In the Shadow of the Gallows: Maurice Orbach and Israel's Attempt to Save the Egyptian Jews Accused in the Cairo Trial, 1955
This year will mark the 60th anniversary of many dramatic events in Israel's history. 1955 was a crucial year and a turning point in relations with Egypt, Israel's most powerful neighbour. At the Archives we will soon complete a collection of documents on foreign relations for that year, the last volume in our series on Israeli foreign policy up till 1960. Here we will bring you some highlights of this collection.
One of the reasons for the deterioration of relations with Egypt was the "security mishap" in 1954, which also led to a political crisis in Israel, the "Lavon Affair". Israeli military intelligence had set up a spy and sabotage ring of young Egyptian Jews in Cairo and Alexandria. In June 1954 they were activated to attack American and British targets, in the hope of preventing an Anglo-Egyptian agreement on evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal zone, transfer of the Canal to Egypt and military aid from the U.S., in a Western attempt to court Egyptian ruler Colonel Nasser. In July 1954 some bombs were planted but the damage was negligible. After a bomb went off in the pocket of one of the agents, the members of the ring were arrested. The question whether Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon had given the order for the operation later became the centre of a political storm and affected Israeli politics for years. However at the time the public was told nothing about the true background to the affair. Israel claimed that the Jews involved were innocent and Cairo was planning a show trial.
In the indictment published in October the prosecution asked for the death sentence for all of the 13 accused. Efforts by Israel and world Jewry to prevent severe sentences began immediately and continued until the end of January 1955. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett was deeply worried that if the Jews were executed, public opinion would make his efforts to reduce border tension and to improve relations with Egypt impossible.
A key figure in these efforts was Maurice Orbach, a British Jew and a Labour Member of Parliament, who visited Cairo in November 1954 as the representative of the World Jewish Congress. After briefing by Sharett, Orbach met Nasser, who told him that the matter was in the hands of the public prosecutor, but he would consider a plea for mercy. Nasser also said he wanted peace with Israel, but could not take steps yet because of the internal situation in Egypt, where a plot to assassinate him by the Muslim Brotherhood had been uncovered. Afterwards there were direct contacts in Paris between Israeli and Egyptian emissaries.
The trial by a military court opened on 11 December in Cairo. Orbach met with Nasser again and messages were passed between him and Sharett (see our previous post on Sharett's letter warning against the effects of a death sentence). Nasser's reply was that he would do everything possible to prevent "inflammatory sentences." He promised to prevent border incidents and agreed to a high level meeting with Israeli representatives. At the end of December Nasser sent another message, saying that Egyptian public opinion was also inflamed, especially in view of the trial and execution of the six Muslim Brothers who had attacked him. In the current state of tension a high level meeting was impossible.
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| Crowds hail Nasser in Alexandria after the failed assasination attempt, October 1954 Photograph: Wikimedia |
At the beginning of January 1955 reports reached Sharett that "things in the Cairo trial were deteriorating" and he wrote to Orbach asking him to return to Cairo immediately. His adviser Gideon Raphael flew to Paris to brief Orbach for his trip. This time Orbach's reception was frosty. His report (the first pages appear here) shows how he gradually came to realize that Nasser was evading him and would not see him until after the trial. It was learned that the Egyptians would not announce the verdict until it was already confirmed by the Revolutionary Council. Nevertheless Sharett did not give up hope and Israel redoubled its efforts to persuade other countries and humanitarian bodies to intervene.
On 27 January Egypt announced that two of the accused, said to be the ringleaders of the Cairo and Alexandria groups, Dr. Moshe Marzouk and Shmuel Azar, had been sentenced to death. Two others were cleared and the rest received long jail sentences. The Foreign Ministry mobilized the U.S. Jewish community to ask for Eisenhower's intervention. However Sharett wrote in his diary that there was almost no chance of Nasser's pardoning the accused Jews, now that the verdict had been published. He asked himself if Nasser had deliberately deceived Israel, or had made promises he could not keep because of changed circumstances or opposition within the ruling junta. At the Israelis' urging, Orbach and Richard Crossman, another British politician who had received promises from Nasser, sent him a telegram begging him to reconsider at the last moment.
