A Missed Opportunity for Peace? Begin and Sadat Meet at Ismailia, 25 December 1977
This week, when the Christian world celebrates Christmas, is also the anniversary of the second meeting between President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin. During Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 many journalists asked if Begin would be invited to visit Cairo in return. Sadat avoided the question while Israel occupied Egyptian territory, but he offered to invite Begin to his home in Ismailia, on the west bank of the Suez Canal, some 90 minutes from Cairo.
At the beginning of December, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Hassan Touhamy had met in Morocco to discuss a peace agreement (see the Mossad report on the meeting). Israel had agreed that Egyptian sovereignty over all of occupied Sinai should be restored. However Begin and Dayan wanted to keep the settlements Israel had built there and two air bases, Etzion, near Eilat, and Eitam, near El-Arish and the Rafiach Salient, under Israeli control. Sadat refused.
At the beginning of December, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Hassan Touhamy had met in Morocco to discuss a peace agreement (see the Mossad report on the meeting). Israel had agreed that Egyptian sovereignty over all of occupied Sinai should be restored. However Begin and Dayan wanted to keep the settlements Israel had built there and two air bases, Etzion, near Eilat, and Eitam, near El-Arish and the Rafiach Salient, under Israeli control. Sadat refused.
In return for his gesture of visiting Jerusalem and offering Israel security within recognized borders, Sadat wanted the Israeli government to make a declaration that it would withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967 and seek a just solution to the Palestinian problem. This declaration would enable him to make a peace treaty with Israel and to invite the other Arab states to join in. But the government, especially Begin, who hoped to extend Israeli sovereignty to the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza, could not agree. Instead Begin drew up a plan for a temporary regime giving the Palestinian inhabitants autonomy and took it to Washington to be approved by US President Jimmy Carter. On 25 December Begin, together with Dayan, Defence Minister Ezer Weizman and a group of advisers and aides, went to Ismailiya to present the plan to Sadat. The records of their meetings are in the Israel State Archives.
The atmosphere at the talks was friendly. Sadat was celebrating his birthday and he welcomed the delegation to Egypt "perhaps the first time we sit together since Moses crossed the waters not very far from here. We sit together to tell the whole world that we are working for peace and that we shall establish peace." Begin wished him as many years as Moses lived - to the age of 120. He too was sure that the two nations would make peace. They had already agreed to set up a political and a military working committee.
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| Begin and Sadat after their first meeting in Ismailia Photograph: Yaacov Sa'ar, Government Press Office |
But then Begin began to outline Israel's peace proposals and the autonomy plan. He explained that the Palestinian Arabs would enjoy self rule and the Palestinian Jews security. His long explanation tired Sadat, who had no patience for details. Begin, attacked by the right for presenting a plan which might become the basis for a Palestinian state, felt he was making a great concession. But it did not meet Sadat's needs.
The Egyptians proposed a joint declaration on Israeli withdrawal, on the right of all states, including Israel, to sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, and on a just solution for the Palestinians based on self-determination. After the legal experts had got together, Begin and Sadat met again. You can see in the record of their meeting how hard it was for each leader to understand the other's background and thinking: Begin, who was so deeply marked by his relatives' death in the Holocaust and by fear of Israel's destruction by the Arabs; Sadat, by his fight for Egypt's independence from colonial rule. He said that for himself, Israel and Egypt could reach a bilateral agreement. "But I cannot do it because Egypt is the leader of the Arab world. Yes, that is right. Egypt has always been the leader."
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| (Dayan at Ismailia with Egyptian Foreign Minister Muhammed Ibrahim Kamel (on the right (and Abd-el Meguid, ambassador to the U.N. (centre Photograph: Yaacov Sa'ar, Government Press Office |
Begin refused to mention self-determination, which to him meant a Palestinian state ruled by the PLO, then a Soviet- backed terrorist organization. Sadat's Foreign Ministry advisers refused to back down, the meeting was a failure and the two sides issued separate statements. Dayan felt that an opportunity had been missed. But some of the formulations reached at Ismailia later formed the basis for the Camp David agreements. Begin finally visited Cairo in April 1979, after the signing of the peace treaty.
Monday, April 7, 2014
Zalman Enav: Drawing the Lines in Sinai
Many of the people involved in the peace talks with Egypt in 1977-1979 were well-known figures in Israeli public life. But our latest project on the peace treatyintroduced us to someone less renowned: Zalman Enav, a civilian volunteer who drew up the lines for the Israeli withdrawal in Sinai. His story shows how paradoxically, the Egyptian and Israeli generals, who had been fighting each other a short time before, understood one another better than the politicians quibbling over every legal point. It seems that the soldiers had a healthy respect for the other's military capacity, and wanted to do everything possible to prevent another round of fighting.
Mr. Enav is a Tel Aviv architect who planned many important building projects in Israel and abroad, especially in Africa and in Egypt (after the treaty). He joined the Palmach in 1946, and later advised the IDF on planning of army and air force bases. Zalman Enav built the homes of Arik Sharon at the Shikmim Farm and of Ezer Weizman in Caesariya and is still active today. We came across his name while looking for maps to illustrate the negotiations on withdrawal in Sinai, and later we read an account of his involvement in the peace process. In a telephone interview, Mr. Enav confirmed that account and added other fascinating details.
Zalman Enav's work on peace with Egypt began in the last stages of the Yom Kippur war, when he was serving at the advance command post of Arik Sharon. General Avraham Tamir, who was about to become the head of the IDF Planning Branch, took him from the front to Tel Aviv to start preparing for peace talks. At thetalks with the Egyptians at the KM. 101 marker on the Cairo-Suez road Enav met General Taha Magdoub, the assistant of General Gamasy, the Egyptian chief of staff. He told Magdoub: "Bring me to Cairo and we'll soon finish the business" of preparing the maps. Magdoub replied: "It's too soon". They met again in Geneva to work on the Interim Agreement signed in September 1975. The Egyptians thought that Enav worked for the security services, as they could not understand what a volunteer was doing in such a post.
