"Stop Shooting and Start Talking": From Opposition to Acceptance of the Rogers Plan, June-August 1970, Part 1

"Stop Shooting and Start Talking": From Opposition to Acceptance of the Rogers Plan, June-August 1970, Part 1

45 years after Israeli acceptance of the Rogers Plan to end the War of Attrition with Egypt, the ISA reveals for the first time the government discussions leading to the decision.

On 8 August 1970, the ceasefire  between Israel and Egypt came into effect, bringing to an end the war on the Suez Canal. This conflict, now largely forgotten, had continued intermittently since March 1969 and claimed the lives of hundreds of Israeli soldiers, while thousands were wounded.  Egypt too paid a high price in human life and economic damage.

The "War of Attrition" campaign ribbon
 Photograph: Wikipedia

45 years after the guns fell silent, the ISA has declassified and published a series of dramatic government meetings held in June-August 1970 on Israel's reply to the initiative of US Secretary of State William Rogers to end the fighting and start talks between the Arabs and Israel. At the time a National Unity government was in power, headed by Golda Meir and including the right wing Gahal party led by Menachem Begin. At first, the ministers rejected the plan, but under heavy pressure from US President Richard Nixon, they eventually agreed to accept a slightly different version. The Gahal ministers  opposed this decision and resigned.

The publication includes nine stenographic records of government meetings, giving a first-hand view of the full and authentic record of events. These records are in Hebrew and are shown on our Hebrew blog, but they contain large sections in English, including exchanges with the US. They are supplemented by documents from the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and other English documents from the ISA and by photographs and video clips on the War of Attrition from our holdings.

Israeli troops returning from the Shadwan Island operation, 23 January 1970
Photograph: Moshe Milner, Government Press Office

The publication is in two parts: the first on the discussions until 19 July and the second ending with the government meeting of 4 August and Golda’s parting words to the Gahal ministers: “I confess that when I took on this position I didn’t really believe in it, but I wanted us all to see the day when peace will come. And if not – then at least to succeed as [her predecessor] the late Eshkol did, to preserve this partnership. I am sorry that we have not reached peace. I am very sorry that it was my lot to head a government which lost a group of its members.”

Background: The War of Attrition and UN and US Peace Initiatives

As a result of the Six Day War Israel and Egypt faced each other across the Suez Canal. At first the situation was calm, and a film clip made in December 1967shows unarmed Egyptian soldiers fishing in the canal opposite  IDF soldiers on the other side. But at the beginning of March 1969 President Gamal Abd-el Nasser announced that Egypt was no longer bound by the ceasefire of June 1967. Soon afterwards a war of attrition began along the canal. There were repeated and lengthy shooting incidents, as well as border incidents with Jordan and Syria. In the clashes with Egypt, Israel lost over 300 soldiers and the Egyptians some 10,000.The cities near the canal, damaged after the sinking of the Israeli destroyer “Elath” in October 1967, were completely destroyed.

To restore the ceasefire two diplomatic initiatives were made: the first by UN mediator Gunnar Jarring and the second by US Secretary of State William Rogers. In December 1969 he proposed a plan based on UN Security Council Resolution 242and demanded that Israel return to the international boundary with Egypt. The government rejected the plan and  stood by its decision of 31 October 1968, demanding a land corridor to Sharm el-Sheikh. The Egyptians also rejected the plan and the USSR said it was one-sided. In June 1970 Rogers proposed a second plan and this time he was successful.

The US Proposal and Israel’s Response

After Israel carried out deep penetration bombing raids into Egypt, in January 1970 Nasser went to Moscow to demand surface to air missiles, which needed Soviet crews to operate them.  In March 1970 Soviet missiles were deployed near Cairo and Alexandria.

A CIA report on missile sites in Egypt as of May 1970
Source: Wikimedia

Realizing that the war involved a danger of confrontation with the USSR, on 19 June 1970 the Administration proposed a plan for negotiations between Israel and Egypt, with a ceasefire as the first step. It was presented to Golda Meir and Foreign Minister Abba Eban by US Ambassador Walworth Barbour, and by Rogers to Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin in Washington. On 20 June it was presented to Egypt and Jordan and also passed on to the USSR.

