1968: Budgeting East Jerusalem
Today's document is a wee bit confusing. It was written by Yehuda Tamir, PM Levi Eshkol's man for dealing with East Jerusalem, and it details what the construction for the next year is to be. Except that nowadays, at any rate, that's decided by the Budget Department of the Finance Ministry, and even if the prime minister himself wants to have a certain result, it still goes through the FM, where the locals look at the suggestion balefully before eventually acquiescing (it is the prime minister, after all). Tamir's letter reeks of the confidence of someone who knows that his words, assumed to be those of his boss, will be acted upon.
It's a different world.
Another minor thing you need to keep in mind is that in the late 1960s, Israel's annual budget year ran from April 1 to March 31. An odd system, thankfully done away with for the complications it engendered. Why anyone would maintain such a system is beyond us.
(Yes, we know.)
Anyway. Not only was the budget year odd, they also didn't use Excel in those days, which makes deciphering the budget a bit challenging. I think he's talking about a sum in the excess of 12 million IL, some to come from bank loans, but I may be misreading. The items in the letter are pretty clear. There is to be construction for Jews on Jerusalem's north side, at Givat Hamivtar, French Hill and elsewhere. The planning of what later became East Talpiyot was to be completed so as to begin construction in 1970. The government offices on the road to Mont Scopus are to be promoted.
Yet there was also a budget for Arabs; homes were to be built for Arabs in Wadi Joz and Beit Hanina. The construction at Beit Hanina really did happen and the buildings are still there; I don't know about Wadi Joz.
(File א-7921/3)
It's a different world.
Another minor thing you need to keep in mind is that in the late 1960s, Israel's annual budget year ran from April 1 to March 31. An odd system, thankfully done away with for the complications it engendered. Why anyone would maintain such a system is beyond us.
(Yes, we know.)
Anyway. Not only was the budget year odd, they also didn't use Excel in those days, which makes deciphering the budget a bit challenging. I think he's talking about a sum in the excess of 12 million IL, some to come from bank loans, but I may be misreading. The items in the letter are pretty clear. There is to be construction for Jews on Jerusalem's north side, at Givat Hamivtar, French Hill and elsewhere. The planning of what later became East Talpiyot was to be completed so as to begin construction in 1970. The government offices on the road to Mont Scopus are to be promoted.
Yet there was also a budget for Arabs; homes were to be built for Arabs in Wadi Joz and Beit Hanina. The construction at Beit Hanina really did happen and the buildings are still there; I don't know about Wadi Joz.
(File א-7921/3)
Tuesday, July 23, 2013
Electrifying the Territories
The things a prime minister has to deal with, I tell you. We think we've got it tough, being so busy these past weeks that blogging has mostly stopped. Well, back in the first years after the Six Day War, the PM's office seems to have been involved with every tiniest detail pertaining to Israel's actions in Jerusalem, and if not every one of them, at least a startling range of things.
Here, look at this document from September 15, 1968. Yehuda Faust, the deputy manager of operations in East Jerusalem, sent a letter to the electricity company (and to the ministers of defense, justice, development, the mayor of Jerusalem and various others) reporting on a recent meeting where it had been decided to lay high-voltage cables to the Jewish neighborhoods in north-east Jerusalem such as French Hill and Givat Hamivtar, and also to series of military camps, mostly to the north. Alas, meetings and decisions were one thing, and actions on the ground were another, so Faust was nagging.
He also included various technical data. There were to be 89 km of cable, at a cost of IL3,240,000.
On page 3, which was apparently added a bit later, Mr Rakover (whoever he was) announced he couldn't string up cables in East Jerusalem without someone in authority OK'ing it, and he didn't know who that might be.
Page 5 mentions that to the south of Jerusalem, some of the installations are settlements, not military camps.
Here, look at this document from September 15, 1968. Yehuda Faust, the deputy manager of operations in East Jerusalem, sent a letter to the electricity company (and to the ministers of defense, justice, development, the mayor of Jerusalem and various others) reporting on a recent meeting where it had been decided to lay high-voltage cables to the Jewish neighborhoods in north-east Jerusalem such as French Hill and Givat Hamivtar, and also to series of military camps, mostly to the north. Alas, meetings and decisions were one thing, and actions on the ground were another, so Faust was nagging.
He also included various technical data. There were to be 89 km of cable, at a cost of IL3,240,000.
On page 3, which was apparently added a bit later, Mr Rakover (whoever he was) announced he couldn't string up cables in East Jerusalem without someone in authority OK'ing it, and he didn't know who that might be.
Page 5 mentions that to the south of Jerusalem, some of the installations are settlements, not military camps.