In January 1978, after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Enav did arrive in Cairo as a member of the Israeli delegation to the military talks with Egypt and met Magdoub again. The joint work of the military delegations continued over many months of ups and downs, crises and solutions and led to agreement on Israeli withdrawal in two stages and the division of Sinai into areas including demilitarized zones and limitation of forces.
Enav was not at Camp David, but in October 1978 he was called to Washington "for a few days" to help prepare the final lines of the peace treaty on maps presented by the Americans. The talks dragged on for months due to disagreements caused by political pressure on the Egyptian and Israeli governments. Nevertheless, after a dramatic visit to the Middle East by US president Jimmy Carter, the treaty was signed 35 years ago last week.
Enav, who by now enjoyed the confidence of all parties, drew up the lines for all of them, watched by an Egyptian and an American officer. The maps were signed by Tamir and Magdoub in the State Department one day before the signing of the treaty on 26 March 1979. At the last minute, after Prime Minister Begin had agreed to advance the date of Israel's handing over the Alma oilfield as a gesture to Sadat, one of the maps had to be re-drawn and Enav had to work all night …In the ISA's digital publication on "Making Peace" in Hebrew you can see copies of the maps, including the most important one – Annex II, the international boundary between Egypt and Israel, which was fixed for the first time. In signing this map Egypt formally recognized the border and the state of Israel.
Mr. Enav is a Tel Aviv architect who planned many important building projects in Israel and abroad, especially in Africa and in Egypt (after the treaty). He joined the Palmach in 1946, and later advised the IDF on planning of army and air force bases. Zalman Enav built the homes of Arik Sharon at the Shikmim Farm and of Ezer Weizman in Caesariya and is still active today. We came across his name while looking for maps to illustrate the negotiations on withdrawal in Sinai, and later we read an account of his involvement in the peace process. In a telephone interview, Mr. Enav confirmed that account and added other fascinating details.
Zalman Enav's work on peace with Egypt began in the last stages of the Yom Kippur war, when he was serving at the advance command post of Arik Sharon. General Avraham Tamir, who was about to become the head of the IDF Planning Branch, took him from the front to Tel Aviv to start preparing for peace talks. At thetalks with the Egyptians at the KM. 101 marker on the Cairo-Suez road Enav met General Taha Magdoub, the assistant of General Gamasy, the Egyptian chief of staff. He told Magdoub: "Bring me to Cairo and we'll soon finish the business" of preparing the maps. Magdoub replied: "It's too soon". They met again in Geneva to work on the Interim Agreement signed in September 1975. The Egyptians thought that Enav worked for the security services, as they could not understand what a volunteer was doing in such a post.
In January 1978, after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Enav did arrive in Cairo as a member of the Israeli delegation to the military talks with Egypt and met Magdoub again. The joint work of the military delegations continued over many months of ups and downs, crises and solutions and led to agreement on Israeli withdrawal in two stages and the division of Sinai into areas including demilitarized zones and limitation of forces.
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| The Israeli military delegation headed by Ezer Weizman, Chief of Staff Mordecai Gur and Tamir meets the Egyptian delegation headed by General Gamasy in Cairo, January 1978 (Photograph: Yaa'cov Sa'ar, Government Press Office) |
Enav, who by now enjoyed the confidence of all parties, drew up the lines for all of them, watched by an Egyptian and an American officer. The maps were signed by Tamir and Magdoub in the State Department one day before the signing of the treaty on 26 March 1979. At the last minute, after Prime Minister Begin had agreed to advance the date of Israel's handing over the Alma oilfield as a gesture to Sadat, one of the maps had to be re-drawn and Enav had to work all night …In the ISA's digital publication on "Making Peace" in Hebrew you can see copies of the maps, including the most important one – Annex II, the international boundary between Egypt and Israel, which was fixed for the first time. In signing this map Egypt formally recognized the border and the state of Israel.
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| Zalman Enav at the White House, March 26, 1979 (Photograph: Zalman Enav) |
Wednesday, May 29, 2013
Book Review: The Accidential Empire
We haven't done any book reviews on this blog yet, which is a shame, actually, since many of the readers at the archives write books based on our materials. Given that our mission is to have folks know about our stuff, and these researchers are writing about our stuff, it's a no-brainer that we should be amplifying their message, no?
Still, it's not obvious that the first book we'd review ought to be Gershom Gorenberg's The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977
. It sits, after all, smack in the middle of one of Israel's major political discussions, and we at the ISA, being civil servants in a national institution, try to stay away from political third rails. On the other hand, what's a national archives for if not to enable the citizenry to see the inner workings of their government, once a reasonable amount of time has passed? And when someone comes by to look and tell, we're still here, so that others can come and see if the initial interpretation was reasonable, or perhaps exaggerated, or unfair. If someone feels Gorenberg's depiction of the evolution of Israel's settlement policy is wrong, they're welcome to come and test his findings.
Actually, they may even have access to more documentation than he had - and from our perspective, that's the reason to review his book here: to examine its relation with our collections. But first, a synopsis of his thesis and findings.
The thesis of the book is that following the Six Day War, Israel had no clear policy what to do with the newly controlled territories, and it spent the next few years (or decades) not acquiring one. Instead, it sort of bungled along. Moshe Dayan had ideas; Yigal Allon had ideas; Levy Eshkol, the prime minster until his death in 1969, had lots and lots of ideas, many of them mutually contradictory; and over time, a growing number of young adults of the religious Zionist camp had ever clearer ideas.
