Israelis Under Fire – Not For The First Time
The recent fighting in Gaza and the south of Israel (Operation "Protective Edge") is not the first time Israeli townships and villages have been attacked by artillery of different sorts. Since the 50s, Jewish communities have been targets for this kind of aggression. The Kisufim, Nirim and Ein Ha'shlosha kibbutzim were bombarded by the Egyptian army (which occupied the Gaza strip after Israel's War of Independence in 1948) in April 1956. In response, the IDF retaliated by bombarding Egyptian targets and inflicted heavy losses on the Egyptians.
After the Sinai war in October 1956, the point of friction moved to northern Israel. The Syrian army, which controlled the Golan Heights overlooking the Hula valley villages and the eastern Galilee, harassed and bombarded the settlements with heavy artillery fire, and many firefights took place in the years 1958–1967.
One of these firefights, on April 7, 1967, deteriorated into a full battle in which the Israeli air force destroyed Syrian artillery batteries, tanks and fortified positions that had bombarded the Gadot and Eib Gev kibbutzim. When the Syrian air force tried to intervene, seven Syrian fighter planes were shot down--several over Damascus itself. Many believe that this incident was a catalyst to the entrance of the Egyptian army into Sinai on May 15, 1967, and three weeks later to the Six Day War.
Following the Six Day War, the settlements in the upper Jordan valley became victims of rocket and mortar fire from Palestinian terrorists, who turned northern Jordan into their stronghold. The Jordanian army and the Iraqi expeditionary force (based in Jordan since the Six Day War) joined in and bombarded kibbutzim such as Ashdot Ya'acov, Sha'ar Ha'golan and Masada, as well as Moshavim (villages) such as Yardena and Beit Yosef. The inhabitants of these communities spent long days and nights in bomb shelters, while the IDF retaliated with artillery fire, tank shells and air force strikes. Here's a part of a newsreel in Hebrew, showing the damage done by the Jordanian artillery and Israeli airstrikes to silence the guns.
Following the intensification of the fire, the Israeli air force bombed the bases of the Iraqi expeditionary force in northern Jordan and inflicted heavy losses. (The Iraqi government used this attack as an excuse to further harass and abuse the remaining Jews in Iraq. This harassment culminated in the hanging of nine Jews in January 1969, as we wrote about previously). The air force bombed the East Ghor Main Canal – a central water project in Northern Jordan. Following the bombings, which rendered the canal useless, King Hussein asked the USA to intervene and stop the bombings and Israel announced that it would do so if the King fought the terrorist organizations. In September 1970, the King did just that when he expelled the Palestinian terrorist organizations and ordered the Iraqi expeditionary force back to Iraq.
The next people to be shelled were the residents of Israel's northern border, especially those who bordered Lebanon. As early as 1968, Palestinian terrorists shelled Kiryat Shmona, Nahariya and other northern towns and villages.
The expulsion of the Palestinian terrorists from Jordan to Lebanon intensified the rate of attacks on Israel's northern border communities. The IDF retaliated in raids, artillery fire and air strikes. This situation continued through the 70s to the early 80s.
In the early 1980s, the PLO's artillery barrages on Israel's northern border escalated, after the organization started using real artillery--Soviet 130mm cannons and heavier rockets. The First Lebanon War (Operation Peace for Galilee: June 1982 – June 1985) eliminated this threat to the northern border. Later on, when the clashes with the Hezbollah terror organization intensified in southern Lebanon, the threat of rocket fire on the northern border became real again. In 1993 and 1996, in Operations "Accountability" and "Grapes of Wrath" (respectively), the IDF concentrated air and artillery strikes to stop Hezbollah from shooting rockets at northern Israel.
After Israel's unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah enlarged its rocket stockpile and unleashed it on the northern Israeli communities during the Second Lebanon War (July 12, 2006 – August 14, 2006). Since then, the northern border has remained quiet--aside from several incidents of rocket fire, usually from Palestinian organizations.