Sunday, June 30, 2013
Incorporation Papers of the Jewish Quarter Company
Today's document is a dreary legal affair: the incorporation of the Company for Development of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City (September 1968). This is the organization which rebuilt the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, and turned it from a pile of rubble into a modern residential neighborhood in one of the worlds' oldest cities, even while preserving the immense archaeological site it is built on, and serving millions of tourists annually.
The document itself is as bad as most such documents are, so we're going to cheat. We're going to send the link to this post to a reader of our blog who is both a lawyer and an incurable Jerusalem expert. If he thinks the document has interesting stuff in it, we'll post his comments automatically. (Readers are encouraged to chip in if they'd like.)
The second thing we're gong to do is point out that we found the document in a file from the office of Prime Minster Levi Eshkol, and it was sent to him after a discussion in the Cabinet subcommittee for economic affairs - which indicates that the whole issue was being closely watched by the very top of the government. Most companies don't have the prime minister poking around in their papers.
Ah, and a third matter, a little anecdote. The secretary of the Cabinet subcommittee was one Michael Nir. These days Michael Nir, the same man, works part time on the staff of the ISA - though he's rather a bit older these days.
(Photo: Wikipedia Commons)
The second thing we're gong to do is point out that we found the document in a file from the office of Prime Minster Levi Eshkol, and it was sent to him after a discussion in the Cabinet subcommittee for economic affairs - which indicates that the whole issue was being closely watched by the very top of the government. Most companies don't have the prime minister poking around in their papers.
Ah, and a third matter, a little anecdote. The secretary of the Cabinet subcommittee was one Michael Nir. These days Michael Nir, the same man, works part time on the staff of the ISA - though he's rather a bit older these days.
(Photo: Wikipedia Commons)
Thursday, June 27, 2013
"We Must Rebuild the Hurva!"
Before the destruction of the ancient Jewish Quarter in the Old City in 1948, the most impressive of its many synagogues went by the odd name of the Hurva, which means The Ruin. The reason for this went back to the early 19th century, when construction was begun and then abandoned; in the 19th century, however, a very fine building was constructed, but the traditional name stuck.
In the battle for the Jewish Quarter in May 1948, the dome of the building was damaged, but when the Jews surrendered to the Arab Legion and left, it was still standing. When Israel took the city in June 1967, the Hurva looked like - well, a hurva.
In late 1968, a Haifa architect named Yaacov Salomon began a frustrating correspondence with the office of Levi Eshkol, the prime minister. Salomon was representing the famous American-Jewish architect Louis Kahn, who had apparently drawn up a proposal to rebuild the Hurva. Correctly or not, Salomon assumed that the only way to make this happen was by convincing the prime minister. To his growing frustration, he wasn't able to reach the prime minster, and certainly not to convince him. In today's documents we can follow his repeated letters to Eshkol - there are at least five of them - between September and November 1968. In response to one of the first letters Eshkol had written that his opinion was that rebuilding the Jewish quarter - the apartments - was more urgent than rebuilding the synagogue, but Salomon disagreed, and wrote ever more exasperated letters. Eshkol's aides, meanwhile, kept putting off the date for a meeting, and this, of course, made Salomon even angrier.
There was the small matter that Eshkol was dying of cancer, but this wasn't public knowledge. It was known, even to Salomon, that he was ill, but this didn't register. In November, he announced that he was washing his hands of the matter. In February 1969, Eshkol passed away, and if the subject was brought to the next prime minster, Golda Meir, the file from Eshkol's office doesn't say.
The synagogue itself was only rebuilt in the early 21st century, and now looks like this:
(The pictures are all from Wikipedia commons. The file with the letters is ג-6423/9)
In the battle for the Jewish Quarter in May 1948, the dome of the building was damaged, but when the Jews surrendered to the Arab Legion and left, it was still standing. When Israel took the city in June 1967, the Hurva looked like - well, a hurva.
There was the small matter that Eshkol was dying of cancer, but this wasn't public knowledge. It was known, even to Salomon, that he was ill, but this didn't register. In November, he announced that he was washing his hands of the matter. In February 1969, Eshkol passed away, and if the subject was brought to the next prime minster, Golda Meir, the file from Eshkol's office doesn't say.
The synagogue itself was only rebuilt in the early 21st century, and now looks like this:
Wednesday, June 26, 2013
Construction Status in Jerusalem, September 1968
It's been ages since we've posted on what used to be one of our main pet projects, namely Jerusalem after the Six Day War. Well, yesterday a file crossed my desk which had been ordered by a researcher in the reading room; when he declared it "uninteresting" someone brought it to me to have a peek. I don't think it's uninteresting. (ג-6423/9)
The file is from Levi Eshkol's office. The particular document we'll start with is an unsigned report from September 19, 1968, summarizing government construction projects in Jerusalem 15 months after the war.