Sharett refused to allow public demonstrations in Israel, and insisted that if protests were made, they must be against the sentence, in order not to encourage the belief that the Jews were innocent. Even Prime Minister Nehru of India, which had no diplomatic relations with Israel, agreed to appeal to Nasser. But Nasser replied to Eisenhower that America too executed spies. It seemed that the international outcry only made him more determined to show his independence. On 31 January Marzouk and Azar were hanged. Sharett thanked those who had tried to help in a special meeting of the Knesset:
"The Government of Israel voices its contempt and horror at the heartless rejection by the rulers of Egypt of the urgent representations made to them, a rejection accompanied even, in some cases, by calculated deceit regarding what was intended.”
“At the same time, the government wishes to express its recognition of all who did what they could, by word and deed, to save human lives and prevent the gallows from casting its shadow over relations between peoples in the days to come."
“At the same time, the government wishes to express its recognition of all who did what they could, by word and deed, to save human lives and prevent the gallows from casting its shadow over relations between peoples in the days to come."
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| Israeli stamp issued in memory of Moshe Marzouk |
Tuesday, April 1, 2014
"Had they known me in Israel, they would not have offered me this important position" -Albert Einstein
"All of our science when measured against reality is primitive and childish and yet it is the most valuable thing we have." - Albert Einstein
In November 1952, Dr Chaim Weizmann, the first President of Israel, passed away. The nation promptly prepared itself: The Israel Embassy in Washington issued directives for the mourning period, and Israeli citizens and Jews abroad began submitting names of important people whom they felt would be suitable to inherit the honoured position.
The Foreign Ministry was asked to assist in finding candidates, and so Ambassador Abba Eban approached Albert Einstein to ask if he would accept the offer to serve as President of Israel.
In his letter to the professor, Eban wrote that he was acting at the instructions of Premier Ben Gurion, reflecting the true sentiments of the Jewish people. He added that acceptance would require relocation to Israel and acceptance of Israeli nationality, but in appreciation of the importance and scope of his work he would be offered all that was necessary with the freedom of action to ensure the continuation of his scientific activity. Israel, Eban said, was geographically a small country but was destined for greatness in continuing its spiritual and intellectual tradition both past and present.
Upon receiving the invitation, Einstein replied in handwriting in English and German.
"I feel deeply moved by the offer of our state Israel, though also sad and abashed that it is impossible for me to accept this offer. Since all my life I have been dealing with the world of physics, I have neither the natural ability nor the experience necessary to deal with human beings and to carry out official functions. For these reasons, I do not feel able to fulfill the requirements of this great task, even were my advanced age not limiting my strength to an increasing extent. This situation is indeedextremely sad for me because my relation to the Jewish people has become my strongest human attachment ever since I reached compleate awerness of our precarious position among the nations."
He concluded with expressions of sympathy upon the death of Dr. Weizmann who had made great efforts to reach independence, and hoped that a suitable person would be found who could bear the great responsibility demanded by the position.
Einstein gave his letters in person to Minister David Goitein of the Washington Embassy who then sent a special report to Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett. Describing his meeting with the professor he quoted Einstein: (In Hebrew)
"Honestly I am very moved that the government and people of Israel want to appoint me their President but throughout my life I never did anything for the Jewish people and so do not merit this honor."
Their interesting discussion ranged over many topics such as Russian – American relations, Judaism, and education in the USA. In this connection Einstein said that if he had a son he would want him educated in Israel rather than in America, and so would benefit from its freedom of thought, education and independence.
Three years after he turned down the Presidency, he was given another opportunity to represent Israel at its Seventh Independence Day celebrations, but died before he could deliver what was his last speech.
At a meeting in Jerusalem to mark the centenary of Einstein's birth, Isaiah Berlin said in reference to his support for Zionism and Israel: "The fact that Einstein who allowed no departure from human decency, believed in this movement and this state unconditionally until his last breath, this fact is one of the most compelling moral testimonies that any state in this century could proudly exhibit, this is deeply meaningful."
The Knesset decided that March 14--Einstein's birthday--would be National Science Day. The Ministry of Science and Technology last year introduced a new initiative, "Popular Science," designed to bring lectures in popular science to the general public. This year there will be extensive activities around this date, by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Space.
In November 1952, Dr Chaim Weizmann, the first President of Israel, passed away. The nation promptly prepared itself: The Israel Embassy in Washington issued directives for the mourning period, and Israeli citizens and Jews abroad began submitting names of important people whom they felt would be suitable to inherit the honoured position.