On January 30, 2001, an improvised rocket was shot at the Netzarim settlement near Gaza. The Hamas terror organization that fired it nicknamed it "Qassam" after the 30s gang leader Izz ad-Din al-Qassam. In April 2001, the first rocket was fired at Sderot. Since then, thousands of rockets, ever improving in payload and range, have been shot at Israel. The IDF has responded to the rockets with air strikes, artillery fire, and three major air and land operations: Operation "Cast Lead" (Dec. 12, 2008 – Jan. 18, 2009), Operation "Pillar of Defense" (Nov. 14, 2012 – Nov. 21, 2012) and the current Operation "Protective Edge" which started on July 8, 2014.
Every decade in Israel's history finds one part of the country or another under artillery fire, and all Israelis continue to share in this hard chapter of Israel's struggle for peace and quiet.
After the Sinai war in October 1956, the point of friction moved to northern Israel. The Syrian army, which controlled the Golan Heights overlooking the Hula valley villages and the eastern Galilee, harassed and bombarded the settlements with heavy artillery fire, and many firefights took place in the years 1958–1967.
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| An Israeli artillery battery in the Galilee (Israel State Archives) |
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| Examining the damage of an artillery shell in Tel Katzir kibbutz (GPO |
Following the Six Day War, the settlements in the upper Jordan valley became victims of rocket and mortar fire from Palestinian terrorists, who turned northern Jordan into their stronghold. The Jordanian army and the Iraqi expeditionary force (based in Jordan since the Six Day War) joined in and bombarded kibbutzim such as Ashdot Ya'acov, Sha'ar Ha'golan and Masada, as well as Moshavim (villages) such as Yardena and Beit Yosef. The inhabitants of these communities spent long days and nights in bomb shelters, while the IDF retaliated with artillery fire, tank shells and air force strikes. Here's a part of a newsreel in Hebrew, showing the damage done by the Jordanian artillery and Israeli airstrikes to silence the guns.
Following the intensification of the fire, the Israeli air force bombed the bases of the Iraqi expeditionary force in northern Jordan and inflicted heavy losses. (The Iraqi government used this attack as an excuse to further harass and abuse the remaining Jews in Iraq. This harassment culminated in the hanging of nine Jews in January 1969, as we wrote about previously). The air force bombed the East Ghor Main Canal – a central water project in Northern Jordan. Following the bombings, which rendered the canal useless, King Hussein asked the USA to intervene and stop the bombings and Israel announced that it would do so if the King fought the terrorist organizations. In September 1970, the King did just that when he expelled the Palestinian terrorist organizations and ordered the Iraqi expeditionary force back to Iraq.
The next people to be shelled were the residents of Israel's northern border, especially those who bordered Lebanon. As early as 1968, Palestinian terrorists shelled Kiryat Shmona, Nahariya and other northern towns and villages.
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| Residents of Kiryat Shmona after a rocket attack in 1968 (Israel State Archives |
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| Golda Meir at the funeral of Daniel Khayo, slain in a rocket attack on Kiryat Shmona in May 1970 (GPO) |
The expulsion of the Palestinian terrorists from Jordan to Lebanon intensified the rate of attacks on Israel's northern border communities. The IDF retaliated in raids, artillery fire and air strikes. This situation continued through the 70s to the early 80s.
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| Children hide in a bomb shelter in Nahariya during a rocket attack on the city in 1979 (GPO) |
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| Residents of Nahariya in a bomb shelter during a rocket attack in 1979 (GPO) |
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| A direct hit in a house in Nahariya, June 1982 (Israel State Archive) |
In the early 1980s, the PLO's artillery barrages on Israel's northern border escalated, after the organization started using real artillery--Soviet 130mm cannons and heavier rockets. The First Lebanon War (Operation Peace for Galilee: June 1982 – June 1985) eliminated this threat to the northern border. Later on, when the clashes with the Hezbollah terror organization intensified in southern Lebanon, the threat of rocket fire on the northern border became real again. In 1993 and 1996, in Operations "Accountability" and "Grapes of Wrath" (respectively), the IDF concentrated air and artillery strikes to stop Hezbollah from shooting rockets at northern Israel.