In the east of the city there are 900 apartments under construction, and another 600 will be in construction within six months, for a total of 1,500. In the west part of town, the government is constructing 800 apartments, and private builders are working on 700, so that's also 1,500 units. We've prepared plots for the construction of 1,900 units in the east, but there aren't enough builders.
On Mount Scopus, enough dormitories are being built to accommodate 450 students by the beginning of the academic year (early November, apparently).
The first stage of construction on the national headquarters of the Police has been completed; the rest will be completed according to plan. Meanwhile, the Jerusalem headquarters has been moved to the Jericho Road in East Jerusalem.
The construction of 200 units for Arabs has been authorized. A fund has been set up, and IL250,000 of IL1m have already been earmarked.
Reconstruction is underway in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. 450 squatters have been removed from the shacks and ruins they were living in; 100 Jews have been settled in the first 200 rooms to have been renovated. They will be joined soon by another 300, and the renovation plans for additional structures are underway. We've begun laying water and electric mains. We've invested IL500,000 in removing 10,000 cubic meters of debris from the area.
Next year, we'll build 400 units on French Hill and 1,000 on Givat Hatachmoshet and 600 in Neve Yaacov (in East Jerusalem). Normally it takes 18 months to build a unit, but in light of the labor shortage it's taking longer.
Sunday, April 7, 2013
Martin Luther King - 45 years since the assasination
Last Thursday, April 4th, commemorated the 45th anniversary of the murder of the American civil rights leader, the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. Reverend King was assassinated on the balcony of his hotel in Memphis on April 4, 1968. Here is another opportunity to revisit the Israel State Archives's publication of the efforts to invite Reverend King to Israel. One can view also further posts on this blog concerning this issue.
 |
| (Wikimedia Commons) |
Sunday, March 10, 2013
The Death of the Dakar
On January 25, 1968, contact with the Dakar was lost. The Israeli navy's newest acquisition, a submarine manned by a crew of 69, was on its maiden voyage from the UK, where it had been purchased, to Israel. The crew may or may not have known what happened to them; the rest of us will never know. As the submerged ship was on course somewhere between Crete and Cyprus, something malfunctioned and it sunk to the bottom; its remains were found only 31 years later, in 1999.
But none of this was known in January and February 1968. All that was known at the time was that contact with the submarine had been lost, and a flurry of diplomatic activity, international military cooperation, wild rumors, and malicious disinformation filled Israel's media. It turns out, now that the ISA has published a trove of documents from the inner circles of government, that exactly the same was going on there. The generals, diplomats and politicians knew exactly not an iota more than anyone else.
Our (Hebrew language) publication this morning includes more than a dozen documents. There are diplomatic cables to and from Israeli delegations involved in coordinating search operations with the participation of the US, British and Greek navies; the Turks didn't allow foreigners into their territorial waters but searched on their own. A Dutch clairvoyant reported to the Israeli embassy in the Netherlands that the submarine seemed to have been hit by a torpedo and was lying on the sea floor west of Cyprus; for lack of anything better to say, the embassy sent a cable about this back to Jerusalem, marked "Urgent".
The top admiral of the navy, Shlomo Erel, reported to the government about the searches and speculations: had the Dakar perhaps been sunk by the Egyptians? By the Soviets? Did the Americans have information about a Soviet attack which they were withholding?
In early February, even the Israelis understood it was too late to save anyone, and the searches were called off; the crew was declared Missing in Action. On March 6, 1968, the cabinet declared the ship officially lost and the crew dead; the decision was announced in the Knesset later that day.
But none of this was known in January and February 1968. All that was known at the time was that contact with the submarine had been lost, and a flurry of diplomatic activity, international military cooperation, wild rumors, and malicious disinformation filled Israel's media. It turns out, now that the ISA has published a trove of documents from the inner circles of government, that exactly the same was going on there. The generals, diplomats and politicians knew exactly not an iota more than anyone else.
Our (Hebrew language) publication this morning includes more than a dozen documents. There are diplomatic cables to and from Israeli delegations involved in coordinating search operations with the participation of the US, British and Greek navies; the Turks didn't allow foreigners into their territorial waters but searched on their own. A Dutch clairvoyant reported to the Israeli embassy in the Netherlands that the submarine seemed to have been hit by a torpedo and was lying on the sea floor west of Cyprus; for lack of anything better to say, the embassy sent a cable about this back to Jerusalem, marked "Urgent".