For a while after the electoral victory of Menachem Begin's Likud party, in 1977, Israel may have had a reasonably clear idea that it intended to hold onto Gaza, the West Bank, the Golan and East Jerusalem, and the government purposefully crafted a settlement policy to promote that; but Gorenberg's book is about the decade before Begin's victory, when the Labor party (in its various permutations) ruled, not Likud. He shows that during that decade almost 80 settlements were set up. To the limited extent that there was a guiding line, it was the idea of Allon, according to which Israel would hold onto - and thus settle - the Jordan Valley, parts of the West Bank to the south of Jerusalem and of course Jerusalem itself. (Holding on to all of Jerusalem was the mainstream Israeli policy at least until the summer of 2000). Yet even the 80 settlements weren't put in place as part of a crafted policy, but rather as the results of lots of different, local motivations. Hence the title of his book: it was an accidental empire in that its acquisition wasn't foreseen, and retaining it wasn't thought out.
Reading the book from the perspective of the archivists, however, adds a layer to the discussion, because sadly, although Gorenberg made good use of all the documentation he could find, much of what's relevant has yet to be declassified.
He used many non-governmental sources, such as memoires, interviews, and private archives. Israel Gallili, a top minister in all the governments of the time, took home far too may documents, and they are now in Yad Tabenkin, the archives of the kibbutz movement. There's a detailed oral history project made with Yigal Allon, at his kibbutz. And there are some very rich files from Eshkol's office, which Gorenberg made use of, and I may make further use of here on the blog, because their documents are so rich and interesting.
He didn't use the reams, truckloads, of the state documentation. At the end of the day, the story of the settlements is a story of government action and state bureaucracy implementation. In order to really tell the tale, you'd need to systematically follow the deliberations of the decision-makers at the top, and the actions of the officials below them. You'd need to read all the transcripts of the relevant cabinet discussions, then the records of the internal ministerial discussions. You'd need to identify which agencies were playing important roles, and figure out what that role was. Oh, and of course, you'd need to look at lots of material from the military government of the territories. Most of these sources were not open while he was researching his book in the previous decade; sadly, too much of it isn't open now, either. Parallel to the research, Gorenberg ran a five-year legal battle against the military archives to open more of their files; the result was a draw, in which he got enough files for the court to close the case, and the archives never had to deal with a court verdict on the matter.
So here's our summary of the matter: in spite of the gazillions of words written over the years about Israel's settlement project, no-one really knows what they're talking about because the documents aren't open. (They are now finally being opened, slowly, and the rate is a matter of budgets not political chicanery). So far, Gorenberg's book is the best one around, and if you're interested in the reality rather than the punditry, you should read it. But be aware that it's essentially a first draft of the story, not a definitive summary - as Gorenberg himself would be the first to admit.
Still, it's not obvious that the first book we'd review ought to be Gershom Gorenberg's The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977
. It sits, after all, smack in the middle of one of Israel's major political discussions, and we at the ISA, being civil servants in a national institution, try to stay away from political third rails. On the other hand, what's a national archives for if not to enable the citizenry to see the inner workings of their government, once a reasonable amount of time has passed? And when someone comes by to look and tell, we're still here, so that others can come and see if the initial interpretation was reasonable, or perhaps exaggerated, or unfair. If someone feels Gorenberg's depiction of the evolution of Israel's settlement policy is wrong, they're welcome to come and test his findings.Actually, they may even have access to more documentation than he had - and from our perspective, that's the reason to review his book here: to examine its relation with our collections. But first, a synopsis of his thesis and findings.
The thesis of the book is that following the Six Day War, Israel had no clear policy what to do with the newly controlled territories, and it spent the next few years (or decades) not acquiring one. Instead, it sort of bungled along. Moshe Dayan had ideas; Yigal Allon had ideas; Levy Eshkol, the prime minster until his death in 1969, had lots and lots of ideas, many of them mutually contradictory; and over time, a growing number of young adults of the religious Zionist camp had ever clearer ideas.
For a while after the electoral victory of Menachem Begin's Likud party, in 1977, Israel may have had a reasonably clear idea that it intended to hold onto Gaza, the West Bank, the Golan and East Jerusalem, and the government purposefully crafted a settlement policy to promote that; but Gorenberg's book is about the decade before Begin's victory, when the Labor party (in its various permutations) ruled, not Likud. He shows that during that decade almost 80 settlements were set up. To the limited extent that there was a guiding line, it was the idea of Allon, according to which Israel would hold onto - and thus settle - the Jordan Valley, parts of the West Bank to the south of Jerusalem and of course Jerusalem itself. (Holding on to all of Jerusalem was the mainstream Israeli policy at least until the summer of 2000). Yet even the 80 settlements weren't put in place as part of a crafted policy, but rather as the results of lots of different, local motivations. Hence the title of his book: it was an accidental empire in that its acquisition wasn't foreseen, and retaining it wasn't thought out.
Reading the book from the perspective of the archivists, however, adds a layer to the discussion, because sadly, although Gorenberg made good use of all the documentation he could find, much of what's relevant has yet to be declassified.
He used many non-governmental sources, such as memoires, interviews, and private archives. Israel Gallili, a top minister in all the governments of the time, took home far too may documents, and they are now in Yad Tabenkin, the archives of the kibbutz movement. There's a detailed oral history project made with Yigal Allon, at his kibbutz. And there are some very rich files from Eshkol's office, which Gorenberg made use of, and I may make further use of here on the blog, because their documents are so rich and interesting.