The Foreign Ministry was asked to assist in finding candidates, and so Ambassador Abba Eban approached Albert Einstein to ask if he would accept the offer to serve as President of Israel.
In his letter to the professor, Eban wrote that he was acting at the instructions of Premier Ben Gurion, reflecting the true sentiments of the Jewish people. He added that acceptance would require relocation to Israel and acceptance of Israeli nationality, but in appreciation of the importance and scope of his work he would be offered all that was necessary with the freedom of action to ensure the continuation of his scientific activity. Israel, Eban said, was geographically a small country but was destined for greatness in continuing its spiritual and intellectual tradition both past and present.
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| David Ben Gurion and Albert Einstein (National Photo Collection) |
"I feel deeply moved by the offer of our state Israel, though also sad and abashed that it is impossible for me to accept this offer. Since all my life I have been dealing with the world of physics, I have neither the natural ability nor the experience necessary to deal with human beings and to carry out official functions. For these reasons, I do not feel able to fulfill the requirements of this great task, even were my advanced age not limiting my strength to an increasing extent. This situation is indeedextremely sad for me because my relation to the Jewish people has become my strongest human attachment ever since I reached compleate awerness of our precarious position among the nations."
He concluded with expressions of sympathy upon the death of Dr. Weizmann who had made great efforts to reach independence, and hoped that a suitable person would be found who could bear the great responsibility demanded by the position.
Einstein gave his letters in person to Minister David Goitein of the Washington Embassy who then sent a special report to Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett. Describing his meeting with the professor he quoted Einstein: (In Hebrew)
"Honestly I am very moved that the government and people of Israel want to appoint me their President but throughout my life I never did anything for the Jewish people and so do not merit this honor."
Their interesting discussion ranged over many topics such as Russian – American relations, Judaism, and education in the USA. In this connection Einstein said that if he had a son he would want him educated in Israel rather than in America, and so would benefit from its freedom of thought, education and independence.
Three years after he turned down the Presidency, he was given another opportunity to represent Israel at its Seventh Independence Day celebrations, but died before he could deliver what was his last speech.
At a meeting in Jerusalem to mark the centenary of Einstein's birth, Isaiah Berlin said in reference to his support for Zionism and Israel: "The fact that Einstein who allowed no departure from human decency, believed in this movement and this state unconditionally until his last breath, this fact is one of the most compelling moral testimonies that any state in this century could proudly exhibit, this is deeply meaningful."
The Knesset decided that March 14--Einstein's birthday--would be National Science Day. The Ministry of Science and Technology last year introduced a new initiative, "Popular Science," designed to bring lectures in popular science to the general public. This year there will be extensive activities around this date, by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Space.
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| Einstein on his first visit to the USA, 1921 |
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| Albert Einstein and his wife as part of a Zionist mission to the USA. Chaim Weizmann is second on left. |
Thursday, July 4, 2013
Happy Fourth of July – and Please Give Us Arms: Golda Writes to Dulles, 4 July 1956
On June 20, 1956, Golda Meir replaced Moshe Sharett as Israel's foreign minister, and on the Fourth of July, the 180th anniversary of American independence, shewrote a letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, still signing with her old name of Golda Myerson. Israel's leaders usually sent formal greetings for the Fourth of July to the Administration, but this time Golda used the opportunity to approach Dulles on a subject which greatly occupied the minds of the Israeli leaders – the search for arms to counter the major Czech-Egyptian arms deal in September 1955.
In October 1955, Sharett met twice with Dulles to request American arms. Until then, the US government had sold Israel only outmoded or defensive weapons. Dulles was reluctant to change this policy, as he still hoped to win over the Egyptian leader, Col. Nasser, to the side of the West in the Cold War, and to prevent an arms race with the USSR. In March 1956, he decided that France and Italy should supply Israel with arms, with American encouragement. But the process was slow, and in Golda's letter she urged him to approve direct supply of arms to Israel in order to speed it up. The Israeli ambassador to Washington, Abba Eban, met with Dulles to give him the letter, and repeated these arguments. Israel had approached Canada, France and Italy but they were waiting for an American lead.