The top admiral of the navy, Shlomo Erel, reported to the government about the searches and speculations: had the Dakar perhaps been sunk by the Egyptians? By the Soviets? Did the Americans have information about a Soviet attack which they were withholding?
In early February, even the Israelis understood it was too late to save anyone, and the searches were called off; the crew was declared Missing in Action. On March 6, 1968, the cabinet declared the ship officially lost and the crew dead; the decision was announced in the Knesset later that day.
Monday, February 11, 2013
Seizure of Private Property in East Jerusalem
Let's not beat around the bush. In May 1967 there were no Jews in the Jordanian sections of Jerusalem. Today there are more than 200,000 Jews living in the parts of town that Israel took from Jordan in the Six Day War. Most of them live on what were once empty hilltops, as those of us old enough to remember can attest even without any archives. Yet even barren rocky hilltops may have been owned, at least in some cases, by individuals. And some of those Jews moved into places such as the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, where the ruined buildings were owned by someone, or the decrepit buildings were inhabited. Which means that at some point, in 1967 or 1970 or 1972, Israel's government expropriated Arab property, or used Eminent Domain, whatever legal terminology you wish to use to describe the action of transferring ownership of property from some individuals, for the purpose of executing policy.
Today's file (גל-13927/17) comes from the Advisor for Arab Affairs, whom we introduced here (and also here). It doesn't describe Israel's policy of seizure of property, which was done in another agency (the Land Administration Agency), but rather the complaints about the policy which were directed towards the Prime Minister's Office, i.e. the Advisor for Arab Affairs in the PMO.
Most of the file is sealed. Not because there are any dark security secrets in it, but because by Israeli law, an individual who passes private information to an authority has the expectation of his (or her) privacy being respected. Once 70 years have passed we may assume the individuals are no longer alive and the files can be opened, but the letters in this file are from 40-45 years ago. Still, by way of giving a taste of what was in them, see pages 7 and 8.
The fellow on page 7, for example: He lived in the Old City, and had been informed his home was about to be seized. So he wrote to the prime minister and made five points:
1. My house is right next to the holy places of Jews and Muslims, so there's no price you can give me to equal what it's worth.
2. The government says the seizure is for the public good, but I don't see any benefit.
3. As an Israeli citizen I demand to stay where I am and I'll promise to respect all the laws.
4. I reserve the right to go to the courts.
5. I'm enclosing the documents which prove my ownership.
Or page 8: Yosef Dan-Gor writing to his boss, Shmuel Toledano, the Advisor for Arab Affairs himself, in the matter of two familes who own homes in the Sheikh Jarrakh area where the government intents to construct a number of ministries. The two familes are obstinate not to leave. Ovad Yakir of the Land Administration Authority, he writes, has suggested I meet them and make a seriously generous offer, before we turn to legal action. I think he's right, but I need your permission. [Intriguingly, they may not have been moved. If you go to the government compound in Sheikh Jarrah you can see that a number of older, Arab, homes are still there.]
Pages 2-5 are a letter from a voluntary welfare organization near the Mount of Olives. In January 196,8 they had been informed that they were to be moved elsewhere because the government was seizing their building, and they strenously obejcted. In addition to describing all the important things their organization did, they also pointed out that the building belonged to the Waqf and thus couldn't be expropriated, and also warned that such an action would cause public unrest and was against peace.
The letter on page 6 is also from Dan-Gor to his boss Toledano, in August 1960: there are five Arab families on French Hill who since January 1968 have been refusing all offers we've made. My impression is that they're not going to change their minds. [Here also: go to this area today and you'll see more than five Arab homes which have been there since before 1967. Are they the same families? Did Israel eventually back down?]
Page 9 is yet another letter from Dan-Gor: regarding the area where the Jordanian army had a military position south of the UN headquarters ("The Sausage"): Colonel Halamish informs us that the IDF is willing to vacate the hilltop to facilitate the construction of the Armon Hanaziv neighborhood.
And finally, most interestingly, the letter on page 10, Dan-Gor to his boss in May 1970: We're trying to seize an area in Wadi Joz so as to build a neighborhood for the [Arab] families which are being evicted from the Jewish Quarter in the Old City. The construction will be done by the [Arab] contractor Kalik Jad'On. The snag is that some of the owners of plots in that area are refusing to go along with the agreement we've already made with most of their neighbours, and now they've turned to the High Court of Justice (Bagatz).
