Golda Meir's Political and Personal Struggle After the Yom Kippur War

Golda Meir's Political and Personal Struggle After the Yom Kippur War

Many of the posts appearing here are about Golda Meir, Israel's fourth prime minister and the only woman (so far) to head the government. This material comes from a collection of Golda's speeches and letters which will soon be published in a  commemorative volume in the series on Israel's late prime ministers and presidents.  The book will shed new light on her role as prime minister and especially on her leadership during the Yom Kippur war of October 1973. 



Cover of a book by journalists published after the war

During the war Golda was acutely conscious of the danger that Israel's military reverses would harm its international standing and its fate in the political struggle which would follow. The prime minister, who was already 75 years old, reacted emotionally to the death of thousands of soldiers.  According to her memoirs she felt guilty that she had not overruled her advisers and insisted on calling up the reserves before war broke out. She wanted to resign, but felt she could not evade her responsibilities, especially the need to discover the fate of the soldiers missing in action and to ensure the return of those held prisoner in Egypt and Syria. 

And she could not abandon the political struggle. On March 4 1974, after a stormy party meeting led her to threaten resignation, Foreign Minister Abba Eban wrote to her in typically convoluted style: 

" I understand the depth of the feelings which exploded in you yesterday afternoon, and I have no argument against them. On the other hand I am constantly aware of the international aspects of the problem. The implications are serious and all agree that the events of yesterday indicate a weakening of our position, and especially a weakening of the opportunities which have opened up recently …. which I fear  that the public does not sufficiently appreciate. It seems to me that you deserve – and all of Israel deserves – that your central responsibility in advancing the chances for peace be exerted "

(translated from the Hebrew).

We have already written here about the disengagement of forces agreements signed during the last months of Golda's government, which were indeed the first stage in the process  leading to peace with Egypt.  This month we mark the anniversary of the return of the POWS following the agreement with Syria on 31 May 1974.  
 After the interim report of the Agranat committee left the political leadership untouched, the public demand for the resignation of Defence Minister Moshe Dayan became unbearable. On April 10 1974 Golda resigned, and Dayan had to follow suit. However Golda continued to head a caretaker government until her successor Yitzhak Rabin had formed a new coalition. Meanwhile US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger helped to negotiate Israeli withdrawal from the part of Syria it had captured in October 1973 and from the deserted Syrian town of Kuneitra, which has figured in the fighting in Syria in recent months.  Golda was afraid that any withdrawal beyond the "purple line" of 6 October 1973 would set a dangerous precedent and she had great sympathy for the opposition led by settlers from the Golan kibbutzim whose lands bordered on Kuneitra.

Following the war and the rise in oil prices, Israel's economic situation was desperate. As well as the return of the POWs and ending a war of attrition with Syria, the most important factor in Golda's decision to agree to withdrawal was the need for US military support and economic assistance. On Dayan's initiative, she proposed a long term commitment by the US to accompany the agreement, ensuring military aid, and a written promise by the president not to demand that Israel to come down from the Golan Heights. On 12 May Golda wrote to Kissingergiving details of Israel's demands. The assurance on the Golan included on a draft of 10 May was left out. She added:

“Mr. Secretary, if I dare put before you, and through you to the President, requests of such dimension, it is because I know that in undertaking the current actions we are assuming grave national risks. We do so because of our firm conviction that these steps are an imperative of the joint course of policy which we both hope will advance the course of peace." 

 President Nixon, already deeply embroiled in the Watergate affair which led to his resignation, was reluctant to give an assurance on the Golan. It was not included in the letters which accompanied the agreement. When Nixon visited Israel in June 1974, Kissinger promised that he would sign the letter on the plane. He didn't. It was finally signed by his successor Gerald Ford in September 1975. But that's a story for another post……

Wounded  Syrian POWs are returned home, 1 June 1974
Photograph: Government Press Office

Monday, October 6, 2014

From Low Probability to the Yom Kippur War: Telegrams from Golda's Bureau to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, 5-7 October 1973

On 12 October 1973 Prime Minister Golda Meir said during a discussion in her bureau: "I say this with full awareness of its significance – we never faced so grave a danger in 1948". Her words show the difference between the Yom Kippur War and Israel's previous wars, which is still felt today. Even 41 years later, the war still arouses public interest and controversy in Israel.

Today, on the 41^st anniversary of its outbreak on 6 October 1973, the Israel State Archives publishes a selection of 14 telegrams exchanged between Golda's bureau in Tel Aviv and the Israeli embassy in Washington between 5–7 October. Some of them were declassified especially for this publication, and they focus on the central diplomatic aspect of the war – the contacts between the Israeli government and the US Administration, especially with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. This story has been told many times from the American point of view: for the first time the ISA is revealing the Israeli side in order to help to complete the puzzle. Two of the telegrams are in English, and the rest are in in Hebrew. They can be seen on theHebrew version of this post.

The publication is accompanied by summaries of the minutes of the consultations of the war cabinet on 6-7 October published by the ISA in 2010. The telegrams and the minutes show the reversals of fortune suffered by the Israeli leadership during these fateful days – from attempts to prevent the outbreak of war on 5 October, to confidence on the first day of the fighting that the war would soon end with a decisive victory by Israel, followed by the catastrophe of the second day, when the leadership found itself at war for the heartland of Israel.