Sharett's failure in this endeavor, while the Defense Ministry was succeeding in forging direct ties with military circles in France, was one of the reasons Ben-Gurion forced his resignation in June 1956. Another was the fear that Sharett would oppose a war with Egypt initiated by Israel. On July 26, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and in October, Britain, France and Israel decided to act against him. Golda's letter and Eban's account of his meeting with Dulles can be found in Volume 11 of the ISA's series, "Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel," which tells the rest of the story of the run-up to the Sinai Campaign. The book has an English companion volume with summaries of the Hebrew documents.
Golda's approach too was unsuccessful. The US administration continued in its refusal to sell modern weapons to Israel until the 1960s, while France remained Israel's main source of arms.
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| Dulles, accompanied by Harold Stassen and Sharett (on the left), inspects an honor guard on his arrival in Israel, May 1953. Photograph: Israel State Archives |
Sharett's failure in this endeavor, while the Defense Ministry was succeeding in forging direct ties with military circles in France, was one of the reasons Ben-Gurion forced his resignation in June 1956. Another was the fear that Sharett would oppose a war with Egypt initiated by Israel. On July 26, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and in October, Britain, France and Israel decided to act against him. Golda's letter and Eban's account of his meeting with Dulles can be found in Volume 11 of the ISA's series, "Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel," which tells the rest of the story of the run-up to the Sinai Campaign. The book has an English companion volume with summaries of the Hebrew documents.
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| Foreign Minister Golda Meir and former French premier Guy Mollet, 1959. Photograph: Fritz Cohen, Government Press Office |
Sunday, April 14, 2013
Albert Einstein to Bar Refaeli: Independence Day, 1955
Incidents on the Gaza border, the Israeli Foreign Ministry mobilizes celebrities to improve Israel's image … 2013? No, it's 1955, and instead of super-model Bar Refaeli, the Foreign Ministry wanted world famous physicist Albert Einstein to make a TV appearance to talk about Israel's scientific progress in honor of the country's Independence Day. Einstein, who was known as a maverick, preferred to speak about Israel's clash with Egypt, which he blamed on the Great Powers, but unfortunately he died just before the speech was made. You can read the story on our website, and you can see Bar Refaeli here:
Einstein was an early supporter of Zionism, and in 1921 he toured America to raise money for the movement with Dr. Chaim Weizmann. However he was also a pacifist, and his views sometimes led to clashes with Weizmann and other leaders of the movement. In later life he moderated his pacifism. These documents show clearly that he was determined to make his support for Israel public, even though he was in poor health and busy with his scientific work – up to his last breath.
Einstein was an early supporter of Zionism, and in 1921 he toured America to raise money for the movement with Dr. Chaim Weizmann. However he was also a pacifist, and his views sometimes led to clashes with Weizmann and other leaders of the movement. In later life he moderated his pacifism. These documents show clearly that he was determined to make his support for Israel public, even though he was in poor health and busy with his scientific work – up to his last breath.
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| Einstein, Weizmann and Zionist leaders, 1921 |
Wednesday, April 10, 2013
Prime Minister Sharett Writes to Nasser, 1954
Another document appearing in the ISA's joint Independence Day collection shown here yesterday, which received much attention in the Hebrew press, is a translation of a message sent to Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt on December 1954 by Israel's second prime minister, Moshe Sharett. The original in English was delivered as an oral message to an Egyptian envoy in Paris by Gideon Raphael, Sharett's advisor.
When the Free Officers deposed the king of Egypt in 1952, Israel hoped that the new regime would concentrate on land reform and solving Egypt's social problems, and be willing to make peace. But these hopes were disappointed. Nasser, who became prime minister in 1954, wanted to become the leader of the Arab world and threatened a "second round" of war. Incidents on the border with Gaza, then under Egyptian rule, multiplied and were followed by Israeli retaliation, in a spiral of escalation. Another problem area was Egyptian refusal to allow Israeli ships through the Suez Canal.
The arrest of a group of Egyptian Jews accused of sabotage and spying for Israel in the summer of 1954 increased the tension even more. The involvement of Israeli intelligence in this affair, known as the "unfortunate mishap", became known to Sharett only after the arrest and was kept secret from the public. The government did everything possible to help the accused. Unofficial contacts with the Egyptian junta were held, in which the two sides discussed an understanding between them. The letter to Nasser was part of these efforts. However Sharett's hopes of halting the deterioration of relations with Egypt were not realized. Two of the accused were sentenced to death and the rest to long terms in prison. In 1955, a major retaliation operation in Gaza and Nasser's decision to buy arms from Czechoslovakia, led to further tension, and eventually to the Sinai Campaign.