Today's file (גל-13927/17) comes from the Advisor for Arab Affairs, whom we introduced here (and also here). It doesn't describe Israel's policy of seizure of property, which was done in another agency (the Land Administration Agency), but rather the complaints about the policy which were directed towards the Prime Minister's Office, i.e. the Advisor for Arab Affairs in the PMO.
Most of the file is sealed. Not because there are any dark security secrets in it, but because by Israeli law, an individual who passes private information to an authority has the expectation of his (or her) privacy being respected. Once 70 years have passed we may assume the individuals are no longer alive and the files can be opened, but the letters in this file are from 40-45 years ago. Still, by way of giving a taste of what was in them, see pages 7 and 8.
The fellow on page 7, for example: He lived in the Old City, and had been informed his home was about to be seized. So he wrote to the prime minister and made five points:
1. My house is right next to the holy places of Jews and Muslims, so there's no price you can give me to equal what it's worth.
2. The government says the seizure is for the public good, but I don't see any benefit.
3. As an Israeli citizen I demand to stay where I am and I'll promise to respect all the laws.
4. I reserve the right to go to the courts.
5. I'm enclosing the documents which prove my ownership.
Or page 8: Yosef Dan-Gor writing to his boss, Shmuel Toledano, the Advisor for Arab Affairs himself, in the matter of two familes who own homes in the Sheikh Jarrakh area where the government intents to construct a number of ministries. The two familes are obstinate not to leave. Ovad Yakir of the Land Administration Authority, he writes, has suggested I meet them and make a seriously generous offer, before we turn to legal action. I think he's right, but I need your permission. [Intriguingly, they may not have been moved. If you go to the government compound in Sheikh Jarrah you can see that a number of older, Arab, homes are still there.]
Pages 2-5 are a letter from a voluntary welfare organization near the Mount of Olives. In January 196,8 they had been informed that they were to be moved elsewhere because the government was seizing their building, and they strenously obejcted. In addition to describing all the important things their organization did, they also pointed out that the building belonged to the Waqf and thus couldn't be expropriated, and also warned that such an action would cause public unrest and was against peace.
The letter on page 6 is also from Dan-Gor to his boss Toledano, in August 1960: there are five Arab families on French Hill who since January 1968 have been refusing all offers we've made. My impression is that they're not going to change their minds. [Here also: go to this area today and you'll see more than five Arab homes which have been there since before 1967. Are they the same families? Did Israel eventually back down?]
Page 9 is yet another letter from Dan-Gor: regarding the area where the Jordanian army had a military position south of the UN headquarters ("The Sausage"): Colonel Halamish informs us that the IDF is willing to vacate the hilltop to facilitate the construction of the Armon Hanaziv neighborhood.
And finally, most interestingly, the letter on page 10, Dan-Gor to his boss in May 1970: We're trying to seize an area in Wadi Joz so as to build a neighborhood for the [Arab] families which are being evicted from the Jewish Quarter in the Old City. The construction will be done by the [Arab] contractor Kalik Jad'On. The snag is that some of the owners of plots in that area are refusing to go along with the agreement we've already made with most of their neighbours, and now they've turned to the High Court of Justice (Bagatz).
Wednesday, January 30, 2013
1968: Housing Projects in Jerusalem
Back in 1968 (and perhaps before and after, our file doesn't say), the management of the Ministry of Housing and Construction used to convene once a month or so to review policies and programs. The minister (Mordechai Bentov in 1968) participated, as did the general manager, David Tene, and lots of top officials. They didn't set national housing policy, but their reviews covered all the large projects they were running and they discussed their pace of progress or - often - how budgetary constraints were preventing them from reaching their goals. In general, the protocols of these meetings would delight urban planners who are also history buffs, or historians of urban development; economic historians interested in how Israel's government tried to control the housing market may also take joy in these files.
The rest of us - well, let's just say one can find more dramatic files in the archives. Yet before we shrug and move on to the next file, let's glance quickly at file ג-4457/1which contains the records of three such meetings, in May, June and August 1968.
On May 29, 1968, Bentov opened the meeting by talking about a recent cut of IL140,000,000 to the ministry's budget (the money was being transfered to the Ministry of Defense). There was some good news, however, such as an added IL26,000,000 for construction in East Jerusalem (p. 2). Tene then commented that Jerusalem was about the only area where the ministry's large projects were progressing quickly (p. 4); the government had decided that Jerusalem and Beer Sheva had the highest priority. Further on, one of the participants noted that since construction in Jerusalem had been slow in previous years, there would be a shortage of new apartments until the current projects would begin to come onto the market, in 1969-70 (p. 6). Bentov also noted that the Prime Minister had urged him to set up a few dozen shacks near Mount Scopus so that someone would start moving in already.