He didn't use the reams, truckloads, of the state documentation. At the end of the day, the story of the settlements is a story of government action and state bureaucracy implementation. In order to really tell the tale, you'd need to systematically follow the deliberations of the decision-makers at the top, and the actions of the officials below them. You'd need to read all the transcripts of the relevant cabinet discussions, then the records of the internal ministerial discussions. You'd need to identify which agencies were playing important roles, and figure out what that role was. Oh, and of course, you'd need to look at lots of material from the military government of the territories. Most of these sources were not open while he was researching his book in the previous decade; sadly, too much of it isn't open now, either. Parallel to the research, Gorenberg ran a five-year legal battle against the military archives to open more of their files; the result was a draw, in which he got enough files for the court to close the case, and the archives never had to deal with a court verdict on the matter.
So here's our summary of the matter: in spite of the gazillions of words written over the years about Israel's settlement project, no-one really knows what they're talking about because the documents aren't open. (They are now finally being opened, slowly, and the rate is a matter of budgets not political chicanery). So far, Gorenberg's book is the best one around, and if you're interested in the reality rather than the punditry, you should read it. But be aware that it's essentially a first draft of the story, not a definitive summary - as Gorenberg himself would be the first to admit.
Thursday, December 27, 2012
Nicolae Ceaușescu's Execution and Israeli-Egyptian Peace
23 years ago, Nicolae Ceaușescu, the tyrant of Romania, was executed by a firing squad. This was the conclusion of the bloodiest chapter in the fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The story unfolded as follows: after riots began in Timişoara on December 17, a mass meeting was organized in Bucharest.While Ceaușescu was delivering his speech there, many in the crowd started booing and jeering, startling the dictator. What followed was an attempted crack-down on the demonstrators by the Romanian army and security forces, but soon many of the soldiers sided with the demonstrators. Ceaușescu and his notorious wife Elena attempted to flee, but were caught and executed by soldiers after a short show trial by a military tribunal (I think we can spare the readers of this blog the pictures of the execution).
Ceaușescu had the distinction of being the only leader of a communist state who did not break off diplomatic relations with Israel after the Six Day War. This fact, and his allegedly independent stance in foreign relations, gave Ceaușescu an important position and role in the early stages of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process.
Last month, we published on our official site a publication on Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem. During their initial contacts, Israel and Egypt used the good services of Ceaușescu to pass messages to each other and to arrange for a meeting between Moshe Dayan, Israel's foreign minister, and Hasan Tohami, the Egyptian Deputy President. This meeting was planned for November 16th, but was canceled – instead, Sadat, by his on initiative, came to Jerusalem on November 19th.
Here's a Hebrew protocol of a meeting between Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Nicolae Ceaușescu in August 1977. The meeting was in Snagov, Ceaușescu's vacation retreat. Ceaușescu was trying to flee to Snagov in 1989 when he was caught. One of the Romanian officials in the meeting was Manea Mănescu, then Prime Minister of Romania, who joined Ceaușescu in his flight from Bucharest in December 1989 (Mănescu was not tried or hurt during the revolution). In the meeting, Begin and Ceaușescu argued mainly about their views on the Palestinian question, which differed sharply in part due to Ceaușescu's good and close relations with Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO.
According to the former Romanian defector, General Ion Mihai Pacepa, Ceaușescu was obsessed with his desire to win a Noble Peace Prize for his efforts to mediate between Israel and the Arabs, especially the Palestinians.
Ceaușescu had the distinction of being the only leader of a communist state who did not break off diplomatic relations with Israel after the Six Day War. This fact, and his allegedly independent stance in foreign relations, gave Ceaușescu an important position and role in the early stages of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process.
Last month, we published on our official site a publication on Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem. During their initial contacts, Israel and Egypt used the good services of Ceaușescu to pass messages to each other and to arrange for a meeting between Moshe Dayan, Israel's foreign minister, and Hasan Tohami, the Egyptian Deputy President. This meeting was planned for November 16th, but was canceled – instead, Sadat, by his on initiative, came to Jerusalem on November 19th.
Here's a Hebrew protocol of a meeting between Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Nicolae Ceaușescu in August 1977. The meeting was in Snagov, Ceaușescu's vacation retreat. Ceaușescu was trying to flee to Snagov in 1989 when he was caught. One of the Romanian officials in the meeting was Manea Mănescu, then Prime Minister of Romania, who joined Ceaușescu in his flight from Bucharest in December 1989 (Mănescu was not tried or hurt during the revolution). In the meeting, Begin and Ceaușescu argued mainly about their views on the Palestinian question, which differed sharply in part due to Ceaușescu's good and close relations with Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the PLO.
According to the former Romanian defector, General Ion Mihai Pacepa, Ceaușescu was obsessed with his desire to win a Noble Peace Prize for his efforts to mediate between Israel and the Arabs, especially the Palestinians.
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| Begin and Ceaușescu meeting, August 1977 (courtesy of the National Photo Collection) |
Tuesday, December 25, 2012
A Providential Visit? Another Document on Sadat's Visit to Jerusalem in 1977
Today we added another document to the Archives' publication on President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, about which we've already written several posts. The new document was received from Mr. Yehuda Avner, who was Menachem Begin's adviser on Diaspora Affairs and later ambassador to the UK. Begin's English, which he had learned while in hiding from listening to the BBC, was excellent, but he still liked British-born Avner to "Shakespearise" his texts.