On 21 June Golda told the government of an" important development in relations with the US".  Eban reported on the paper they had received from Barbour, which expressed US concern that the war of attrition would cause Egypt and Jordan to abandon Resolution 242, with dangerous implications for moderate Arab states such as Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. As Israel had asked, the US had protested to the Soviets about their actions which endangered Israel's security and survival. But it proposed a diplomatic initiative, as well as a military one, to counter the Soviet threat. The commitments of the parties should be tested: Egypt to the principle of peaceful coexistence with Israel and Israel to the principle of withdrawal as expressed in Resolution 242. In order to allow resumption of the Jarring mission, the US proposed a ceasefire from 1 July until 1 October. The agreement would include provisions on preservation of the status quo on the canal front and preventing shooting and incursions.

The Americans asked Israel not to reply publicly until Egypt's reply had been received. If the Arabs rejected it, the onus would be on them. But if Egypt responded positively, Israel would have to do the same and to accept a proposal for peace "substantially within its 1949–1967 borders."

The talk with Barbour was also a reply to Israel's request for more planes. The plan specified that US supply of arms to Israel would continue but the supply of planes would be limited while "efforts to get the parties to stop shooting and start talking" continued. The Americans agreed to give Israel three Phantoms in July and three in August. The planned order for six Phantoms in 1971 would not be affected. They also agreed to earmark 18 Phantoms and 16 Skyhawks in the future in order to make up for expected losses.  They expected Israel to continue to refrain from deep-penetration bombing. (At the time the US needed war planes for its own forces in Vietnam.)

According to Eban, Golda had said that she was deeply disturbed by the linkage between arms supply and political demands. She would have to inform the government of this capitulation to Nasser.  She both rejected a temporary ceasefire or the prospect of opening negotiations before the firing had ended, while Soviet arms flowed to Egypt but arms to Israel were held up.  She warned that she would recommend to the government to reject the proposal. After a long discussion the ministers decided unanimously to adopt Golda’s negative reply to Barbour, but not to publish its reply until after a statement by the Administration.

In the next government meeting on 25 June Golda said: “I know what I have to hold onto with regard to public opinion: this is [stoppage] of arms supply, this is a ceasefire which is a death trap.” However she postponed her reply to a message from Nixon and proposed to call Rabin home for consultations. On 29 June she would make a political statement in the Knesset. On the same day Rogers told a press conference about the initiative for a ceasefire and for talks under Jarring's auspices. However he refused to give details or to discuss publically military assistance for Israel.  

Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, 2 October 1969
Photograph: Moshe Milner, Government Press Office

On 28 June the government renewed its discussion, together with Rabin. He warned against a negative answer to the president and a possible crisis in relations with the US. Nixon already knew from Barbour and Rogers's reports that Israel’s stand was negative. Begin fiercely opposed the American initiative and claimed that it would return Israel to the borders of 4 June 1967, quoting Eban’s well- known saying that "this map represented Auschwitz". Minister Yisrael Galili proposed conveying Israel’s reply to Nixon secretly. Moshe Dayan’s main concern was the fear that the plan would lead to the return of the refugees. Golda repeated her opposition to any plan based on complete withdrawal to the 1967 borders. Although the Americans kept begging Israel not to publish its stand and to let Egypt take responsibility for the plan's failure, the head of military intelligence Aharon Yariv warned that this time Egypt and the Soviets would not reject the initiative as they had the first Rogers plan.

On 29 June Golda told the Knesset that Israel was in continuous dialogue with the US Administration, but she would not give details until the US had published its plan. She argued that Nasser had no intention of reaching a true ceasefire or peace negotiations, citing his speech in Benghazi on 25 June  "fanning the flames of hostility and giving the conflict a pan-Arab character". He demanded full Israeli withdrawal and rights for the Palestinians.

On July 1 Golda wrote to Nixon repeating her negative stand. She added that over the last two days the Soviets had started to deploy SA2 and 3 missile batteries to cover the area up to the Canal Zone. These batteries could be used to protect a Canal crossing, and Israel had no choice but to destroy them. In these circumstances it needed increased supplies of planes.  The letter was given to Joseph Sisco, the assistant secretary for Middle East affairs, by Rabin and reported to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. This report noted that the US was deeply concerned over the new developments and that it was clear that the Israeli government was strongly opposed to the US proposals.

Golda also called Barbour to her office in Tel Aviv on half an hour's notice. Accompanied by the Chief of the General Staff, Haim Bar-Lev, she briefed him about the deployment of the SAMs near the Canal. Each battery was manned by a few Soviet troops. The air force had lost two Phantoms within an hour from attacks on the batteries, and a Soviet major had been severely wounded.  Barbour reported to Rogers that Israel was urgently requesting planes and new electronic equipment. Nixon decided to give the electronic equipment at once and to speed up the supply of planes.