When the Free Officers deposed the king of Egypt in 1952, Israel hoped that the new regime would concentrate on land reform and solving Egypt's social problems, and be willing to make peace. But these hopes were disappointed. Nasser, who became prime minister in 1954, wanted to become the leader of the Arab world and threatened a "second round" of war. Incidents on the border with Gaza, then under Egyptian rule, multiplied and were followed by Israeli retaliation, in a spiral of escalation. Another problem area was Egyptian refusal to allow Israeli ships through the Suez Canal.
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| Gamal Abdel Nasser |
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| Newspaper headline on the execution of two of the agents, January 1955 |
Tuesday, December 18, 2012
Creating Constitutional Stability is Lots of Work
Our post yesterday about authorizing a commemorative stamp for Eleanor Roosevelt touched upon the question of whether the president had the authority to make such weighty decisions. Moreover, the cabinet evaded the question rather than answering it, and this was 15 years after the creation of the state. Constitutional principles, it turns out, are fine things to have, but they still leave wriggle room and wobble space, and these get dealt with in an incremental process which takes years, or decades, or centuries.
Here's another very similar example: in August 1955, President Izhak Ben Zvi complained to the Minister of Justice, Pinchas Rosenne, that although notionally he was supposed to appoint Israel's diplomats, in practice he often read about them in the newspaper before anyone ever informed him. Rosenne and his fellow ministers agreed among themselves that he had a point [p.7-8].
Here's another very similar example: in August 1955, President Izhak Ben Zvi complained to the Minister of Justice, Pinchas Rosenne, that although notionally he was supposed to appoint Israel's diplomats, in practice he often read about them in the newspaper before anyone ever informed him. Rosenne and his fellow ministers agreed among themselves that he had a point [p.7-8].
Monday, December 10, 2012
We're All Patriots, Except...
Here's a final post based on the deliberations of the Ministers' Committee for Foreign Relations and Security of December 13, 1955, and then it really is time to move on to other matters. (The previous posts on this document were here, here, and here.)
Near the end of the meeting (p.26), Ben Gurion responded to various complaints the ministers had made about the decision-making process prior to the operation against Syrian positions two days earlier. Some of the considerations of his colleagues he accepted, others he sharply rebutted. Yet ultimately, he concluded:
Near the end of the meeting (p.26), Ben Gurion responded to various complaints the ministers had made about the decision-making process prior to the operation against Syrian positions two days earlier. Some of the considerations of his colleagues he accepted, others he sharply rebutted. Yet ultimately, he concluded:
Our differences of opinion stem from common ground: I'm concerned for the future of the country, and others are likewise concerned. When it comes to that, I'm certain we're all equally concerned for the future of the state - well, except for the Communists.
Sunday, December 9, 2012
How are Military Actions Authorized?
Last week we posted twice about a government discussion from December 13th 1955. First, we cited David Ben Gurion explaining the need for significant military retaliation against Syrian military targets, after a period of many small-scale Syrian attacks against Israeli fishing on the Sea of Galilee. The next day we posted a letter of reprimand by Moshe Sharett, whom Ben Gurion had recently replaced as Prime Minister but who was still Foreign Minister.
The tension between them is an expression of the original question which brought me to this particular document: How do Israel's leaders decide on military action? What type of actions require authorization from which military or civil officials? The December 1955 discussion shows that there was already an accepted procedure, but also that it was not yet sufficiently well-defined.
The document is the stenogram of a meeting of the Ministers' Committee on Foreign Relations and Security. Nowadays there's a group with a shorter name, the Minister's Committee on Security Matters, which is quite active, and being a member is a sign of belonging to the upper echelon of the Cabinet. The earlier version seems to have been much less important. First, it didn't convene very often. Seond, whatever its task was, it clearly hadn't been consulted prior to the action on the Syrian front. Nor, for that matter, had Ben Gurion intended to convene it after the operation, either. He did so because another member, Haim-Moshe Shapira, insisted it be convened to discuss two matters. First, how is it possible that the cabinet sat until 8:30 PM the evening of the operation without any inkling of its advent, and the ministers simply heard about it the next morning on the news? Second, was there really need, and is there really justification, for such a large-scale operation? (50 Syrian soldiers had been killed along with 6 Israelis, and an additional 30 had ben captured and brought back to Israel.)