The document is a draft of the communiqué issued by the Israeli government at the end of Sadat's visit on November 21, 1977. It was drawn up the previous evening by the Egyptian and Israeli delegations at a "working dinner" at the King David Hotel. From the handwritten note by Deputy Premier Yigal Yadin, you can see that it was suggested by Hassan Tuhami, the deputy prime minister of Egypt, and written down by Sadat himself. When Begin reported to the government on November 24, he said that the Egyptians wanted to describe Sadat's visit as "providential." The Israelis thought this was over the top, but Tuhami said that Sadat had told his people that his mission to Jerusalem was a holy one, which was divinely inspired. In his private talk with Begin, Sadat agreed to change the expression to "important," and later Avner made it significant."
You can also see that the expression "treaties ... with all the neighbouring Arab states" was added at the end of the communiqué. This was to emphasize that Sadat did not seek a separate peace for Egypt, but rather to put forward the Arab case in general. In the end, only Israeli-Egyptian peace was achieved. Attempts to bring in other Arab states did not succeed until much later.
You can read Mr. Avner's own reminiscences about the visit in his fascinating book about the Israeli prime ministers he served.
Thursday, December 20, 2012
Sometimes Governments Deny Stuff
You may remember that a while ago we put up a large collection of documentsabout the visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 of Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian president. Assuming some readers hadn't read the entire thing, we've been blogging about it from time to time. (Try our "1977" label.)
In November, following decades of hostility and a few months of very careful and very secret preliminary negotiations, Sadat and then Begin found themselves passing messages to each other on the evening news. Suddenly understanding that this was all for real, Begin wrote a letter of invitation to Sadat. Since this was in the pre-e-mail era, and the normal postal service didn't connect Israel with Egypt, the letter was sent through the respective American ambassadors. Another copy was sent to President Jimmy Carter.
The letters are here. If you don't read Hebrew, skip the first page; the other three pages are in English. They're self-explanatory and I have no need to do any punditry about them - except to highlight this curious sentence from Begin's cover letter to Carter:
Do you think Carter knew what he was referring to?
In November, following decades of hostility and a few months of very careful and very secret preliminary negotiations, Sadat and then Begin found themselves passing messages to each other on the evening news. Suddenly understanding that this was all for real, Begin wrote a letter of invitation to Sadat. Since this was in the pre-e-mail era, and the normal postal service didn't connect Israel with Egypt, the letter was sent through the respective American ambassadors. Another copy was sent to President Jimmy Carter.
The letters are here. If you don't read Hebrew, skip the first page; the other three pages are in English. They're self-explanatory and I have no need to do any punditry about them - except to highlight this curious sentence from Begin's cover letter to Carter:
Over a period of 29 years all six of Israel's prime ministers, including myself, have stated their readiness to go anywhere and at any time to meet the Arab rulers to talk about peace. These offers have remained without response apart from certain clandestine meetings subsequently publicly denied by both sides.Huh? Run that by me again? Never ever any meetings except for the ones we've all denied?
Do you think Carter knew what he was referring to?
Friday, December 7, 2012
Conspiracy Theory: Was Gamal Abdel Nasser an Israeli Spy?
As a general policy, this blog doesn't operate on Friday, but what with the ongoing turmoil in Egypt, here's a quick anecdote.
At the first secret high-level Egyptian-Israeli meeting prior to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, Egypt's Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Hassan Touhami asked Moshe Dayan for the truth about the previous Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. According to the English-language summary of the meeting:
At the first secret high-level Egyptian-Israeli meeting prior to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, Egypt's Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Hassan Touhami asked Moshe Dayan for the truth about the previous Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. According to the English-language summary of the meeting:
Touhami's opinion of Nasser was of extreme and hateful despise [sic]. He asked MD [Moshe Dayan] if Nasser had been in connivance with him when Nasser sent Abdel Hakim Amer with an airplane on an inspection tour just when our planes attacked at 08:00 on the morning of the 5th of June 1967.The Mossad report of the meeting added a bit of detail:
The fact that the [Egyptian] Airforce was unprepared and its commanders were sanguine was explained by Touhami by the fact that Nasser was actually in conspiration with the Israelis. "Tell us the truth," Touhami requested seriously, "wasn't Nasser conniving with you at the time? Otherwise, how to explain what happened?" Touhami gave the appearance of rage and despise [sic] at Nasser, whom he described as having brought Egypt to the edge of calamity.
Thursday, December 6, 2012
Mossad Reports on Negotiations, 1977
The other day we looked at a newly declassified Mossad document from Moshe Dayan's meeting in Morocco with Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Hassan Tuhami in September 1977. Today, let's look at the second Mossad document in the same publication. November 1977 came and went, Anwar Sadat stepped out from behind the secret preliminary negotiations and visited Israel in the full glare of international astonishment, and now, in December, it was time to move the negotiations forward to an agreement. The going wasn't easy (and indeed, many months of hard bargaining were to pass before the breakthrough at Camp David in September 1978). In December 1977, Dayan and Tuhami were once again guests of King Hassan of Morocco - and once again, a Mossad agent was there and wrote a top secret report. (For more detailed background, see our summary.)
Here are some reflections about this Mossad document and its contents.
1. Note the very appearance of the document: a sparse letterhead, no insitutional logo, but a bright red stripe down the length of each page, with the words Top Secret (Sodi Beyoter), also in red. This is an organization with a high awareness of security matters, and when they create highly sensitive documents, they want those documents to be easily recognized from afar. Anyone who's got such a document has very high security clearance, but one can never be too careful, and the organization wishes to ensure that the document will be handled gingerly. So: no logo, which is a form of marketing, because there's no-one to market to; and a bright red bar, to ensure no-one accidentially reads it on the subway while commuting home. (And of course, there aren't many subways in Israel.)
2. Most of the discussions were between the Israeli and the Egytian. The host, King Hassan, came and went, and saw his job as facilitator. Thus, over dinner, he gently rebuked Dayan:
Here are some reflections about this Mossad document and its contents.