At the next meeting, on June 5, 1968 (exactly a year after the Six Day War), Bentov opened his review by noting that on the land which had been expropriated in East Jerusalem, the ministry intended to build 2,500 housing units--1,200 in the first stage and the rest in a second stage. The original intention had been to start with 400 private homes on what is now known as Givat Hamivtar, but now it seemed better to allocate plots for only 250 of them and to use the rest for apartment buildings. This then set off a lively discussion, as more than 1,200 families had already signed up for the project. There was also a plan to build cheaper apartments near Sanhedria for religious families. (Well, that certainly happened.) (p.9-10)
Much of the meeting of August 22, 1968, focused on the various construction projects in East Jerusalem - certainly more than any other single area. One of the construction companies was already working, another two were expected to start very soon. One problem they were going to encounter was a lack of professional construction workers; discussions with the ministry of Labor were already underway to employ a few hundred laborers from the West Bank, some of whom would need to be sent through training courses. (p.14-ff).
All the construction projects being discussed in Summer 1968 were in the north-east of town: Sanhedria, Givat Hamivtar, French Hill, and perhaps the area which would later be named Ramat Eshkol (PM Levi Eshkol died in 1969).
The rest of us - well, let's just say one can find more dramatic files in the archives. Yet before we shrug and move on to the next file, let's glance quickly at file ג-4457/1which contains the records of three such meetings, in May, June and August 1968.
On May 29, 1968, Bentov opened the meeting by talking about a recent cut of IL140,000,000 to the ministry's budget (the money was being transfered to the Ministry of Defense). There was some good news, however, such as an added IL26,000,000 for construction in East Jerusalem (p. 2). Tene then commented that Jerusalem was about the only area where the ministry's large projects were progressing quickly (p. 4); the government had decided that Jerusalem and Beer Sheva had the highest priority. Further on, one of the participants noted that since construction in Jerusalem had been slow in previous years, there would be a shortage of new apartments until the current projects would begin to come onto the market, in 1969-70 (p. 6). Bentov also noted that the Prime Minister had urged him to set up a few dozen shacks near Mount Scopus so that someone would start moving in already.
At the next meeting, on June 5, 1968 (exactly a year after the Six Day War), Bentov opened his review by noting that on the land which had been expropriated in East Jerusalem, the ministry intended to build 2,500 housing units--1,200 in the first stage and the rest in a second stage. The original intention had been to start with 400 private homes on what is now known as Givat Hamivtar, but now it seemed better to allocate plots for only 250 of them and to use the rest for apartment buildings. This then set off a lively discussion, as more than 1,200 families had already signed up for the project. There was also a plan to build cheaper apartments near Sanhedria for religious families. (Well, that certainly happened.) (p.9-10)
Much of the meeting of August 22, 1968, focused on the various construction projects in East Jerusalem - certainly more than any other single area. One of the construction companies was already working, another two were expected to start very soon. One problem they were going to encounter was a lack of professional construction workers; discussions with the ministry of Labor were already underway to employ a few hundred laborers from the West Bank, some of whom would need to be sent through training courses. (p.14-ff).
All the construction projects being discussed in Summer 1968 were in the north-east of town: Sanhedria, Givat Hamivtar, French Hill, and perhaps the area which would later be named Ramat Eshkol (PM Levi Eshkol died in 1969).
Tuesday, January 29, 2013
ID Cards for Arabs in East Jerusalem (1967-70)
Yesterday I introduced the Advisor on Arab Affairs, and we looked at one of his files on East Jerusalem. Here's another one, of a very diferent character however. As the front page of the file indicates, its title is bland and uninformative: "ID cards". Could mean all sorts of things, no?
The file contains three distinct types of records, all of which indeed fit under that title. The first are a few letters dealing with the practicalities of handing out Israeli ID cards to the Arabs of East Jerusalem.
On page 2 of the file we've got a handwritten summary of a conversation one of the officials had with Mr. Zarfati fo the Ministry of Interior on November 14th 1967: The ministry continues to hand out ID cards to anyone with a note of participation in either of the two census actions taken since the Six Day War in East Jerusalem. People who were not counted and registered, and thus have no notes, are not granted ID cards at this stage. Apparently, there are thousands of them. Requests for re-unifiation of families should be submitted to Zarfati if they're in Jerusalem, or to the Military Governor if they're elsewhere in the West Bank.