One of the greatest fears in the Prime Minister's Bureau was of a confrontation with the USSR, which would use its full force against Israel.  The Israeli decision makers knew that the IDF was designed to fight Arab armies, but it could not take on the Soviets.  They wanted to know how the US would react in such a case. The head of the bureau, Simcha Dinitz, sent a message to Rabin asking Kissinger to arrange a personal meeting between Golda and Nixon. She wanted his help in deterring the Soviets before they had strengthened their hold in Egypt. Dinitz added that "the prime minister is not afraid personally to start a campaign which she has no reasonable hope of winning. Our view of the situation is so serious….that considerations of prestige or effort are not a factor." Rabin met Kissinger but his impression was that there was little enthusiasm. A visit in September would be approved, on condition it was not to be devoted only to arms requests.

On 12 July in another government meeting, Yosef Sapir of the Liberal party said that as Nasser had gone to Moscow for help,  Golda should go to Washington to see Nixon. Golda warned that she could not propose a visit unless she was sure the US would agree. Eban described the increased arms supply from the US and added that there was only one explanation: the Americans wanted Israel to succeed in the current battle. "In order to sit on the eastern bank of the Canal and do nothing, there is no need for all the equipment they are rushing to us."

On 15 July Nixon sent Golda a reassuring message through Arthur Burns, head of the Federal Reserve Bank who was visiting Israel. In her reply she thanked him for his concern but warned that Israel was facing increasing Soviet involvement. "It is natural that this should deepen our anxiety and strengthen our resolve. Both your words and deeds are crucial for us." In the government meeting Eban reported no new developments. It was unlikely that the Soviets would reject the American initiative outright. There were signs that Egypt would accept a limited ceasefire, and Israel would be in a delicate position. World opinion did not care about the semantics of a ceasefire resolution, but it was worried about an international clash. He concluded: "We have differences with the United States. But if there is one point of agreement, it is that we must stay on the Canal line until [there is[ peace….in order to preserve what they call superiority."

Abba Eban receives Rogers at Lod airport, May 1971
Photograph: Fritz Cohen, Government Press Office

Sunday, August 3, 2014

Israelis Under Fire – Not For The First Time

The recent fighting in Gaza and the south of Israel (Operation "Protective Edge") is not the first time Israeli townships and villages have been attacked by artillery of different sorts. Since the 50s, Jewish communities have been targets for this kind of aggression. The Kisufim, Nirim and Ein Ha'shlosha kibbutzim were bombarded by the Egyptian army (which occupied the Gaza strip after Israel's War of Independence in 1948) in April 1956. In response, the IDF retaliated by bombarding Egyptian targets and inflicted heavy losses on the Egyptians.

After the Sinai war in October 1956, the point of friction moved to northern Israel. The Syrian army, which controlled the Golan Heights overlooking the Hula valley villages and the eastern Galilee, harassed and bombarded the settlements with heavy artillery fire, and many firefights took place in the years 1958–1967.

An Israeli artillery battery in the Galilee (Israel State Archives)

Examining the damage of an artillery shell in Tel Katzir kibbutz (GPO

One of these firefights, on April 7, 1967, deteriorated into a full battle in which the Israeli air force destroyed Syrian artillery batteries, tanks and fortified positions that had bombarded the Gadot and Eib Gev kibbutzim. When the Syrian air force tried to intervene, seven Syrian fighter planes were shot down--several over Damascus itself. Many believe that this incident was a catalyst to the entrance of the Egyptian army into Sinai on May 15, 1967, and three weeks later to the Six Day War.

Following the Six Day War, the settlements in the upper Jordan valley became victims of rocket and mortar fire from Palestinian terrorists, who turned northern Jordan into their stronghold. The Jordanian army and the Iraqi expeditionary force (based in Jordan since the Six Day War) joined in and bombarded kibbutzim such as Ashdot Ya'acov, Sha'ar Ha'golan and Masada, as well as Moshavim (villages) such as Yardena and Beit Yosef. The inhabitants of these communities spent long days and nights in bomb shelters, while the IDF retaliated with artillery fire, tank shells and air force strikes. Here's a part of a newsreel in Hebrew, showing the damage done by the Jordanian artillery and Israeli airstrikes to silence the guns.