1. Note the very appearance of the document: a sparse letterhead, no insitutional logo, but a bright red stripe down the length of each page, with the words Top Secret (Sodi Beyoter), also in red. This is an organization with a high awareness of security matters, and when they create highly sensitive documents, they want those documents to be easily recognized from afar. Anyone who's got such a document has very high security clearance, but one can never be too careful, and the organization wishes to ensure that the document will be handled gingerly. So: no logo, which is a form of marketing, because there's no-one to market to; and a bright red bar, to ensure no-one accidentially reads it on the subway while commuting home. (And of course, there aren't many subways in Israel.)
2. Most of the discussions were between the Israeli and the Egytian. The host, King Hassan, came and went, and saw his job as facilitator. Thus, over dinner, he gently rebuked Dayan:
You [the Israelis] can't live on bayonets. You must find a way to peace. You [Dayan] look sad and tense and you're not like before. You must help Sadat overcome the difficulties.
Dayan: I'm sad because I don't see any progress in the Egyptian position. We're not getting anywhere even though I'm proposing significant changes to our position. I'm and honest man; I can't see any any possibility for progress with [Syrian President Hafez] Assad or even with [Jordanian King] Hussein. I wish you were right that Hussein will eventually join Sadat [in negotiating for peace with Israel] but I don't believe it. We will not meet any representatives of the PLO: they're murderers. I won't meet them anywhere, that must be clear.
Tuhami: Why are you so angry since we last met? Let's discuss things cordially. We should meet once again before you leave; you'll prepare a document with the points you brought up today, and I'll read you a document I've received from President Sadat....3. Documents such as these offer us tones of dicussions and details. Near the end of the report King Hassan wished to placate Dayan and encourage him that the effort was worth making:
If you bring Hussein to join Sadat, those two will sign agreements with you even without Syria. Decisions of the Arab League have been changed in the past; in the matter of the Palestinians we'll be able to change the decision of [the 1974 Arab League Summit in] Rabat [where Hussein was forced to relinquish his claim to represent the Palestinians of the West Bank]. We need time, but let's aim for that. The PLO is a cancer for us. Their fate doesn't interest me at all. The two of you must get over minor details such as [control of] Sharm el Sheikh. The final goal is peace.
Tuesday, December 4, 2012
The Spook's Report
Here's another installment based on our Sadat-in-Jerusalem publication.
On September 16th 1977, though none of us mortals knew it at the time, Israel's Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, flew to Morocco and met Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Hassan Tuhami in the Royal Palace. According to the English-language summary of the meeting - which one really ought to read if one likes behind-the-scenes documentation - the first substantial thing Tuhami had to say to Dayan was that Sadat hadn't trusted the previous Israeli government (led by Yitzchak Rabin), but that he did trust his ability to reach an agreement with Begin. It's hard to know what to make of that statement: was it true? was it flattery? was it a negotiating ploy? Whatever it was, it was not what any pundit was writing in any newspaper in those days.
The really dramatic document, however, in terms of skulduggery and cloak-and-dagger, is the next one in our publication: a top-secret report written on September 8th by an unnamed Mossad agent who was present in the meeting, and reported "to your eyes only" - probably to Ytzchak Hofi, at that time Head of the Mossad. It's not an everyday event that Mossad documents get declassified and put online, even here at the ISA, so if you've got the Hebrew, you really ought to meander over and have a peek.
Much of the content of the meeting is similar in both reports, which, given the gravity of the matter, isn't that surprising. Everyone present was trying to make sure everyone present was hearing the same content. Unlike media reports or memoirs of politicians, which have different goals, these documents needed to be accurate or they were worthless. Yet the Mossad report has some color and context which the dry English-language summary didn't have; partially this was because the Mossad person was trained to see things diplomats might not have cared about.
At the end, the author of the report notes that Dayan promised to send an updated map of Jerusalem so that Tuhami might see the extent to which it has become one single city.
* Were the archaeological artifacts really Dayan's private possessions? From today's perspective?
On September 16th 1977, though none of us mortals knew it at the time, Israel's Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, flew to Morocco and met Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Hassan Tuhami in the Royal Palace. According to the English-language summary of the meeting - which one really ought to read if one likes behind-the-scenes documentation - the first substantial thing Tuhami had to say to Dayan was that Sadat hadn't trusted the previous Israeli government (led by Yitzchak Rabin), but that he did trust his ability to reach an agreement with Begin. It's hard to know what to make of that statement: was it true? was it flattery? was it a negotiating ploy? Whatever it was, it was not what any pundit was writing in any newspaper in those days.
The really dramatic document, however, in terms of skulduggery and cloak-and-dagger, is the next one in our publication: a top-secret report written on September 8th by an unnamed Mossad agent who was present in the meeting, and reported "to your eyes only" - probably to Ytzchak Hofi, at that time Head of the Mossad. It's not an everyday event that Mossad documents get declassified and put online, even here at the ISA, so if you've got the Hebrew, you really ought to meander over and have a peek.
Much of the content of the meeting is similar in both reports, which, given the gravity of the matter, isn't that surprising. Everyone present was trying to make sure everyone present was hearing the same content. Unlike media reports or memoirs of politicians, which have different goals, these documents needed to be accurate or they were worthless. Yet the Mossad report has some color and context which the dry English-language summary didn't have; partially this was because the Mossad person was trained to see things diplomats might not have cared about.
1. FM arrived in Rabat on a special flight 19:15 on 16th Sept. 77, accompanied by his bodyguard, Dalimi's deputy and our representative in Morocco. The group left Rabat on a special flight to Le-Bourget at 03:30 on sept. 17th.The rest is similar to the English language summary.