Ben Gurion launched into a response even before anyone else had a chance to voice an opinion.
In spite of Ben Gurion's historical stature, his contemporaries were not cowed by him. Pinchas Rosenne, the Justice Minister, pointed out that had there been a prior decision he might or might not have been swayed by BG's arguments, but in reality it was a near miss because the Syrians could have responded with greater force and both sides could have decsended into full war without the government ever having deliberated such a move. Development Minister Mordechai Bentov talked about the collective responsibility of all the members of the cabinet, and how that responsibility couldn't be reconciled with BG's way of making decisions. Transportation Minister Moshe Carmel noted that indeed such matters couldn't be discussed in the full cabinet which already has too much to do, but asked if it wasn't the specific task of the present committee? Levi Eshkol, on the other hand, Minister of Finance and future Prime Minister himself, felt the cabinet needed to decide on principles, while only a small group (presumably the three designated ministers) should make the concrete decisions.
Ben Gurion eventually closed the meeting with a decision to discuss the rules in a full cabinet meeting.
One final point which is quite startling from our point of view: The participants in the meeting were all ministers. No generals were invited nor their opinion even mentioned; and no legal advisors. The Ministers may not have been clear about how they were to reach decisions, but it didn't occur to them to defer to the civil servants.
The tension between them is an expression of the original question which brought me to this particular document: How do Israel's leaders decide on military action? What type of actions require authorization from which military or civil officials? The December 1955 discussion shows that there was already an accepted procedure, but also that it was not yet sufficiently well-defined.
The document is the stenogram of a meeting of the Ministers' Committee on Foreign Relations and Security. Nowadays there's a group with a shorter name, the Minister's Committee on Security Matters, which is quite active, and being a member is a sign of belonging to the upper echelon of the Cabinet. The earlier version seems to have been much less important. First, it didn't convene very often. Seond, whatever its task was, it clearly hadn't been consulted prior to the action on the Syrian front. Nor, for that matter, had Ben Gurion intended to convene it after the operation, either. He did so because another member, Haim-Moshe Shapira, insisted it be convened to discuss two matters. First, how is it possible that the cabinet sat until 8:30 PM the evening of the operation without any inkling of its advent, and the ministers simply heard about it the next morning on the news? Second, was there really need, and is there really justification, for such a large-scale operation? (50 Syrian soldiers had been killed along with 6 Israelis, and an additional 30 had ben captured and brought back to Israel.)
Ben Gurion launched into a response even before anyone else had a chance to voice an opinion.
I'm not going to talk abut the operation itself, since you've got all the details from the newspapers...
As to the dimensions: I'm surprised by you, Shapira. [Here he gave the explanation we published the other day about incremental attacks on Israeli fisherman vs. strong responses. He then continued] On Sunday there was a particularly nasty incident, and it just so happened that I was serving also as the Foreign Minister that day. [Sharett was abroad.] The pleasure to deal with such matters I don't wish on my enemies, not for the reasons you mention, and I'll get to them in a moment, but not because of the UN or the British or the Americans. The reason it's distasteful for me to deal with such matters is that I'm not certain all the men I send into action will return. That's the unpleasant part, and I've got a principle that I don't demand of others what I'd not be willing to do myself...Here Ben Gurion began describing the dynamics of a battle, in which you never know how the enemy will respond and therefore it's impossible to gauge how many casualties there will be.
I wish to say something about the impact. Whatever we do will make a splash abroad. When they kill one person, or blow up a well or knock down the wall of a house, the Times doesn't report on it. But when we send military units against military installations, that's a big story. [BG went into a long and very interesting digression about the use of military force and the media, and the ability to explain Israel's positions, before eventually meandering back to his original point:] I don't object if you wish to convene this committee, and if a decision is made to create a new procedure, so be it. In the meantime, however, there was a serious attack on our fishermen, and the routine is that the Minister of Defense - that's me - talks to the Prime Minister - that's me - and the Foreign Minister, who it so happened was also me, so I made the decision even though it wasn't easy.To which Shapira responded dryly: "we could have made it easier for you."