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| Clearing the rubble after a rocket attack on Kiryat Shmona, August 1993 (GPO) |
After Israel's unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah enlarged its rocket stockpile and unleashed it on the northern Israeli communities during the Second Lebanon War (July 12, 2006 – August 14, 2006). Since then, the northern border has remained quiet--aside from several incidents of rocket fire, usually from Palestinian organizations.
On January 30, 2001, an improvised rocket was shot at the Netzarim settlement near Gaza. The Hamas terror organization that fired it nicknamed it "Qassam" after the 30s gang leader Izz ad-Din al-Qassam. In April 2001, the first rocket was fired at Sderot. Since then, thousands of rockets, ever improving in payload and range, have been shot at Israel. The IDF has responded to the rockets with air strikes, artillery fire, and three major air and land operations: Operation "Cast Lead" (Dec. 12, 2008 – Jan. 18, 2009), Operation "Pillar of Defense" (Nov. 14, 2012 – Nov. 21, 2012) and the current Operation "Protective Edge" which started on July 8, 2014.
Every decade in Israel's history finds one part of the country or another under artillery fire, and all Israelis continue to share in this hard chapter of Israel's struggle for peace and quiet.
Thursday, July 4, 2013
Happy Fourth of July – and Please Give Us Arms: Golda Writes to Dulles, 4 July 1956
On June 20, 1956, Golda Meir replaced Moshe Sharett as Israel's foreign minister, and on the Fourth of July, the 180th anniversary of American independence, shewrote a letter to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, still signing with her old name of Golda Myerson. Israel's leaders usually sent formal greetings for the Fourth of July to the Administration, but this time Golda used the opportunity to approach Dulles on a subject which greatly occupied the minds of the Israeli leaders – the search for arms to counter the major Czech-Egyptian arms deal in September 1955.
In October 1955, Sharett met twice with Dulles to request American arms. Until then, the US government had sold Israel only outmoded or defensive weapons. Dulles was reluctant to change this policy, as he still hoped to win over the Egyptian leader, Col. Nasser, to the side of the West in the Cold War, and to prevent an arms race with the USSR. In March 1956, he decided that France and Italy should supply Israel with arms, with American encouragement. But the process was slow, and in Golda's letter she urged him to approve direct supply of arms to Israel in order to speed it up. The Israeli ambassador to Washington, Abba Eban, met with Dulles to give him the letter, and repeated these arguments. Israel had approached Canada, France and Italy but they were waiting for an American lead.
Sharett's failure in this endeavor, while the Defense Ministry was succeeding in forging direct ties with military circles in France, was one of the reasons Ben-Gurion forced his resignation in June 1956. Another was the fear that Sharett would oppose a war with Egypt initiated by Israel. On July 26, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and in October, Britain, France and Israel decided to act against him. Golda's letter and Eban's account of his meeting with Dulles can be found in Volume 11 of the ISA's series, "Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel," which tells the rest of the story of the run-up to the Sinai Campaign. The book has an English companion volume with summaries of the Hebrew documents.
Golda's approach too was unsuccessful. The US administration continued in its refusal to sell modern weapons to Israel until the 1960s, while France remained Israel's main source of arms.
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| Dulles, accompanied by Harold Stassen and Sharett (on the left), inspects an honor guard on his arrival in Israel, May 1953. Photograph: Israel State Archives |
Sharett's failure in this endeavor, while the Defense Ministry was succeeding in forging direct ties with military circles in France, was one of the reasons Ben-Gurion forced his resignation in June 1956. Another was the fear that Sharett would oppose a war with Egypt initiated by Israel. On July 26, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and in October, Britain, France and Israel decided to act against him. Golda's letter and Eban's account of his meeting with Dulles can be found in Volume 11 of the ISA's series, "Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel," which tells the rest of the story of the run-up to the Sinai Campaign. The book has an English companion volume with summaries of the Hebrew documents.