Following the intensification of the fire, the Israeli air force bombed the bases of the Iraqi expeditionary force in northern Jordan and inflicted heavy losses. (The Iraqi government used this attack as an excuse to further harass and abuse the remaining Jews in Iraq. This harassment culminated in the hanging of nine Jews in January 1969, as we wrote about previously). The air force bombed the East Ghor Main Canal – a central water project in Northern Jordan. Following the bombings, which rendered the canal useless, King Hussein asked the USA to intervene and stop the bombings and Israel announced that it would do so if the King fought the terrorist organizations. In September 1970, the King did just that when he expelled the Palestinian terrorist organizations and ordered the Iraqi expeditionary force back to Iraq.

The next people to be shelled were the residents of Israel's northern border, especially those who bordered Lebanon. As early as 1968, Palestinian terrorists shelled Kiryat Shmona, Nahariya and other northern towns and villages.

Residents of Kiryat Shmona after a rocket attack in 1968 (Israel State Archives

Golda Meir at the funeral of Daniel Khayo, slain in a rocket attack on Kiryat Shmona in May 1970 (GPO)

The expulsion of the Palestinian terrorists from Jordan to Lebanon intensified the rate of attacks on Israel's northern border communities. The IDF retaliated in raids, artillery fire and air strikes. This situation continued through the 70s to the early 80s.

Children hide in a bomb shelter in Nahariya during a rocket attack on the city in 1979 (GPO)

Residents of Nahariya in a bomb shelter during a rocket attack in 1979 (GPO)

A direct hit in a house in Nahariya, June 1982 (Israel State Archive)

In the early 1980s, the PLO's artillery barrages on Israel's northern border escalated, after the organization started using real artillery--Soviet 130mm cannons and heavier rockets. The First Lebanon War (Operation Peace for Galilee: June 1982 – June 1985) eliminated this threat to the northern border. Later on, when the clashes with the Hezbollah terror organization intensified in southern Lebanon, the threat of rocket fire on the northern border became real again. In 1993 and 1996, in Operations "Accountability" and "Grapes of Wrath" (respectively), the IDF concentrated air and artillery strikes to stop Hezbollah from shooting rockets at northern Israel.

Clearing the rubble after a rocket attack on Kiryat Shmona, August 1993 (GPO)

After Israel's unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah enlarged its rocket stockpile and unleashed it on the northern Israeli communities during the Second Lebanon War (July 12, 2006 – August 14, 2006). Since then, the northern border has remained quiet--aside from several incidents of rocket fire, usually from Palestinian organizations.


On January 30, 2001, an improvised rocket was shot at the Netzarim settlement near Gaza. The Hamas terror organization that fired it nicknamed it "Qassam" after the 30s gang leader Izz ad-Din al-Qassam. In April 2001, the first rocket was fired at Sderot. Since then, thousands of rockets, ever improving in payload and range, have been shot at Israel. The IDF has responded to the rockets with air strikes, artillery fire, and three major air and land operations: Operation "Cast Lead" (Dec. 12, 2008 – Jan. 18, 2009), Operation "Pillar of Defense" (Nov. 14, 2012 – Nov. 21, 2012) and the current Operation "Protective Edge" which started on July 8, 2014.


Every decade in Israel's history finds one part of the country or another under artillery fire, and all Israelis continue to share in this hard chapter of Israel's struggle for peace and quiet.

Monday, January 27, 2014

45 Years Since the Public Execution of 9 Jews in Baghdad

Today marks 45 years since nine Iraqi Jews were hanged in Baghdad's central square. The murdered Jews were: Ezra Naji Zilkha, Fuad Gabay, Yakub Gorji Namordi, Daud Haskil Barukh Dalal, Daud Ghali, Haskil Saleh Haskil, Sabah Hayim, Naim Khaduri, and Charles Rafael Horesh. Their hanging was a nadir in the persecution of Iraqi Jews, but persecutions did not end with them, and in August 1969 two more Jews were hanged, and scores more were arrested and never seen again, presumed murdered. Today, few if any Jews remain in Iraq – remnants of an illustrious Jewish community that numbered more than 150,000 members in the middle of the 20th century.