2. Upon arrival the guests were taken by Dalimi to the personal guest house of the king, near his private home.
3. After a short rest, Dalimi took Dayan and our representative at 20:45 on 16 to the king's domicile, where they were let in through a back door which Dalimi told us is reserved for secret guests.
4. The group was received by [deleted] who allowed Dayan to take off his disguise and return to his normal appearance. The group was brought into a room with modern furniture, where the king and his group were waiting for Dayan.
5. As Dalimi explained, Tohami had requested to talk to the king before our arrival, so he was there already.
6. Those present were the king, his prime minister, his foreign minister, the minister of the court, Dalimi, Tuhami, Dayan and our representative. We sat in half a crescent, with tea tables spread in front of us. We were served by two servants who had already seen Dayan in his natural appearance, back at the king's palace. Other than them and Dalimi, who personally escorted us, no-one saw Dayan without his disguise.
7. The meeting went on without any break for four hours. At one point it continued without the king, who explained that he had to go see his mother who had come to visit him.
8. The entire time the atmosphere was pleasant and cordial, which expressed itself in a collegial tone, courtesy and a degree of humor. The king himself set this tone.
9. After the meeting the king led us to a nearby dining room for a meal, shortly before 01:00; over the meal we discussed personal and political matters.
10. At 01:45 Dalimi led us back to the guest house at the palace, and from there, after an hour of rest, his deputy [name deleted] led us to the Rabat airport and at 03:30 we flew back to LeBourget.
11. At the beginning of the meeting with Tuhami, Dayan presented the king with some Canaanite-era weapons from his personal collection.* No other presents were exchanged.
12. All the administrative, logistical and security matters passed with no hitches. [deleted] suggested, "with all due respect", that next time Dayan ought to wear darker glasses.
13. Dayan promised to send Tuhami an English copy of his book.
At the end, the author of the report notes that Dayan promised to send an updated map of Jerusalem so that Tuhami might see the extent to which it has become one single city.
* Were the archaeological artifacts really Dayan's private possessions? From today's perspective?
Insider's View of Peace Negotiations: Principles Sometimes Change
Last week we published a collection of documents pertaining to Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, which eventually led to the signing of a peace accord between Egypt and Israel. Serious students of international diplomacy as well as anyone who wishes to understand the dynamics of such negotiations are urged to read the entire publication, and to read as many of the documents as possible (many are in Hebrew, but some are in English).
We're assuming, however, that the readers of this blog may not all be eager to spend many hours on one single topic, preferring smaller bites of history. Which is why we've already offered two smaller packages, and here's a third.
Begin and the Likud party won the election in May 1977, and entered government in June. President Carter invited Begin to the White House almost immediately, and thus began a whirlwind of diplomacy at the highest levels towards convening an international peace conference in Geneva. Ultimately nothing came of this, since Egypt and Israel instead set out on their own bilateral negotiations, but of course the contemporary actors couldn't have known this. One of the last documents we've published regarding these preliminary negotiations is a letter from Israeli foreign Minister Moshe Dayan to American Secretary of state Cyrus Vance on September 2nd 1977. In his letter, Dayan spelled out the principles which would guide Israel in the upcoming negotiations. (It's in English, of course.)
We're assuming, however, that the readers of this blog may not all be eager to spend many hours on one single topic, preferring smaller bites of history. Which is why we've already offered two smaller packages, and here's a third.
Begin and the Likud party won the election in May 1977, and entered government in June. President Carter invited Begin to the White House almost immediately, and thus began a whirlwind of diplomacy at the highest levels towards convening an international peace conference in Geneva. Ultimately nothing came of this, since Egypt and Israel instead set out on their own bilateral negotiations, but of course the contemporary actors couldn't have known this. One of the last documents we've published regarding these preliminary negotiations is a letter from Israeli foreign Minister Moshe Dayan to American Secretary of state Cyrus Vance on September 2nd 1977. In his letter, Dayan spelled out the principles which would guide Israel in the upcoming negotiations. (It's in English, of course.)
(a) Any settlement should take fully into account the need to ensure Israel's security.
(b) The right of Israel to unimpeded freedom of navigation and overflight through and over the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba should be ensured. For this purpose Israel will retain territorial control over Sharm-el Sheikh and the Tiran Straits, including territorial continuity to Eilat
(c) In order to maintain the security of its southern areas, the outer limits of Israel's territorial control from the Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba should run west of the previous international boundary, in such a manner as to incorporate an area on the Mediterranean Coast south of the Gaza Strip.
(d) West of the area under Israeli control there shall be as part of the security arrangements, continuous buffer zones, demilitarized zones, and areas of limited armamament and forces.What happened in the end? Not what Dayan had said. Egypt demanded a full withdrawal from the entire Sinai, with no border adjustments whatsoever and certainly no territorial strips hundreds of miles long to be transferred to Israel; on the other hand, the Egyptians offered a more comprehensive peace than Israel had apparently been expecting, including guarantees of unimpeded Israeli shipping to Eilat and, more significantly, Israeli use of the Suez Canal which effectively lessened the need for the port in Eilat at all, since Haifa and Ashdod could receive ships from Asia. Egypt also agreed to a separate peace with Israel. Given these structural modifications of the reality, Israel changed its fundamental assumptions, the principles of its negotiating stance, and agreement became possible.
(e) Subject to these principles, and bearing in mind the means of implementation outlined above, Israel would be prepared in the context of a Peace Treaty, for substantial withdrawal of its forces from the existing line in the Sinai Peninsula.