 Golda Meir and Simcha Dinitz on a visit to the US before the war.
Photograph: GPO

5 October – "Low Probability"

On Friday, 5 October, the Yom Kippur fast, the holiest day of the year, when Israel generally comes to a standstill, was about to begin. However, during the preceding few days, intelligence reports were piling up about a high alert in the Syrian and Egyptian armies and massive deployment of their forces on Israel's borders. Nevertheless, IDF Military Intelligence maintained its assessment that there was a "low probability' of the outbreak of war. During the night, disquieting reports had arrived of a major evacuation of the families of the Soviet advisors in Egypt and Syria, with the help of a fleet of planes sent by the USSR to Damascus and Cairo. In view of the reports, a general alert of the highest order was declared in the regular forces of the IDF, but still without calling up the reserves. Meanwhile the head of Israel's overseas intelligence agency, Mossad, Zvi Zamir, had been called to London for an urgent meeting with Egyptian agent Ashraf Marwan.

In the consultations held that day in the prime minister's bureau in Tel Aviv, the head of Military Intelligence, Eli Zeira, continued to claim that the probability of war was low. However the participants, including Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff David Elazar and Zeira himself were less convinced about their assessment. They had begun to think that an outbreak of hostilities was possible: perhaps there would be a war and perhaps it would even start on Yom Kippur. However they were confident in the ability of the IDF regular forces in their current dispositions to deal with any threat or military activity which might develop until the reserves could be called up. In the meantime there was no need to call up the reserves.

The director-general of the Prime Minister's Office, Mordechai Gazit, sent a telegram in the evening to Mordechai Shalev, the minister in Washington who was then in charge of the Israeli embassy (Ambassador Simcha Dinitz was in Israel due to a death in the family). In the telegram Gazit sent Shalev the government'sevaluation of the possible reasons for the current tension: either that Egypt and Syria were afraid of an Israeli attack, or one or both of them intended to attack Israel. Kissinger was asked to send a message through diplomatic channels to Egypt, Syria and the USSR that Israel had no intentions of attacking its neighbours. However, if they dared to attack it – Israel would respond with all its strength and determination. In the margins of the telegram it was added that if it turned out that there was a reasonable possibility of the Arabs opening fire, then Israel request immediate provision of a number of items of military equipment (See Telegram No. VL/760).  

Shalev replied that he had informed General Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger's assistant at the National Security Council, about the telegram and its contents and Scowcroft promised to relay it immediately to Kissinger, who was in New York. Scowcroft added that American intelligence agreed with the estimate that the deployment of the Egyptian and Syrian armies was defensive, but he found it difficult to understand the  meaning of the landings of Soviet planes in Cairo and Damascus. It was decided to keep the communications channels open even during Yom Kippur (See Telegram No. VL/952)

 October 6 – This Evening the War Will Start

On the morning of 6 October 1973, at 03:50 a.m on Yom Kippur, the ringing of the telephone woke Prime Minister Golda Meir, after sleep had eluded her for most of the night. On the line was her military secretary, Israel Lior, who told her a message had arrived from Zamir, saying he had heard from Ashraf Marwan that Egypt and Syria were about to launch a combined attack on Israel that evening. A few hours later a telegram arrived with the full report from Zamir, with detailed information on the Egyptian plan which, according to the source, had a 99% chance of being carried out (Marwan left a 1% chance for the possibility that Sadat would change his mind at the last minute).

A short time later, Golda was already making her way to her bureau through the empty Tel Aviv streets, with only a small number of people on their way to synagogue. At 07:30 she arrived at her bureau and received from Lior the details of Zamir's full report. Now that the die was cast, Golda took action on several levels, including vigorous diplomatic efforts to persuade the US to accept Israel's evaluations and positions and perhaps to avoid war; if not, to rush vital arms supplies to Israel. On her instructions, a telegram was sent to the embassy in Washington and to Foreign Minister Eban, who was at the UN General Assembly in New York, with details of the news and an instruction to keep policy-makers in the US informed on what was happening (See: Telegram No. TA-14).

At 08:05 a consultation was convened between the prime minister and Dayan, Elazar and Zeira, with Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and minister Yisrael Galili who had been brought urgently from their homes in Kibbutz Na'an and Kibbutz Ginossar respectively. The meeting focused on the extent of mobilization of the reserves, on which Dayan and Elazar disagreed. COGS Elazar supported extensive mobilization of the fighting forces, while the minister of defence said that partial mobilization of two divisions and the Air Force was sufficient at this stage. The second issue discussed was the possibility of a preemptive military strike. The COGS presented the advantages of this step, which would destroy the Syrian air force, hit the anti-aircraft missiles and give the Israeli air force freedom of action during the fighting. Dayan was opposed for political reasons. The prime minister, an elderly woman with no military experience, was forced to decide between them On mobilization, Golda decided in favour of the COGS because 'if there really is a war, we need to be in the best position possible'. With regard to a strike, like Dayan, she presented the political difficulties involved, and postponed the decision till later. In fact she had decided against it. She assumed that Israel would need significant American diplomatic support and military aid in the coming days, and was guided by advice given by Secretary Kissinger to the previous Israeli ambassador in Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, and to Simcha Dinitz – never to put Israel in a position where it would be accused of having started a war, and would find it difficult to get political and military aid from the US (For the minutes of the consultation, see the ISA publication).

Henry Kissinger and Yigal Allon, on one of Kissinger's visits to Israel

At 10:15 Golda Meir met with the American ambassador in Israel, Kenneth Keating, and updated him on the situation. In reply to a direct question, Golda promised that Israel would not initiate a pre-emptive strike, "although it would make the situation much easier for us"; but Egypt and Syria should be aware that Israel knew of their plans and would repel the attacks and hit back hard. She expressed confidence in Israeli victory, and suggested that the US should still try to talk to the Egyptians and the Soviets in order to prevent the outbreak of war, as reported in a telegram to the embassy in Washington (See: Telegram No. VL762/A).