The general background of the persecution of the Jews in Arab countries is intertwined with the creation of the state of Israel and Israel's war of Independence in 1948-9. Until the 20th century, Jews in Arab countries were usually treated as inferiors, in accordance with Laws of the Khalif Omar from the 7th century. The encroachment of Western powers to the Middle East brought with it an improvement in the status of the Jews. The resulting growing conflict between Jews and Arabs in Israel/Palestine from the 1920's onwards soon began to influence the condition of Jews in Arab countries. In July 1941, just after the British defeated the Nazi-influenced Iraqi government, an Arab mob (with many soldiers and policemen in its ranks) committed the "Farhud" – a pogrom against the Jews of Baghdad. Almost 200 Jews were murdered in this atrocity.

Israel's War of Independence worsened the conditions of Jewish communities in the Arab world, and Iraq was no exception. Iraq sent an expeditionary force to invade Israel on May 15, 1948, and an Iraqi general commanded the "Arab Liberation Army" (an Arab volunteer force, organized by the Arab League to prevent the creation of Israel). The Iraqi government started to implement discriminatory measures against Jews in accordance with a law drafted by the political department of the Arab League. Jewish civil servants were fired (Jews had served in senior government posts in Iraq; the first Minister of Finance of independent Iraq was Jewish), doctors could not receive their licenses, Jewish banks were not allowed to change foreign currency, and new and heavier taxes were imposed on the Jews. Jews were not allowed to leave Iraq for more than a year and those that left had their property confiscated and their citizenship nullified. In September 1948, a rich Jewish businessman, Shafiq Ades, was hanged under false accusations. The persecutions caused many Jews to secretly cross the border to Iran and from there escape to Israel. In December 1949, Tawfiq al-Suwaidi replaced Nuri el Said as Prime Minister, and conditions became easier for the Jews. After a secret negotiation with El-Suwaidi, Jews were allowed to leave Iraq without hindrance, and 120,000 of the Jews in Iraq chose to come on Aliyah to Israel in Operation Ezra and Nehemiah.

The restrictions on those Jews who did not leave Iraq remained, and they could not leave the country to go to Israel, but could depart for other countries. The restrictions persisted until the military coup in 1958. During the rule of General Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958-1963) most of them were lifted, and Jews were treated better and some of their confiscated property was returned. Things changed for the worse after the military coup of 1963 and subsequent coups until the 1968 coup of the Baath party. All restrictions were reinstated and more were added – Jews were required to carry yellow identification cards, banned from leaving Iraq altogether, and subject to many more harsh laws.

The Six Day War made things even worse for the remaining Jews in Iraq. Iraq always described itself as a vanguard of Arab nationalism and declared continually its desire to destroy Israel. During the war, the Israeli air force attacked the H3 air base in western Iraq and the Iraqi expeditionary force sent to Jordan did not arrive in time to play a role in the war. One unit that did come close to the Jordan River was badly mauled by the Israeli air force and retreated. The Iraqis vented their frustration from the results of the war on the Jews of Iraq: Their telephones were disconnected, Jews were fired from their jobs, shops under Jewish ownership were closed, and Jews were barred from traveling from one city to another. Leaving Iraq, banned already before the war, was now impossible. The small Jewish community lived in constant fear.

The Iraqi expeditionary force remained in Jordan and participated in the "War of Attrition" (1968-70) by bombarding Israeli Kibbutzim and villages in the Jordan valley and helping Palestinian terrorists attack Israel. In retaliation, the Iraqi expeditionary force was attacked by the Israeli air force on December 1968 for 4 consecutive days, which inflicted heavy casualties. The bodies of the dead soldiers were brought to Baghdad in a mass funeral. The popular call for revenge was exploited by the newly formed Baath regime (The Baath party overthrew the government in July 17 1968), and it put a group of Jews, arrested on bogus counts of espionage in October, on trial before a military kangaroo court. The military court found them guilty of espionage for Israel and sentenced them to death. On January 27, 1969, 14 defendants (9 of them Jews) were executed in Baghdad and in Basra. The Baath regime called on the public to celebrate the execution, and half a million people celebrated under the hanging bodies in Baghdad's central square.

After the arrest of the Jews in Iraq, their relatives turned to Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs for help in receiving information on their fate and to try and organize their release. Israel turned to different states and international organizations in order to save the detainees, while emphasizing the fact that they were innocent and that it was clear that the Jews could not be spies due to the isolation and segregation of Jews from the other parts of Iraqi society. Appeals were made to the Secretary General of the UN, U-Thant, The Red Cross and to different governments, friendly to Iraq, such as Turkey. These appeals did not help.