Pages 3-5 are the Arabic original and the Hebrew translation of a letter by the head of the Arab Chamber of Commerce to the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Barakat. Barakat noticed the long lines and interminable hours of waiting required of people trying to pick up their new ID card, and he had all sorts of suggestions for improvements: more clerks, informing people in advance which day they should come to the office to get their ID card, and creating a separate line in a separate section of the building for women, so that they not need to stand among the men (October 30, 1967). As we saw yesterday, the Arabs of East Jerusalem took it for granted that Israeli officials either knew Arabic or would make the effort to translate their incoming mail.
Much of the file contains dozens of letters by individual Arabs explaining how come they came not to have census notes ("my wife was in the hospital that day") and requesting their ID cards. These letters were still being written in 1970. (I didn't scan this section of the file for privacy purposes.)
The part of the file which seems most significant is the attempt by Eli Amir, an official in the office, writing to his boss, the Advisor on Arab Affairs himself, Shmuel Toledano. Toledano later went on to be elected to the Knesset, while his underling, Amir, grew up to be an important novelist and public figure; in 1968, however, it's a safe bet they were both mostly unknown to the general public. On June 12, 1968, exactly a year after the unification of Jerusalem, Amir summarized the status of issuing ID cards:
The file contains three distinct types of records, all of which indeed fit under that title. The first are a few letters dealing with the practicalities of handing out Israeli ID cards to the Arabs of East Jerusalem.
On page 2 of the file we've got a handwritten summary of a conversation one of the officials had with Mr. Zarfati fo the Ministry of Interior on November 14th 1967: The ministry continues to hand out ID cards to anyone with a note of participation in either of the two census actions taken since the Six Day War in East Jerusalem. People who were not counted and registered, and thus have no notes, are not granted ID cards at this stage. Apparently, there are thousands of them. Requests for re-unifiation of families should be submitted to Zarfati if they're in Jerusalem, or to the Military Governor if they're elsewhere in the West Bank.
Pages 3-5 are the Arabic original and the Hebrew translation of a letter by the head of the Arab Chamber of Commerce to the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Barakat. Barakat noticed the long lines and interminable hours of waiting required of people trying to pick up their new ID card, and he had all sorts of suggestions for improvements: more clerks, informing people in advance which day they should come to the office to get their ID card, and creating a separate line in a separate section of the building for women, so that they not need to stand among the men (October 30, 1967). As we saw yesterday, the Arabs of East Jerusalem took it for granted that Israeli officials either knew Arabic or would make the effort to translate their incoming mail.
Much of the file contains dozens of letters by individual Arabs explaining how come they came not to have census notes ("my wife was in the hospital that day") and requesting their ID cards. These letters were still being written in 1970. (I didn't scan this section of the file for privacy purposes.)
The part of the file which seems most significant is the attempt by Eli Amir, an official in the office, writing to his boss, the Advisor on Arab Affairs himself, Shmuel Toledano. Toledano later went on to be elected to the Knesset, while his underling, Amir, grew up to be an important novelist and public figure; in 1968, however, it's a safe bet they were both mostly unknown to the general public. On June 12, 1968, exactly a year after the unification of Jerusalem, Amir summarized the status of issuing ID cards:
1. There were two census actions. The first by the Ministry of the Interior in July 1967; the second by the Municipality in September.So did Toledano sit down and write a full response to Amir? Apparently not. A month later, on August 9, 1968, Amir wrote again: We need a policy. Legitimate people are hamstrung, and also the press is sniffing around the story (p. 8). Another month passed, and on September 2 Amir wrote again: "I'm sorry for being a nag (nudnick) but we really do need a policy." On September 3, someone inserted a tiny note into the file:
2. Most people were registered in the first census, and they've been given ID cards. A small group, comprised mostly of young men, was registered but didn't request their cards. We don't know why. When they come now, almost a year later, they must give a satisfying explanation before cards are issued to them.
So far about 65,000 cards have been issued. We assume about 6,000 people have yet to request them:
a. Families. Estimated at about 5,000 people in complete family units, they were missed in the first census and identified in the second.
b. Individuals. Estimated at about 1,000, they are divided as follows:
b1. Unmarried people of all ages who live with identifed parents. They are given ID cards when they prove they live with their parents.
b2. Uncles, grandparents etc: likewise. As soon as they demonstrate that they live with registered relatives they're issued cards.
b3. Unmarried singles without registered families. They are not issued ID cards at this stage.
b4. Families with only one registered parent. Probably about 250 people, and they're issued cards.
3. The municipality counted 65,857 people. About 65,000 ID cards have already been issued, yet there are still those 6,000. So there seem to be about 71,000 Arabs in East Jerusalem. Where did the last 5,000 come from?