Later the minister in Washington, Shalev, reported that after receiving the first urgent message from Keating, Kissinger telephoned him and said that he had begun vigorous diplomatic efforts to prevent war. The secretary asked him to inform the prime minister immediately that her message in the telegram of 5 October (See above) had been transmitted to the Soviets, who had even agreed to cooperate, and to the Egyptians, and cautioned Israel against initiating a pre-emptive strike. Some 45 minutes later, Shalev reported that Kissinger had called him again and told him that Keating's full report had arrived, and the message that Israel was not planning a pre-emptive strike had been passed to the Soviets and the Egyptians. "We have hereby undertaken a commitment that you will indeed not initiate any action", said Kissinger (See: Telegrams Nos. LV/954, 955).

At 12:00 an urgent government meeting began, after ministers had been rushed from their homes. During the argument as to how to deal with the Syrians, if only Egypt opened fire, the wail of a siren was heard, and Lior entered and announced that the Syrians had opened fire, and apparently the Egyptians as well. Golda's reaction was: "So they did surprise us, after all… I am angry that they surprised us". She repeated this several times during the coming hours. The siren at 14:00 broke the peace of the holy day and Israel radio came on the air and began to announce the outbreak of fighting and to broadcast call up codes for the mobilization of reservists. At a stroke Israel found itself making frantic preparations for war. People living in the north could hear the noise of battle in the Golan Heights like a continuous roll of thunder. 

The outbreak of fighting was accompanied by vigorous diplomatic activity. The Israeli leaders tried to prevent a meeting of the Security Council and adoption of a ceasefire resolution, before Israel had thrown back the attackers, and to ensure a supply of vital arms from the Americans. "There will be no ceasefire before the situation returns to what it was before", declared the prime minister. In a telegram sent from the prime minister's bureau to the embassy in Washington and the foreign minister in New York on the night of 6 October, they were told under no circumstances to accept proposals to convene the Security Council for a ceasefire resolution: "On both fronts, we intend to fight until we have pushed the last of the Syrian and Egyptian soldiers back over the ceasefire lines", it said. Shalev reported that the Americans were indeed working to prevent a meeting of the Council (See: Telegrams Nos. VL/765, LV/965).

The first reports from the front were optimistic. In discussions at the bureau and at the additional government meeting that met that evening at 22:00, there was a fairly confident feeling that the IDF was in control of the situation, and that it would soon strike a decisive blow at the Arab armies, who would realize what a huge mistake they had made. That evening Defence Minister Dayan spoke on television. He mentioned a number of local victories for the Arab armies, especially the Egyptians, and explained why Israel had not initiated a pre-emptive strike and did not mobilize the reserves until it was certain that a war would break out. He expressed his confidence that "we will be able to smite them [the enemy] hip and thigh" (Judges, 15:8); and concluded with a confident statement: "And I believe that we can say with confidence "G'mar hatima tova [A good conclusion]" (traditional Yom Kippur blessing) (See: Dayan's speech on television). The end of the first day of the war thus found the leadership confident and convinced of the IDF's ability to repel the enemy armies and strike hard at them within a short period of time.

At 01:30 a telegram was sent to the embassy in Washington and to Eban in New York, written by Allon, summing up the first day of fighting for Kissinger. Allon reviewed the situation and passed on Israel's estimate that the Egyptians were planning to transfer major forces to the front, in order to reach deep into the Sinai Desert. The text of the telegram radiated optimism on the IDF's ability to stop the Arab attacks. Allon summed up with the words: "Taking into account the fact that for political reasons which he [Kissinger] is aware of, we did not begin with a preemptive strike, and are concentrating on the containment stage; despite minor successes, especially by the Egyptians, the situation is satisfactory" (See: Telegram No. VL/769).  

7 October – War for Israel's Heartland

The second day, 7 October, was one of the most dramatic days of the Yom Kippur War. It began with optimism on the part of the government. On this basis Israel made every effort to prevent a ceasefire that would perpetuate the existing situation. Golda wrote another telegram, expressing her appreciation to Kissinger for stopping the initiative of Egyptian Foreign Minister Ziyat to call for a special session of the General Assembly. She repeated that it was undesirable to convene the Security Council until the Egyptians had been pushed back to their own side of the border, which she thought would take about three days. She added that Israel was planning to attack strategic targets deep in enemy territory, but promised that there would be no attack on civilian targets (See: Telegram No. VL/770). During the early hours of the morning feverish contacts took place between the Israeli foreign minister and his staff and the US State Department on the issue of convening the Security Council. Eban reported that Kissinger had said in a telephone conversation that the Americans could not oppose this move and were therefore considering doing so themselves, in order to adopt a resolution on a ceasefire and a return to the 6 October lines. They would draw out the discussion as much as possible, so as to enable Israel to act on the military front. In any case, according to Kissinger, the American strategy was dependent on Israel's  agreement (See: Telegram No. NR/46).

However, as time passed it became clear that the optimistic reports were not supported by reality. During the night of 6/7 October and the following morning the military situation. The Egyptian army widened the bridgeheads it had constructed and deployed additional forces across the Suez Canal. During the night many of the outposts that constituted the "Bar-Lev Line" along the Suez Canal were surrounded, and some of them were captured by the Egyptian army. The situation in the north was desperate. In the centre and the south of the Golan Heights, the main Syrian force broke through the IDF's lines and penetrated deep into the Heights, nearly reaching the bridges over the Jordan River leading to northern Israel. They faced only by sparse Israeli forces that were unable to stop them.