The public hangings came as a painful shock in Israel and its Iraqi citizens (Babylonian Jews as they are traditionally known). Prayer and memorial services were organized, such as the one in this newsreel, showing the late Rabbi Ovadia Yosef (then the chief rabbi of Tel Aviv) speaking from a podium. Rabbi Yosef was himself of Iraqi descent. A special mourning session was held in the Knesset, andPrime Minister Levi Eshkol in one of his last public appearances--Eshkol passed away on 26 February 1969--said in his speech: "The hangings have illuminated the fate of the remnants of the Babylonian Jewry with nightmarish light. The land of Iraq has become one great prison for its Jewish remnants. Our brethren are prey to terror in the hands of villains….If there is a conscience in this world, let it voice awaken to immediate need to rescue the remnants of the Jewish communities in Arab countries".

Minister Without Portfolio Menachem Begin addressing a student's protest rally against the Iraqi hanging of Jews, at the campus of the Tel Aviv University (GPO - Fritz Cohen)

Part of a crowd attending a protest rally in Ramat Gan against the execution of Jews in Iraq (GPO - Fritz Cohen)

The Israel State Archives holds many documents regarding the hangings in Iraq. The state of Israel tried to help Jews in Arab states, especially after the Six Day War. The defeated Arab countries saw the remnants of the Jewish communities in their countries as easy scapegoats for their military, political and social failure. Jews were jailed, persecuted, tortured, murdered and hanged (especially in Iraq). The coordinator of the efforts to help Arab Jewry was Deputy General Manager of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Middle Eastern affairs, Shlomo Hillel (later Minister of Police and Speaker of the Knesset). Hillel had a personal stake in this matter – he was formerly an aliyah operative from Iraq who participated in many clandestine aliyah operations.

As mentioned, appeals were made to the UN and International organizations. Appeals were made to governments and rulers by Jewish communities and organizations – Indian Jews met the Indian Foreign minister, for instance, which proved fruitless due to India's pro-Arab stance. A similar appeal was made to the Shah of Iran. Another approach was demonstrations and other forms of public protest. These actions prompted different governments to agree to accept Jews from Iraq. Another country that lent a hand to save the Jews of Iraq, although it was not approached to do so, was France. Relations between Israel and France were strained, ever since France imposed an embargo on exporting weapons to Israel just weeks before (not to mention the French attitude towards Israel before, during and after the Six Day War), after Israel raided the Beirut National Airport in retaliation of an attack for an El Al airliner in Athens in December 1968. The French government pressured the Iraqi government to release Jewish detainees and allow Jews to leave Iraq. At a government meeting in early February 1969, Foreign Minister Abba Eban estimated that the French action was meant to stop the wave of protests and anti-French denunciations in the USA, initiated by Jewish organizations.

According to different sources, such as Israeli journalist and researcher Shlomo Nakdimon, Israel used the Mossad's covert operation in Iraqi Kurdistan (which was helping the forces of Mullah Mustapha Barazani fight the Iraqi army) to smuggle Jews from Iraq to Iran and from there to Israel.

The persecution of the Jewish community in Iraq came again to public attention last year. After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, American troops found in the flooded basement of the building of the Iraqi secret police a large collection of Jewish Torah scrolls and holy books, as well as the Jewish communal archive, confiscated by the Iraqi government. The books were transferred to the U.S. for restoration. Now the Iraqi government demands the return of the collection to Iraq, arguing that it is an Iraqi cultural property. At the same time, Jews from Iraq living in the U.S. demand that the collection remain, as Iraq has no right to demand the collection, given that it was stolen from the Jewish community.

Sunday, July 21, 2013

Catching the Bus to the Kotel

On February 16, 1969, a fellow by the name of Bazrai (whose family must have come from Basra) sent a letter to Yehuda Tamir, Levy Eshkol's top aide for Jerusalem affairs, reporting about a meeting he had recently held with representatives of Egged, the main bus company.

At the meeting it was decided to launch a regular bus line through the Old City, from Jaffa Gate to the Western Wall (the Kotel). It will stop at the Kishle police station, Zion Gate,  The Jewish Quarter, and Dung Gate near the wall. It will come by every 15 minutes, meaning there will need to be two buses. The smallest buses in service can just inch by the arch in the Armenian Quarter, and it would be nice if someone could widen the alley at that point.
The line will connect to lines 18 and 20 and for 35 cents (agorot) passengers will be able to get a connecting ticket; a single ticket will be 20 agorot, while a normal single bus ticket on all the other lines is 25 agorot.
The service will operate between 6am (for early risers who want to pray the morning service at the Kotel) until 9:30pm. 

