooting. Third, eventually the archives can reveal what was actually going on, and historians, unlike politicians, journalists and bloggers, can be expected to relate to the facts, not only the myths. (Assuming anyone still cares.)
Finally, on a totally different note: the three legal types involved in this particular exchange - Zamir the Attorney General, Gabriel Bach the Solicitor General, and the young department head in the Ministry of Justice who carried out the actual investigation and reported on her findings, one Dorit Beinish - each eventually ended up as a justice on the Supreme Court. Beinish was even the Chief Justice until she retired earlier this year. Israel is a small place, but not so small that by heaving a single brick you're likely to hit three future Supreme Court justices. Rather, it's a place where sometimes talent concentrates in specific corners, and once there is propelled forward as far as it can go.
Just as in other countries, I expect.
One of the discussions on the margins of the main event was about how the government lost the case. In a number of the cabinet meetings (we'll talk about them later) Ariel Sharon muttered, and later said outright, that the Attorney General's staff hadn't prepared the case correctly, and they were to blame that the government had lost the case and was now forced to dismantle the settlement.
Each time Sharon said this, Yitzhak Zamir, the Attorney General, objected. Eventually, on January 6th 1980, Zamir sent a letter of protest to Menachem Begin. The allegations, he said, were never true and even had the specifics they were based on been true, there was nothing in them to change the court's decision. Since the minister kept on repeating them, however, he asked the Solicitor General to look into the matter. Zamir attached the result of that investigation to his letter. He also suggested that politicians might wish to be considerate of civil servants doing their jobs.
A few comments come to mind. First, politicians the world over, from all political camps and ideological stripes, sometimes like to propagate sloppy versions of events which subsequently become urban legends. Israeli politicians are as human as any others in this respect. Second, sometimes such fibs can be shot down early in their flight, but most of them can't, and sending a letter documenting the truth is not a particularly effective way of doing the shooting. Third, eventually the archives can reveal what was actually going on, and historians, unlike politicians, journalists and bloggers, can be expected to relate to the facts, not only the myths. (Assuming anyone still cares.)
Finally, on a totally different note: the three legal types involved in this particular exchange - Zamir the Attorney General, Gabriel Bach the Solicitor General, and the young department head in the Ministry of Justice who carried out the actual investigation and reported on her findings, one Dorit Beinish - each eventually ended up as a justice on the Supreme Court. Beinish was even the Chief Justice until she retired earlier this year. Israel is a small place, but not so small that by heaving a single brick you're likely to hit three future Supreme Court justices. Rather, it's a place where sometimes talent concentrates in specific corners, and once there is propelled forward as far as it can go.
Just as in other countries, I expect.
Tuesday, July 31, 2012
Basic Law: Jerusalem, 1980
We've been declassifying documents about Jerusalem in 1967. Yesterday, July 30th, was the anniversary of the 1980 Basic Law: Jerusalem.
Israel has no constitution - an interesting story for another day. What it does have, however, are a series of Basic Laws, which are intended cummulatively to make up a constitution, eventually. As the previous documents in this series have shown, at the time of the secret discussions in 1967, Menachem Begin's position was often decisive on the question of Jerusalem: where all his ministerial colleagues agreed that unified Jerusalem must be under Israeli sovereignty and must be the capital, Begin stood out in his insistance this should be declared openly and clearly. At the time, his position was not always accepted. Perhaps it's not a coincidence, then, that when he was prime minister and at the head of a coalition grounded by his party, he took the most declarative step possible, and enacted a Basic Law whereby: united Jerusalem is Israel's capital and is the seat of government; the religious freedom of the various denominations and their access to their holy sites will be preserved; and the government of Israel will take steps to ensure the development of the city.
Neither the legal status of the city nor the reality on the ground seem to have been changed by the enactment of this law, since previous laws had already achieved the same goals with lesser fanfare. In response to the legislation, the UN Security Council on August 20th 1980 passed resolution 476, which directly censured and rejected Israel's law. The resolution passed by 14 votes, with the United States abstaining. Where the Israeli law had been entirely declarative, the UNSC resolution had one practical implication. It called upon the few countries which still maintained embassies in Jerusalem to remove them, and most did. (The last two, Costa Rica and El Salvador, were removed in 2006).
In 2001 the Basic Law: Jerusalem was modified and paragraphs 5-7 were added. These determined the specific line defining Jerusalem; that no section of Jerusalem could be transfered to any foreign power; and that this law itself could be changed only by enacting a contravening Basic Law by a full majority of members of Knesset (and not be a simple majority of MKs who might be in the Chamber at the moment of enactment). These additions, obviously, were the result of the Oslo Process and its failure, and were intended to ensure that any future change to the status of Jerusalem or any part of it be the purposeful decision of a solid majority of legislators, not a decision by the government.
The city line cited in the 2001 addition to the law is the line defined back on June 28th 1967.
Israel has no constitution - an interesting story for another day. What it does have, however, are a series of Basic Laws, which are intended cummulatively to make up a constitution, eventually. As the previous documents in this series have shown, at the time of the secret discussions in 1967, Menachem Begin's position was often decisive on the question of Jerusalem: where all his ministerial colleagues agreed that unified Jerusalem must be under Israeli sovereignty and must be the capital, Begin stood out in his insistance this should be declared openly and clearly. At the time, his position was not always accepted. Perhaps it's not a coincidence, then, that when he was prime minister and at the head of a coalition grounded by his party, he took the most declarative step possible, and enacted a Basic Law whereby: united Jerusalem is Israel's capital and is the seat of government; the religious freedom of the various denominations and their access to their holy sites will be preserved; and the government of Israel will take steps to ensure the development of the city.
Neither the legal status of the city nor the reality on the ground seem to have been changed by the enactment of this law, since previous laws had already achieved the same goals with lesser fanfare. In response to the legislation, the UN Security Council on August 20th 1980 passed resolution 476, which directly censured and rejected Israel's law. The resolution passed by 14 votes, with the United States abstaining. Where the Israeli law had been entirely declarative, the UNSC resolution had one practical implication. It called upon the few countries which still maintained embassies in Jerusalem to remove them, and most did. (The last two, Costa Rica and El Salvador, were removed in 2006).
In 2001 the Basic Law: Jerusalem was modified and paragraphs 5-7 were added. These determined the specific line defining Jerusalem; that no section of Jerusalem could be transfered to any foreign power; and that this law itself could be changed only by enacting a contravening Basic Law by a full majority of members of Knesset (and not be a simple majority of MKs who might be in the Chamber at the moment of enactment). These additions, obviously, were the result of the Oslo Process and its failure, and were intended to ensure that any future change to the status of Jerusalem or any part of it be the purposeful decision of a solid majority of legislators, not a decision by the government.
The city line cited in the 2001 addition to the law is the line defined back on June 28th 1967.
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