School children filling sandbags in Ramat Gan, 7 October 1973
Photograph: Hanania Herman, GPO.

At 07:30 the prime minister crossed the lawn that separated her bureau from the IDF's command headquarters (the 'Hole'), and heard an update from COGS Elazar. "We have had a bad night," said Elazar, and added details about the difficult position on the Golan Heights, while the situation at the Suez Canal "was a little better". This was the first in a series of consultations that day on the serious events at the fronts. At 14:50 the war cabinet was convened for another consultation, revealing the full extent of the deterioration in the military position. It focused on the report presented by Defence Minister Dayan, who had just returned deeply concerned from a tour of the fronts. His words produced an atmosphere of gloom and doom. He described a grim scenario in which the Arabs would not stop their attack. This was not the time to think of counter-attacks but rather of the defence of Israel itself. They "will come to fight us for the land of Israel itself" and therefore "descent from the Golan is not a solution, since they will go on to the Hula valley…..to conquer Israel, to finish off the Jews." The prime minister agreed with Dayan's assessment andsaid: "There is no reason for them not to continue, not only now. They've tasted blood… This is the second round since 1948". (See a summary of the  record of the consultation)

Moshe Dayan at a press conference, 6 October 1973
Photograph: Chanania Herman, GPO 

Despite the bleak picture, the prime minister continued to express optimism in a message to Kissinger, writing that although the fighting was fierce, the military estimate was "that with the entrance of the reserves… a change in our favour is about to take place". She reminded him of her decision to avoid a preemptive strike, which could have greatly improved Israel's position, and urged him to postpone the discussion in the Security Council till the fourth or fifth day, "when we have reason to assume that we will be in an attacking position, instead of a defensive one". An assessment sent with the telegram wrote that Israel hoped to push back the Syrians and the Egyptians over the ceasefire lines by the end of the day and even to cross them in order to improve the situation (See: Telegram No. VL/773). Nevertheless Golda's mood was grim and she even feared for Israel's survival.

At a government meeting held at 21:00 in a sombre atmosphere, the minister of defence presented a report of the IDF's heavy losses, alongside a slightly more encouraging description of the situation on the fronts. Several ministers, such as Allon, began soul searching and drawing conclusions (this meeting was not released for publication).  No operative decisions were reached but the general consensus, as reported in a telegram from Galili to Eban in New York, approved by the prime minister, was that the goals remained the same as before: "A. To drive back the Egyptian army to the other side of the [Suez] Canal; B. To drive back the Syrian army over the ceasefire line on the Golan Heights, C. During those two actions, to inflict severe blows on the two enemy armies" (See: Telegram No. VL/778).

Following the reports on the grave military situation, the Israeli leadership changed its demands for military aid from the US. No more requests for individual items were made, but rather demands for massive aid, especially of fighter planes and tanks, with the prime minister exerting the full weight of her position (See Telegram No. VL/775). During the night, Shalev reported on a meeting between Dinitz, now back in Washington, and Kissinger, in which Dinitz "presented him with [the prime minister's] urgent request for Phantoms (planes)". Dinitz also reiterated Golda's decision not to order a preemptive strike, partly on Kissinger's advice, and claimed that this put the US under a moral obligation to help Israel. Kissinger praised Israel's decision, but said that supplying planes was very difficult. He told Dinitz that he had received a message from Sadat's adviser Hafez Ismail, according to which the Egyptians had no intentions of expanding the bridgeheads they had established, and if Israel would announce its willingness to withdraw to the '67 borders, they would be prepared to open negotiations on this. The secretary of state added that he was only transmitting the information and was not making any recommendation to consider it (See: Telegram No. LV/982). The Egyptians repeated this proposal several times during the coming days.

During the night the atmosphere in the prime minister's bureau began to improve. At 20:50 Lior reported that Deputy COGS Israel Tal was preparing reserves for a counter-attack and that things would return to their previous state or even better. Close to midnight a consultation was held with Yitzhak Rabin, who reported on a visit to the southern front with the COGS. Rabin stated that it was decided to launch a counter-attack against the Egyptian army the following day, which would be carried out gradually: only one of the three divisions there would attack at any one time, because "only these tanks stand between Tel Aviv and the Canal", as he put it. He ended with the statement that despite the difficulties and problems with Israel's forces, "all in all, the situation is satisfactory" (See above).

Commanders consult on the Southern front, among them ex-COGS Yitzhak Rabin, COGS Elazar and head of the Southern command Shmuel Gorodish, 8 October 1973. Photograph: Shlomo Arad, GPO

Sunday, June 9, 2013

Summer 1973: Who, if Anyone, Screwed Up?

Depending upon when you think it began, the Jewish-Arab conflict has been going on for about a century. Some might put its beginning earlier than that, but it's hard to see how its starting point can be later than 1920, or 93 years ago. Depending upon how you read history, this longevity can be the result of numerous fumbles and mistakes, or of hard-hearted obstinacy, or of implacable enmity. These readings, then, may inform your expectations for the future: a resolute determination not to miss any more opportunities, a campaign against narrow-mindedness, or the resolve to be patient until the other side tires, no matter how long that takes.

Our publication today won't resolve any of this, as it can be understood through any of these prisms. Still, since much of it is based on previously unseen documents, at least it has new facts to offer, even if the various interpretations may well be impervious to novelty.