The arch in the Armenian Quarter was of course never tampered with; it's still there and the small buses still inch by.

Wednesday, July 10, 2013

Cabinet Transcripts are Off-Limits Even if You Were There

Blogging has been very slow recently, and sadly, will probably remain slow. There's been a parallel uptick in our activities on at least four tracks, and what with blogging being a luxury, well, we've not had the time. At least two of the projects may generate visible or reportable results by summer's end; the others will take longer but will generate lasting change which is intended to benefit our public.

Still, since I've got at least three files open on my desk, I really ought to flip through them before sending them back. One is Levy Eshkol's East Jerusalem file which has supplied grist for a number of recent posts. One of them was about the reconstruction of the Hurva synagogue, which ultimately didn't happen until 40 years later.

Apparently on January 1, 1969, the Cabinet discussed the idea. By now, 2013, the transcript of that meeting has been declassified and I could call it up and tell you what happened at the meeting if I wasn't otherwise engaged. Yaacov Lipshuetz, the Haifa attorney who had been nagging for months and not allowing the matter to slide, had to write the Cabinet secretary for a copy of the transcript at the time.

Nope, he was told. Cabinet transcripts don't get published or even sent in the mail. Anyway, since you were there, you know what transpired.

Helpful, huh? Readers of this blog, of course, can and do see such transcripts with some regularity, which just goes to show that you need to be wise in choosing your decade of birth.

Monday, June 10, 2013

Moshe Sasson Talks to Palestinians

We recently mentioned that there seems to have been quite a bit of conversation going on after the Six Day War between high Israeli officials and public figures on the West Bank. Here's what appears to be a highly significant document, though it's unusually frustrating, too. It's a seven-page report by Moshe Sasson to Prime Minister Levy Eshkol from December 13, 1967, behind a cover letter from December 15; it's a summary of his discussions with 33 prominent Arabs in Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza over the preceding month. Sasson, a Damascus-born diplomat and son of cabinet member Eliyahu Sasson, eventually went on to serve for seven years as Israel's ambassador to Cairo; in late 1967, he was serving as Eshkol's special advisor on the population of the West Bank. He spoke perfect Arabic, of course.

The problem is, the document's almost illegible. The copy in this particular file is a low-quality xerox copy of a low-quality carbon copy (remember those?). The first page is more or less decipherable, but the rest - hardly. So I've sent a description of the document to a clutch of our more knowledgeable staffers, and asked them if they can find one of the originals. There are more than 150,000 boxes of documents in the ISA, with an average of 15-20 files per box; a file can contain one document, or ten, or fifty. Which means we've got something like 30-60,000,000 documents (and roughly 300,000,000 pages). The current database of descriptions relates to files, not documents, so the only way to find a specific document is to be very experienced and lucky, both.

In the hope that by next week I'll have the original in my hand, I've given up on the deciphering for today. I'm posting the document so that it will be out there - readers who wish are welcome to have a go at it. In the meantime, here's a summary of the content of the cover letter, from December 15, 1967:

We'll discuss my findings at our upcoming meeting. In the meantime, I suggest topics for your decision
1. How to proceed with the discussions.
2. If and how to encourage pressure from the West Bank figures on [King] Hussein [of Jordan] so that he'll be empowered to represent them?
3. Should we be encouraging self rule of the WB populace?
4. Should we be promoting the idea of a Palestinian State?
5. How should we combat the Communists and limit terror?
6. Should we deport Rouchi elKahtib so as to encourage the populace of East Jerusalem to municipal cooperation?

I sure hope they find a good copy of this document.

Just as a matter of interest, here's a scan of an interview with Sasson in Maariv, October 13, 1969; actually, Maariv translated an Arab-language interview with Sasson from the East Jerusalem paper Al-Quds. Two years after his discussions with leading Palestinians, Sasson was not optimistic. He didn't see why Israel should be for or against a Palestinian state; sadly, however, so he said, the Arab and Palestinian forces outside of the territories were staunchly against the idea, nor were any of the locals pressing to make it happen.