Thursday, November 29, 2012
Another, Unconventional Way of Looking at Sadat's Visit to Israel
Here's another, unusual way of looking at Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Israel in November 1977. On his blog, Journal of a UFO Investigator, David Halperin dubs Sadat's visit a "Close Encounter of the Fifth Kind," which he explains to denote when hostile aliens meet to understand each other as fellow-citizens of the universe. (Halperin invented the "fifth kind" category for this purpose, as "fourth kind" is already in use for UFO abductions.)
We're not writing to ridicule Halperin's post, especially when the rest of what he records is so touching and real--his feeling during the historical moment, his memories from Israel at the time, and his views on the events of 1977 in retrospect. To us, it's just another--if unconventional--way to see the events of that fateful November.
Here are our posts on Sadat's visit: first, our official collection of historical documents surrounding the visit on the archives site. Second, our blogged accountof Israeli President Katzir's meetings with Sadat. And finally. our post on the visit of Sadat to Israel.
Oh, and here's a link to the trailer for Steven Spielberg's classic Close Encounters of the Third Kind.
We're not writing to ridicule Halperin's post, especially when the rest of what he records is so touching and real--his feeling during the historical moment, his memories from Israel at the time, and his views on the events of 1977 in retrospect. To us, it's just another--if unconventional--way to see the events of that fateful November.
Here are our posts on Sadat's visit: first, our official collection of historical documents surrounding the visit on the archives site. Second, our blogged accountof Israeli President Katzir's meetings with Sadat. And finally. our post on the visit of Sadat to Israel.
Oh, and here's a link to the trailer for Steven Spielberg's classic Close Encounters of the Third Kind.
Wednesday, November 28, 2012
A Tale of Two Presidents: Another View of President Sadat's Visit to Jerusalem, 1977
"An exciting and moving event, which was undoubtedly one of the highlights of my term as president."
Protocol dictated that Katzir, as head of state, was Sadat's official host, and he felt very keenly the responsibility involved. Katzir received the distinguished guest on his arrival at the airport, walked at his side on the red carpet and drove with him to Jerusalem. He thus had a unique opportunity to get to know the Egyptian president personally.
Katzir led the way for Sadat into the Knesset for his historic speech to Israel's parliament and hosted the farewell ceremony which took place at the President's Residence.
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| Knesset speaker and future prime minister Yitzhak Shamir, President Sadat and President Katzir |
In his speech on this occasion, Katzir, a distinguished scientist, voiced his hope for cooperation between Israel and Egypt.
On his return to Egypt, Sadat sent Katzir a letter of thanks for the hospitality he had received in Israel and asked him to thank Prime Minister Begin personally for the invitation to come to Jerusalem, and for the productive talks. "The audacious step taken by us amounts to an historical turning point in the history of our region, whose security and stability are closely linked with the security, stability and welfare of the whole world," wrote Sadat.
Katzir received the letter while on an official visit to Mexico, and during a conversation with US ambassador Samuel Lewis--a transcript of which we published here yesterday--Begin telephoned Katzir about the letter. He told Lewis that Sadat liked Katzir very much and appreciated his scientific knowledge.
In several articles which he published after leaving office, Katzir described his impressions of Sadat and his hopes for scientific cooperation with Egypt, which unfortunately were not realized.
Tuesday, November 27, 2012
"One of the Great Events of our Times": Sadat Comes to Jerusalem, November 1977
Most Israelis over 50 can remember what they were doing on November 19, 1977, 35 years ago this month. On that day, Anwar el-Sadat, the leader of Egypt, Israel's longtime enemy, arrived in Israel as an honored guest, after his sudden decision to come to Jerusalem and to address the Knesset. But for younger people these events must seem very far away. After the events of the last week, when Israel's relations with Egypt were again in the news and the peace agreement between the two countries was put to the test, it seems more relevant than ever to look at the beginnings of direct Israeli relations with Egypt and the negotiations that led to the historic accord between them.
A few years ago, when declassification of documents on the peace process started, the Israel State Archives decided to embark on a major project to collect and publish a selection of these documents. Today we published online the "first fruits" of this project, "No More War": The Peace Plan of the Israeli Government and President Sadat's Journey to Jerusalem, November 1977.
The publication includes 42 documents, dating back to the election of Menachem Begin as Prime Minister of Israel. We survey the peace policy put forward by his government, the unsuccessful attempts of the Carter administration to convene a Middle East peace conference in Geneva, secret contacts between Israel and Egypt, and Sadat's decision to break the deadlock by going to Jerusalem. Documents on the visit itself include notes by Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, and the accounts from Begin and his team of the government meeting, which was specially declassified for this purpose. We haven't found any official minutes of the meetings with Sadat, though we're still looking.
We end with the plans for further meetings and a report by the Mossad on Dayan's secret meeting in Morocco with the Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister in December 1977. Although some of the most interesting documents are in Hebrew, such as the protocols (stenograms) of government meetings, many of them have English equivalents or translations. For example, you can see here Begin and Dayan's account of the Sadat visit to Samuel Lewis, the popular American ambassador.
A few years ago, when declassification of documents on the peace process started, the Israel State Archives decided to embark on a major project to collect and publish a selection of these documents. Today we published online the "first fruits" of this project, "No More War": The Peace Plan of the Israeli Government and President Sadat's Journey to Jerusalem, November 1977.
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| Begin and Dayan meet with Sadat and Mustapha Khalil, later Prime Minister of Egypt, in the King David Hotel |
We end with the plans for further meetings and a report by the Mossad on Dayan's secret meeting in Morocco with the Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister in December 1977. Although some of the most interesting documents are in Hebrew, such as the protocols (stenograms) of government meetings, many of them have English equivalents or translations. For example, you can see here Begin and Dayan's account of the Sadat visit to Samuel Lewis, the popular American ambassador.
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