The publication is about a secret attempt by Golda Meir to start negotiations with Egypt's Anwar Sadat in the summer of 1973, a few months before the beginning of the Yom Kippur War. In addition to our publication of mostly ISA documents, Dr. Haggai Tsoref of the ISA and Prof. Michael Wolfsohn of the Military Academy in Munich have published a joint article on the German side of the story. In brief, Golda, who was skeptical about the ability or likelihood of internationally sponsored peace programs, gambled that Germany's Willy Brandt would be a better bet to create a secret channel for talks with the Egyptians. She seems to have felt that Brandt, as a fellow social-democrat, a world-class diplomat and peacemaker, and Nobel laureate for his Ostpolitik policy of mending fences with the soviet block, would be well positioned and willing to take on the task. If we're reading the documents from her office correctly, she was so intent upon enlisting Brandt that she did as much as she could to defend him from public ire in Israel after the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympics, and even after Germany freed the three surviving terrorists in October 1972.

Brandt visited Israel between June 7-11, 1973, 40 years ago this week. The single most important document of the visit is the summary of the second, secret meeting between Meir and Brandt on June 9, at which Golda requested that Brandt talk to Sadat and tell him that Israel sincerely wishes for peace, will not insist on retaining control of Sinai or half of Sinai, and that if it's easier for him (Sadat), they can begin their negotiations in secret.

At the end of the visit and for a few weeks thereafter, it seemed that a top-secret channel of communication had been set up between Meir and Brandt. Then a mid-level German diplomat went to Egypt and talked to Hafez Ismail, Sadat's top aide. Ismail rejected the offer, and a few months later Egypt and Syria attacked Israel.

So far the story of the documents. The German-language article accompanying our publication looks mostly at the German sources, and claims that the failure was Brandt's. He hadn't believed in the Israelis' sincerity to begin with, but even once he was convinced, during his visit, he didn't use his full moral and diplomatic weight to try and bring the two sides together. Since the classified German documents of the time are not open, we don't know if there's anything in them that would refute this. The Egyptian documents are of course not open, so we can't say why Ismail was so adamant that the Israeli offer was irrelevant. And of course, there's the niggling question about Israel's position; if it was so determined to reach negotiations with Egypt, why put too many eggs in one covert basket? Yes, publicly calling for negotiations with Egypt might - or might not - have frightened them away because of adverse public opinion in the Arab world, but what about other secret channels?

The documents leave us with these and other unresolved historical questions. At the same time, they cast some doubt on the generally accepted narrative of Israeli intransigence, Egyptian eagerness to negotiate, and European eagerness to mediate.

Willy Brandt and Israel's Secret Approach to Egypt, June-July 1973

Today the Archives published a collection of documents to mark the 40th anniversary of the visit of Wiily Brandt, chancellor of West Germany, to Israel in June 1973. Brandt was known as an anti-Nazi and was famous for his gesture in 1970, when he knelt in silent apology before the memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. Israel's Labour government saw him as a Socialist comrade, and as was the custom in those days, he was taken on the obligatory trip to Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon's kibbutz, Ginossar, and even went fishing on Lake Kinneret.

The visit was an important chapter in Israel's relations with Germany. Here we'll focus on another aspect, mentioned in our post on Thursday. Only three months before the Yom Kippur war, Israel's Prime Minister Golda Meir was eager to use Brandt's good offices to contact the Egyptians and to propose secret talks on a peace settlement and withdrawal from part of Sinai.

Willy Brandt and US President Richard Nixon (Wikipedia)

Even today, Golda has become a symbol of Israel's refusal to negotiate with the Arabs and of its inflexible demands for direct negotiations and a full peace treaty. This was the official policy, but documents in the ISA and in US archives show that from 1971 on, after Sadat's rise to power, there were repeated efforts at advancing an agreement with Egypt based on Israeli withdrawal from part of Sinai. You can see one of these documents, a letter Golda wrote to Brandt in November 1971, in the publication. In this letter, Golda regrets that Sadat has refused to discuss withdrawal from the Suez Canal unless Israel commits itself in advance to return to the 1967 borders. On the other hand, in March 1973 she asked the Americans to postpone their initiative for a settlement with Egypt until after the Knesset elections scheduled for the autumn.

Did she really want a partial settlement? Did Sadat? Could the war have been prevented? Among historians there is much controversy on these questions. The war was so traumatic for Israel that emotions still run high, even 40 years later. Some blame the US Administration for the failure to push an agreement, others still think that Golda's government was responsible. Next week, Dr. Hagai Tsoref of the ISA, editor of a forthcoming collection of documents to commemorate Golda Meir, will present his views at a one-day conference at Haifa University.

Cover of a book about the failure of the government in the Yom Kippur war (Wikipedia)

What became of Brandt's involvement? Apparently his agreement to help was half-hearted: he sent a middle ranking diplomat to talk to Hafiz Ismail, Sadat's adviser who had already held inconclusive talks with the Americans in February and May 1973. After these talks and the Brezhnev-Nixon summit in June, which made it clear that the Great Powers did not intend to act on a Mid East settlement, it seems that Sadat had decided that only war would break the stalemate. The German initiative was a case of "too little, too late."

Tuesday, February 5, 2013

Knesset Members Get a Classified Report During the Yom Kippur War

The 19th Knesset will be sworn in today. (The Knesset website should be updated later today to reflect the change.) Something like 50 of its 120 members are new at their job, while a similar number just lost theirs, most of them unwillingly. Since some people invest tremendous efforts in becoming MKs, it's worth asking if it's an important job; the answer is that sometimes it certainly can be, but not always--a point the newbies and the veterans might wish to keep in mind, if only to ensure more significance and less insignificance.