Monday, February 11, 2013

Seizure of Private Property in East Jerusalem

Let's not beat around the bush. In May 1967 there were no Jews in the Jordanian sections of Jerusalem. Today there are more than 200,000 Jews living in the parts of town that Israel took from Jordan in the Six Day War. Most of them live on what were once empty hilltops, as those of us old enough to remember can attest even without any archives. Yet even barren rocky hilltops may have been owned, at least in some cases, by individuals. And some of those Jews moved into places such as the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, where the ruined buildings were owned by someone, or the decrepit buildings were inhabited. Which means that at some point, in 1967 or 1970 or 1972, Israel's government expropriated Arab property, or used Eminent Domain, whatever legal terminology you wish to use to describe the action of transferring ownership of property from some individuals, for the purpose of executing policy.

Today's file (גל-13927/17) comes from the Advisor for Arab Affairs, whom we introduced here (and also here). It doesn't describe Israel's policy of seizure of property, which was done in another agency (the Land Administration Agency), but rather the complaints about the policy which were directed towards the Prime Minister's Office, i.e. the Advisor for Arab Affairs in the PMO.

Most of the file is sealed. Not because there are any dark security secrets in it, but because by Israeli law, an individual who passes private information to an authority has the expectation of his (or her) privacy being respected. Once 70 years have passed we may assume the individuals are no longer alive and the files can be opened, but the letters in this file are from 40-45 years ago. Still, by way of giving a taste of what was in them, see pages 7 and 8.

The fellow on page 7, for example: He lived in the Old City, and had been informed his home was about to be seized. So he wrote to the prime minister and made five points:
1. My house is right next to the holy places of Jews and Muslims, so there's no price you can give me to equal what it's worth.
2. The government says the seizure is for the public good, but I don't see any benefit.
3. As an Israeli citizen I demand to stay where I am and I'll promise to respect all the laws.
4. I reserve the right to go to the courts.
5. I'm enclosing the documents which prove my ownership.

Or page 8: Yosef Dan-Gor writing to his boss, Shmuel Toledano, the Advisor for Arab Affairs himself, in the matter of two familes who own homes in the Sheikh Jarrakh area where the government intents to construct a number of ministries. The two familes are obstinate not to leave. Ovad Yakir of the Land Administration Authority, he writes, has suggested I meet them and make a seriously generous offer, before we turn to legal action. I think he's right, but I need your permission. [Intriguingly, they may not have been moved. If you go to the government compound in Sheikh Jarrah you can see that a number of older, Arab, homes are still there.]

Pages 2-5 are a letter from a voluntary welfare organization near the Mount of Olives. In January 196,8 they had been informed that they were to be moved elsewhere because the government was seizing their building, and they strenously obejcted. In addition to describing all the important things their organization did, they also pointed out that the building belonged to the Waqf and thus couldn't be expropriated, and also warned that such an action would cause public unrest and was against peace.

The letter on page 6 is also from Dan-Gor to his boss Toledano, in August 1960: there are five Arab families on French Hill who since January 1968 have been refusing all offers we've made. My impression is that they're not going to change their minds. [Here also: go to this area today and you'll see more than five Arab homes which have been there since before 1967. Are they the same families? Did Israel eventually back down?]

Page 9 is yet another letter from Dan-Gor: regarding the area where the Jordanian army had a military position south of the UN headquarters ("The Sausage"): Colonel Halamish informs us that the IDF is willing to vacate the hilltop to facilitate the construction of the Armon Hanaziv neighborhood.

And finally, most interestingly, the letter on page 10, Dan-Gor to his boss in May 1970: We're trying to seize an area in Wadi Joz so as to build a neighborhood for the [Arab] families which are being evicted from the Jewish Quarter in the Old City. The construction will be done by the [Arab] contractor Kalik Jad'On. The snag is that some of the owners of plots in that area are refusing to go along with the agreement we've already made with most of their neighbours, and now they've turned to the High Court of Justice (Bagatz).

Tuesday, November 20, 2012

Newsreel of Missiles at Israeli Civilians, in... 1969

Here's a section from a newsreel of August 1969, including a short report about Katyusha rockets shot at Kiryat Shemona. One woman was injured and property damaged. Richard Nixon was president at the time. The Beatles were (just barely) still recording songs together. Humanity was all agog about Apollo 11's trip to the moon. Angelina Jolie's birth was still six years in the future. Queen Elisabeth was on the throne. And Palestinians were shooting rockets at Israeli civilians.

 Carmel Newsreels 546

 קב-401.6 ISA file