In spite of Ben Gurion's historical stature, his contemporaries were not cowed by him. Pinchas Rosenne, the Justice Minister, pointed out that had there been a prior decision he might or might not have been swayed by BG's arguments, but in reality it was a near miss because the Syrians could have responded with greater force and both sides could have decsended into full war without the government ever having deliberated such a move. Development Minister Mordechai Bentov talked about the collective responsibility of all the members of the cabinet, and how that responsibility couldn't be reconciled with BG's way of making decisions. Transportation Minister Moshe Carmel noted that indeed such matters couldn't be discussed in the full cabinet which already has too much to do, but asked if it wasn't the specific task of the present committee? Levi Eshkol, on the other hand, Minister of Finance and future Prime Minister himself, felt the cabinet needed to decide on principles, while only a small group (presumably the three designated ministers) should make the concrete decisions.
Ben Gurion eventually closed the meeting with a decision to discuss the rules in a full cabinet meeting.
One final point which is quite startling from our point of view: The participants in the meeting were all ministers. No generals were invited nor their opinion even mentioned; and no legal advisors. The Ministers may not have been clear about how they were to reach decisions, but it didn't occur to them to defer to the civil servants.
Thursday, December 6, 2012
Moshe Sharett and Operation Kinneret: Does Israel Have a Foreign Policy?
A footnote to yesterday's post about the Israeli operation against Syria on December 11-12, 1955 (known as "Operation Kinneret"): you can see quite a different side to this story in the collection of documents in Hebrew in memory of Moshe Sharett, Israel's second prime minister, published by the Archives in 2007.
Sharett generally opposed retaliatory attacks, believing that they had little effect and led to a spiral of violence. He had just been replaced as prime minister by Ben-Gurion, but was still serving as foreign minister. At the time of the operation he was in the United States, trying to raise money and mobilize political support for Israel against the threat of the Soviet-backed Nasser regime in Egypt. In September 1955, Czechoslovakia had announced a massive deal to sell modern arms and planes to Egypt, and Israel was seeking arms from the US to restore the balance. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had not yet given up hope of persuading Nasser to join the Western camp and was reluctant to help Israel. He warned it repeatedly against provoking a war.
The attack on Syria had no immediate cause. It was seen by the press (and still is by some historians) as an attempt by Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan to provoke a war with Syria into which Egypt would be drawn. Dayan favored a preventive war with Egypt before it could absorb the Czech weapons, and Ben-Gurion did too – some of the time. At others he was reluctant to risk war without Great Power support and a guaranteed supply of arms.
Sharett saw the Kinneret operation, which was widely condemned, as a direct attempt to undermine his efforts. Ben-Gurion did not consult him or the acting foreign minister, Golda Meir. Sharett wrote bitterly in his diary: "Defence Minister BG consulted Foreign Minister BG and received the approval of Prime Minister BG."
On December 13 he sent Ben-Gurion a caustic telegram:
Sharett generally opposed retaliatory attacks, believing that they had little effect and led to a spiral of violence. He had just been replaced as prime minister by Ben-Gurion, but was still serving as foreign minister. At the time of the operation he was in the United States, trying to raise money and mobilize political support for Israel against the threat of the Soviet-backed Nasser regime in Egypt. In September 1955, Czechoslovakia had announced a massive deal to sell modern arms and planes to Egypt, and Israel was seeking arms from the US to restore the balance. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had not yet given up hope of persuading Nasser to join the Western camp and was reluctant to help Israel. He warned it repeatedly against provoking a war.
The attack on Syria had no immediate cause. It was seen by the press (and still is by some historians) as an attempt by Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan to provoke a war with Syria into which Egypt would be drawn. Dayan favored a preventive war with Egypt before it could absorb the Czech weapons, and Ben-Gurion did too – some of the time. At others he was reluctant to risk war without Great Power support and a guaranteed supply of arms.
Sharett saw the Kinneret operation, which was widely condemned, as a direct attempt to undermine his efforts. Ben-Gurion did not consult him or the acting foreign minister, Golda Meir. Sharett wrote bitterly in his diary: "Defence Minister BG consulted Foreign Minister BG and received the approval of Prime Minister BG."