Today's document demonstrates that sometimes the insignificance can pop up even where it's not expected. The document is a section of the stenogram of the discussion in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee from October 8, 1973.

Of the twelve permanent Knesset committees, the Foreign Affairs and Defense is easily the second most prestigious - the most powerful, of course, being the Finance Committee, which is the one that prepares the budget for legislation. Nothing can be more powerful in government than handing out the money. Still, having parliamentary oversight over both foreign affairs and defense in a conflict-ridden country like Israel is important. Opposition parties generally send their top-tier MKs to the FA&D; coalition parties send the top MKs who aren't otherwise occupied by being government ministers. (Note to our American readers: in Israel, being a parliamentary democracy, there's significant overlap between the legislators and the ministers).

So it was October 8, 1973, the third day of the Yom Kippur War, and the FA&D was convened for its daily report on the war. The first few pages of the stenogram deal with a technical matter: the Ministry of Defense had published an emergency decree to requisition heavy transportation vehicles, and it needed the Knesset (represented by this committee) to authorize it. There was never any doubt that the committee would comply, but before doing so the members had all sorts of questions to the MoD's attorney. How will payment be made to the owners? (A: according to the law.) Is it arbitrary? Are trucks flagged down and requisitioned? (A: the owners know if their vehicles are registered for emergency requisitioning, and the practice is that they're called in individually.) Why was the order signed on the 10th of Tishrei? That's Yom Kippur? Perhaps we should post-date the order? (A: The 10th of Tishrei was the day the war started. Fact.)

Having finished the technical stuff, the committee turned to hearing a report on the military situation. A careful reading, however, shows that this, too, may have been more ceremonial than true parliamentary oversight. First, because of the official doing the reporting. Major General Aharon Yariv had until the previous year been the head of Military Intelligence, an important and well-informed job; but he had retired in 1972, and had only been called up as a special advisor to the Chief of Staff on October 6th. Which means the army was sending a reservist to report to the Knesset because all the people with real jobs were busy (if not overwhelmed) with running the war. The best indication, however, is the content of the exchanges between Yariv and the MKs, who came armed with things they had heard on the media, or simple rumours, and wanted them verified. See page 5, for example:

Yariv: So that's the situation on the Golan. Sadly, I must inform you that the Golani brigade failed to re-take the position on Mont Hermon.
Menachem Begin: The report about the crumbling of the Syrian line was not accurate?
Yariv: I don't think so.
Benjamin Halevy: "They've begun retreating": true? "We're chasing them"?
Yariv: Technically true, in that there were Syrian forces who retreated, and some of ours followed them. But let's not imagine a collapsing Syrian army with the IDF racing towards Damascus.
Gideon Hausner: I saw an item in the paper about how the IDF is going to push the Syrians back to the previous line and then stop. My question is what's the basis for this?
Yariv: My question, too.
[...]
Becker: I also hear that the families have been allowed to return to the Golan settlements they were evacuated from?
Yariv. I haven't checked. I imagine it's only the men, and most of them have been mobilised anyway.
Lanadu: I heard a report that the air force has freedom of the skies? What about the Syrian anti-aircraft missiles?
Yariv: Within the range of the Syrian anti-aircraft missiles the IAF's freedom of action is limited.
Landau: I don't understand?
Yariv: Within the range of the Syrian anti-aircraft the ability of our air force to operate is limited.
[...]
Halevi: If the reports on the radio aren't accurate, and essentially are misleading, who's going to fix the false impression?
Yariv: We're not responsible for the radio.
Halevi: They don't get their information from official sources?
Yariv: As I've already explained, the military censor does his best that no operational secrets leak out, that's all. The radio is sovereign. But perhaps I can see what can be done.
Zadok: So it's not a media policy?
Yariv. No.
[...]
Landau: So did we bomb the Damascus airport?
Yariv: No. It's an international airport.
Refael: Did we operate according to plan yesterday?
Yariv. Yes. The plan was to hold the line and bolster it.
Refael: So we attained yesterday's goals?
Yariv: No. We stopped when their reinforcements arrived.
[...]
[Referring to a an IDF position to which there had temporarily been no contact] Landau: What do you mean there was no contact with them?
Yariv: I'm asking you. Maybe you can explain to me. When there's a war on and the lines get cut and the equipment is damaged, there's no contact.
Landau: That looks very simple to you. To me it doesn't look simple.
Zadok: Of the area of the Golan we previously controlled, how much do we now control?
Yariv: I don't know. Because I don't know exactly where our forces are. Perhaps even some of them have crossed the previous line [eastwards, into Syrian territory].

What's the moral of the story? That war is chaotic, perhaps; and that there are times when the army can't really offer clear reports, not even to the legislature; and that at such moments, the oversight of the legislature, which is crucial in a functioning democracy, isn't of much use, and probably can't be expected to be, either.

Golda Meir and Anwar Sadar Exchange Messages, January 1974

"When I made my [political] initiative in 1971, I meant it; when I threatened war, I meant it; when I now talk of permanent peace between us, I mean it." This was the message from President Anwar Sadat given to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger shortly before the signing of the Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Egypt (Sinai I) on January 18, 1974. You can see it on our website in a short publication of 6 documents in English to mark the 40th anniversary of the agreement.