Three possibilities:
a. The census wasn't accurate.
b. People are infiltrating from outside Jerusalem.
c. Both of the above.
4. The East Jerusalem branch of the Ministry of the Interior reports that there continue to be new applicants. We don't know how to explain these ongoing applications - why did people wait a year? How did they live their lives for a year with no papers?
5. Conclusions:
1. There seem to be significant numbers of infiltrators.
2. Perhaps we should stop accepting new applications.
3. The groups of legitimate applicants (above) should be given ID cards.
4. A committee should be created to decide about the unclear 6,000 people: interior, police, security.
5. Assuming the committee will identify infiltrators, we need a decision as to what happens to them.
Sima in Toledano's name says the Cabinet will set up a committee.The file has nothing helpful to add.
Monday, January 21, 2013
Martin Luther King's plan to visit Israel in 1967
Last week, we posted an official publication on our website on the connection between Martin Luther King Jr. and Israel. We showed how Israeli and Jewish groups tried to invite MLK to the Jewish state several times, but to no avail.
King's attitude towards Israel has been a subject of some controversy. At his blog, Prof. Martin Kramer recently re-published a March 2012 article tracing the provenance of a quote attributed to King, in which he rebuked a student attacking Zionism. King was quoted as saying "When people criticize Zionists, they mean Jews. You’re talking anti-Semitism!”
In 2004, two Palestinian-American activists suggested that this quote was fabricated or invented. They claimed, in a nutshell, that MLK could not have said it, because he was not and could not have been in the place where he was claimed to have done so -- Cambridge, Massachusetts -- before his assassination. In this very researched and detailed article, Prof. Kramer proves that King could have said that quote -- since he was most certainly in Cambridge in late October 1967.
Prof. Kramer also posted on Facebook a most interesting poster of Martin Luther King's planned visit to the Holy Land in November 1967, after the visit that was cancelled due to the Six Day War. We published on our site the formal invitation to visit Israel sent by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to Martin Luther King, and King's acceptance of the invitation. In his own words: "I take these means to express my deep appreciation to you for the invitation you extended to me to come to your wonderful country."
While I was writing this post, Prof. Kramer posted another piece, solving a question that had arisen while we were preparing our official publication: Why didn't Rev. King visit Israel in 1967, as he promised PM Eshkol in May 1967? Prof. Kramer found the answer in the FBI wiretaps of King and his advisers. In a conference call with his advisers, King said that if he went to the Middle East “I’d run into the situation where I’m damned if I say this and I’m damned if I say that, no matter what I’d say, and I’ve already faced enough criticism including pro-Arab” and that "I just think that if I go, the Arab world, and of course Africa and Asia for that matter, would interpret this as endorsing everything that Israel has done, and I do have questions of doubt."
Tuesday, January 1, 2013
"Let's not miss the Messiah in Jerusalem"
Here's a letter from Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to Minister of Housing Mordechai Bentov, on June 24, 1968. The file it comes from must have been opened by a new secretary who was then moved elsewhere, as it contains only two unconnected letters and a handwritten note - so I can't tell anything about the context, or the previous or subsequent events. All we've got is this single letter, standing on its own. (ג-6420.9).
Yet I think that if I quote it in its entirety, it tells a profound story - or three of them, or six - rather well. It does this so very well that I'm not even going to add annotations, even at the risk that some readers will miss some of the layers of this little gem:
Yet I think that if I quote it in its entirety, it tells a profound story - or three of them, or six - rather well. It does this so very well that I'm not even going to add annotations, even at the risk that some readers will miss some of the layers of this little gem:
To: The Minister of Housing
From: The Prime Minister
You can imagine that I know a bit about creating new townships, and the distinction between founding a town and baking bread is clear to me. Yet even bread rolls need to be baked properly, but sometimes they're baked hurriedly as our fathers baked on their way out of Egypt. But it's possible to stoke the furnace and prepare the dough concurrently, and there's no need to wait between one activity and the next.
History will forgive us if we miss by a centimeter or two, and it won't be important. I took umbrage at the complacence in your words when you said that there's no hurry, nothing is running away, and Jerusalem will remain ours forever. The reality is that the ground is burning under our feet and any delay could cause us to miss the steps of the Messiah.
Sincerely,
Levi Eshkol
Wednesday, November 7, 2012
Blowing Up Houses
Here's a short section from a 1968 newsreel about building homes in 24 hours, by inflating a balloon, encasing it with cement, and pulling out the deflated balloon. To be honest, it doesn't look particularly convincing, which may explain why there aren't thousands of such structures all over the country. Yomanei Geva 424, file number 425/7 קב
No comments:
Post a Comment