On December 13 he sent Ben-Gurion a caustic telegram:
Ben-Gurion.
In the wake of the retaliation in Syria ... I would like to bring the following facts to your attention.
A. Up till now there has never been a retaliatory operation which in its extent and force was so entirely out of proportion to the damage which preceded it.
B. The series of Syrian attacks on fishing in the Sea of Galilee [Kinneret] (which is dangerous in itself) did not lead to a single casualty in the last few months, whereas we killed fifty people at a single stroke and sacrificed at least four of our own men...
I. The damage to fishing ... has been going on for years, and even if it was decided to react to it with a major and crushing operation, a worse time for it could not have been chosen. It directly contradicts the vital political and diplomatic efforts being made in the name of the government and on its instructions, in both America and Europe, and is bound to give public opinion a false impression, which is completely opposed to the central political and military campaign [we are waging].
J. The question is bound to arise: does Israel have a single government, if so does it have a single policy, and if it does, does this policy consist of obstructing its representatives, sabotaging itself and missing its objectives?
Sharett
Wednesday, December 5, 2012
What's a Proportional Response?
This is the blog of an archives. We don't do yesterday's news; for that you've got better blogs. No, we do old stuff, from old times, when no-one did any blogging at all.
Here's a fascinating document from December 13th 1955, in which the Ministers' Committee for Security and Foreign Affairs discussed a clash which had taken place two nights earlier on the north-eastern coast of the Sea of Galillee: IDF infantry units had assaulted the Syrian positions the length of the coast (about ten kilometers), killing some 50 Syrian troops and capturing 30; six Israelis had been killed in the action. The commander of the action had been a young Lt. Colonel named Ariel Sharon; there are lots of pictures of the event here, and further details in Hebrew are here.
There are many interesting themes in the document, and I expect to come back to some of them in the next few days. Today I'd like to look at Ben Gurion's explanation for the background of the action:
Here's a fascinating document from December 13th 1955, in which the Ministers' Committee for Security and Foreign Affairs discussed a clash which had taken place two nights earlier on the north-eastern coast of the Sea of Galillee: IDF infantry units had assaulted the Syrian positions the length of the coast (about ten kilometers), killing some 50 Syrian troops and capturing 30; six Israelis had been killed in the action. The commander of the action had been a young Lt. Colonel named Ariel Sharon; there are lots of pictures of the event here, and further details in Hebrew are here.
There are many interesting themes in the document, and I expect to come back to some of them in the next few days. Today I'd like to look at Ben Gurion's explanation for the background of the action:
We're in a difficult situation with the Arabs, because when they wish to destroy or murder, they don't have to kill hundreds of us at a time. Instead, they make our life miserable day by day. Maybe they can't do otherwise, since they're afraid to send an entire military unit against us. So they send a small squad, and the squad crosses the border and waits for nightfall. Under cover of darkness they wander around until they find an object or a person, and they destroy it or kill the person. Their intention is to do this for years and wear us down...
We can't do what they do, even if we wished to, because we can't kill civillians, say to start killing Arab civilians we meet along the way..
So we have two options. We can resign ourselves to this situation, or we can not resign ourselves to it. This government was created to not resign itself to such a situation. I announced this in the Knesset. Based on that announcement, I called [Eedson] Burns [the UN commander in the area] and informed him that this government would respond and he should tell [Gamal] Nasser...
On the Sea of Galillee they've got a system. They shoot at our fishermen, and they shoot at our police boats. The entire lake is in our territory, no-one disputes that. It's the begining of the fishing season, and they've been shooting a lot. It's merely a coincidence that none of our people was hurt, but the boats have been hit. We can't accept this situation... In Syria there's no efficient regime, they're perpetually on the verge of a putsch. Either we'll aquiesce with the loss of our right to fish, or we'll have to destroy their fortifications. We could do as they do, and simply shoot back, but then we'll hit their civilians, beause their troops are all protected by their fortifications. I said: we're not going to target their civilians, their women and children, their villages, so we'll have to take and destroy their fortifications. [p.3-5]Later in the discussion Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol elaborated a bit further:
There haven't been many casualties on the lake, perhaps because many fishers stay away from that part of it. We slowly get used to the situation. It's far from Tel Aviv, it's far from Jerusalem, we're not there - yet that's where they're trying to kill our people...1955.
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