The next day Golda replied that she hoped that their contact through Kissinger would prove to be a turning point in their relations, and repeated Sadat's words: "When I talk of permanent peace between us I mean it." Only three months after the Yom Kippur War, when they had led their countries in a bloody and costly conflict, the two leaders exchanged messages expressing goodwill and the desire for peace between them.

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was the first person to propose a separation of forces in a government meeting on October 27, 1973. The war had just ended, but sporadic firing continued and continued to bring casualties. The smoke still lingered on the battlefields and a grieving Israel was anxious for a ceasefire and a political solution which would allow the IDF to withdraw from its dangerously overextended lines on the western bank of the Suez Canal. Over the coming weeks, the plan underwent a series of changes in talks with the Egyptians at the 101 Kilometer talks and through Secretary Kissinger, until it reached its final form in a shuttle by Kissinger between Cairo and Jerusalem. The signing of the agreement marked a historic change in the relations between Israel and Egypt and the first withdrawal from territories occupied in the Six Day War.

Ten days later Sadat and Golda again exchanged messages on the need to advance a disengagement agreement with Syria. These messages also appear in the publication together with the text of the Sinai I agreement and its secret annexes, and the memorandum of understanding between the US and Israel. We've already talked here about the negotiations with Syria and the opposition to them in Israel. On May 31, the agreement with Syria was signed, the last act of Golda Meir's government following her resignation.

Wednesday, May 1, 2013

Is this the Note that Launched Maaleh Adumim?

In early July 1974 (there's no precise date) Ariel Sharon, a recently elected Member of Knesset in the opposition Likud party, dashed off a note to Yisrael Galili, a minister without portfolio in Yitzhak Rabin's brand-new first government. Galili, it must be noted, though he didn't run any ministry, was one of the most powerful, behind-the-scenes movers in Israeli politics at the time.

Here's the full content of the note, which comes from file number 7458/3-ג:

Yisrael,
A fellow by the name of Eliezer Ben-Arye called me a few minutes ago. He says he's part of a group of 75 families who wish to settle in Maaleh Adumim. [Underlined in the original]. I suggested he call your office. I hope you'll be agree to meet them.
Arik

Tuesday, February 12, 2013

How to Sell Arab Property in East Jerusalem

Following the mild self-rebuke of the previous post about using too many words on this blog while presenting long-winded documents, here's a short post about a very slim file (גל-13922/11, if you insist on its name). It contains all of five brief letters, and yet it underlines an entire field of bureaucratic practice which has never been fully clarified: who decided who owned which property in the territories Israel took control of in 1967. If you think about it for a moment, it's an extremely important issue, and it underlies much of the settlement project. Of course, this particular file shines a light at the issue, it doesn't resolve it.

On April 7, 1971, S. Shapira, a lawyer at the Land Authority, wrote a two-paragraph note to the Attorney General: we're seeing a growing number of Arabs living in other countries who are sending us their representatives so as to sell their East-Jerusalem real estate to Israelis. How are we supposed to deal with such transactions? (p.2)

On April 19, Michal Bodenkin, an assistant to the AG, replied even more tersely: We'll need to deal with each separate case (p.3); she then sent a copy of her letter to the Advisor on Arab Affairs (p.4). Marking turf, apparently.

Why was there an upswing of such transactions? It wouldn't reflect the very large construction projects getting underway in East Jerusalem, as those were administered centrally, while Shapira's query seems to refer to individual transactions. The file offers no explanation; when we find one we'll tell.

The final document in the file is pure turf-wars, but its subject is interesting: Zvi Terlow, the executive director of the Ministry of Justice, announces to lots of important folks in lots of ministries, that all cases of claims by Jews on land plots in the territories must go through his ministry. It was February 1974, and I assume someone was seeing a rise in Jews purchasing land on the West Bank; the Gush Emunim settler movement was to break onto the public scene within weeks.

Monday, January 28, 2013

The Islamic Council and the Israeli Prime Minister

A major theme of this blog so far has been Israel's actions in East Jerusalem after the Six Day War. Today we'd like to look at the subject from a new perspective: the relations with the Islamic Council and with the Mufti of Jerusalem himself, in the early 1970s. Today's file comes from the office of the Adviser on Arab Affairs, which was a unit in the Prime Minister's Office from the early years of the state until the turn of the century when it was abolished. (The abolition reflected the understanding that the affairs of Israel's Arab citizens should be dealt with, like those of all other citizens, in each respective ministry, rather than by a separate one).

File גל-13922/13 was active between 1970-1974. Much of its content are letters from various Arab institutions or groups to the Prime Minister, complaining about Israeli actions or warning of their dire consequences; in one case the file also contains a response. It's interesting to note the authors of the letters - the Islamic Council, the Mufti himself, but also lesser figures such as the mayor of Jenin or the head of the African community in East Jerusalem - all wrote to Israel's Prime Minister and other officials in Arabic. Their working assumption was that the Israelis would not be troubled by this. The one letter of response, by Deputy PM Yigal Allon (pages 7-8), was written in Hebrew, then translated and sent in Arabic. Allon himself actually spoke Arabic, but since the file contains a number of versions of his letter in Hebrew, clearly it was translated by a professional; Allon wouldn't have wanted to offend his interlocutors with his pidgin Arabic.

This blog doesn't have the expertise to say if such a practice is standard in the annals of conflicts.

Much of the correspondence deals with the Arab dissatisfaction with Israeli actions near the Temple Mount (or Haram a-Shariff, depending on whether you're reading the Hebrew or the Arabic), although one of the letters, from August 1972, describes a plan to remove some families from their homes as part of the construction of Hebrew University as "threatening the lives of innocent children" (p. 13).

By way of giving a feel for the tone and content of the letters, here's a rough translation of the last one in the file, from the Mufti Saad Adin El-Alamy to the new PM Yitzchak Rabin on June 4th 1974 (pages 21-26):

Your Honor,

On the event of the appointment of the new government, I wish to bring to your attention the many transgressions against the Muslims, their mosques and courts, in the hope that this government will desist from harming the Muslims, as has been happening in spite of hundreds of letters of protest. Among the transgressions:

1. The El Aksa Mosque has been repeatedly attacked and once was even ignited. The government knows this, but has never informed us about anyone being punished.

2. The key to the Mugrabi Gate [to the Temple Mount]: the army took the key by force, against the will of the Muslims. Such aggression has never happened anywhere in the world, that a key to a holy place is taken from the believers. What is your response to the fact that it has happened at El Aksa, which is holy to 700,000,000 Muslims in the world. Therefore I demand that the key be returned to the Muslims so that they be soothed and allowed to practice freedom of religion.

3. The el-Tankzia School: this school was built in 1328, and includes a mosque. It was active until the Israeli occupation. The Israeli army shut it down and Muslims are not allowed in. We demand it be returned to the Muslims. How is it possible for the Muslims to protect the holiest of their mosques in this land while foreigners hold the key to its gate and the also control a building which looks out upon it.

4. The Abrahamic Mosque (in Hebron): This Muslim mosque is desecrated by Israelis who enter it with their shoes on, have placed Jewish objects in it and pray in it as if it was a Jewish synagogue, and all this in violation of the basic principles of Islam which forbid any use of their mosques for the purpose of other religions or their use for any purpose which is not Muslim prayer; therefore I demand that this mosque be respected exclusively as a mosque, the removal of any non-Muslims, and the forbidding of any use beyond Muslim prayer. I'm enclosing a report about the trespassing in this holy place.

5. Archeology: the archaeological digs south of the Haram [Temple Mount] must be stopped.

6. The government has taken over much Arab property, including Waqf property. It must be returned.

7. The Mosque of the Prophet Samuel. The building is a mosque, yet Jews pray there as if it was a synagogue. This is forbidden by Muslim law.

8. The Shariya Court in Jerusalem. This is the oldest court in the land, and has been active since 1320. In the past it was a central agency of government, and its activities included land registration, relations with foreign citizens and consulates, criminal justice and other matters. Recently its writ has been limited to marital affairs of the Muslim population, but the government doesn't even recognize its authority in that sphere.

Finally, I'd like to point out that the actions of the Israeli occupation authorities ignore the facts that it is:

a. An occupation government which is forbidden from any actions except protecting its own security, while all previous laws and rules must remain in place;

b. The occupying force is forbidden from any intervention in the religious affairs of the occupied populace;

c. It is forbidden, by all international laws, to make any changes to any holy sites;

d. The UN Security Council and UNESCO and human rights commissions have all condemned any Israeli action on conquered Arab land and called for their reversal.

The report about Hebron is attached.

Two comments: First, the terminology of Arab, rather than Palestinian, is in the original. In 1974, the Arabs under Israeli control did not yet regularly refer to themselves as Palestinians. Second, we're presenting the document. We're not arguing with it - but nor are we condoning its content.

Thursday, August 23, 2012

"Madam Prime Minister....Don't Endanger Israel's Security!"

At the beginning of Golda Meir's conversation with Kissinger on a disengagement agreement with Syria, shown here last week, he asked: "What is the policy of the people who are demonstrating? What do they want?" Golda replied "That we shouldn't budge."

Today we present another document on opposition to  withdrawal in the Golan Heights – aletter (in Hebrew) sent to Mrs. Meir on 6 May 1974 by a group of writers, academics and public figures, who had begun a hunger strike outside her residence in Jerusalem. They included Moshe Shamir, a well-known writer originally from the left wing Mapam party, now a supporter of the Greater Land of Israel movement, and Yisrael Eldad , one of the ideologues of the right.  They reminded Golda of her words to a delegation from the Golan settlements, rejecting any withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, including Kuneitra. They added:

Madam Prime Minister, did you honestly mean what you said? Or have you changed your mind? The entire people is following with deep anxiety the signs and reports of erosion in the government's position, in the face of the war of attrition by the murderous Syrians and the false and misleading policy of the American secretary of state – who is tempting us to enter a fatal trap.

At this late hour we call on you, before the fateful decision is taken […]

to stop the deterioration

to prevent the execution of the plan bringing forward the destruction of the state

to prevent the withdrawal from the Golan

Don't give a prize to the aggressors!

Don't give bases to the Syrian artillery!

Don't breach the wall of the settlements!

Don't abandon the Golan!

Don't endanger Israel's security!"

With memories still fresh of Syrian shelling in the Jordan valley before the Six Day War and the Syrian attack on Yom Kippur in October 1973, the demonstrators represented, if in extreme form, genuine public feeling. Taking the risk was not an easy step for Mrs. Meir. On the other hand Kissinger argued that the strategic importance of Kuneitra was minor compared to co-operation with the United States, which had stood by Israel during the war and given it generous economic assistance.  In the end, Israel signed and withdrew from Kuneitra and a small area of the Golan. On 30 May Golda presented the agreement to the Knesset and shortly afterwards the prisoners of war were released.  The fears of the demonstrators were not realized, and Syria was punctilious in keeping the agreement.