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| Foreign Minister Golda Meir and former French premier Guy Mollet, 1959. Photograph: Fritz Cohen, Government Press Office |
Friday, April 12, 2013
A "sulcha" in Kfar Kassem
As a general rule this blog isn't active over weekends (Friday-Saturday in Israel). Sometimes we make exceptions, however. Today's exception starts with this news item which is up on Y-net today (Y-net being Israel's most popular news site). The item relates a recent event which took place in the Israeli-Arab town of Kfar Kassem. In 2006, one of the men in the town shot his daughter-in-law, which set off a feud between the two families. Now, the mayor, the police, and the family leaders have hammered out a reconciliation agreement, in which the woman's children have been compensated with money and property, and the agreement was sealed with a feast of reconciliation - sulcha - which hundreds of people participated in.
Reading this brought to mind our recent publication of more than 100 documents about Israel's first two decades (here's the Hebrew publication, and here's the Y-net report about it). In the publication, we published four letters about the massacre by IDF troops of 49 Arab civilians of Kfar Kassem, which happened in October 1956, against the backdrop of the Sinai War. The final letter in the correspondence is from the mayor of Petach Tikva (which is near Kfar Kassem) to Ben Gurion, summarizing the work of a committee of five notables, two Arabs and three Jews, who had been tasked with agreeing on restitution payments to the families of the victims. Although the case was worse than the feud of 2006-2012 in its magnitude and the fact that the perpetrators were soldiers in uniform, they were both resolved using the same mechanisms: a police investigation, a trial with convictions, then a negotiation about restitution, and finally a sulcha ceremony.
Reading this brought to mind our recent publication of more than 100 documents about Israel's first two decades (here's the Hebrew publication, and here's the Y-net report about it). In the publication, we published four letters about the massacre by IDF troops of 49 Arab civilians of Kfar Kassem, which happened in October 1956, against the backdrop of the Sinai War. The final letter in the correspondence is from the mayor of Petach Tikva (which is near Kfar Kassem) to Ben Gurion, summarizing the work of a committee of five notables, two Arabs and three Jews, who had been tasked with agreeing on restitution payments to the families of the victims. Although the case was worse than the feud of 2006-2012 in its magnitude and the fact that the perpetrators were soldiers in uniform, they were both resolved using the same mechanisms: a police investigation, a trial with convictions, then a negotiation about restitution, and finally a sulcha ceremony.
Sunday, March 3, 2013
The Gomulka Aliya: Polish Jews in Israel, 57 Years Later
Another fascinating story told by the documents in the Israel State Archives is that of the many groups of Jews from all over the world and their immigration to Israel. In the late 1950s, fifty thousand Jews left Communist Poland as a result of the liberal policy of Party chairman Wladyslaw Gomulka. Although well-integrated into Israel (they include many successful Israelis in the professions, arts and journalism), many of them kept their ties to Poland. Last week they held a conference at Tel Aviv University to mark the "Gomulka Aliya," as described in this article which appeared in Haaretz today.
Four years ago, the Israel State Archives published a volume of documents in Hebrew and Polish, the result of a joint project with the Polish State Archives on relations between Israel and Poland from 1945 to the Six Day War. Immigration from Poland, and especially the Gomulka Aliyah, played a central role in these relations.
Congratulations to Ewa Wegrzyn, a young researcher from Krakow who spoke at the conference and recently completed her doctorate, the first ever on the subject of this aliya. Ewa did much of her research at the ISA.
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| Wladyslaw Gomulka |
Congratulations to Ewa Wegrzyn, a young researcher from Krakow who spoke at the conference and recently completed her doctorate, the first ever on the subject of this aliya. Ewa did much of her research at the ISA.
Sunday, February 10, 2013
1956: How Do We Arrange Upper Nazareth?
Let's start with the "end" of the story. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2011 there were almost 74,000 people in Nazareth, almost 70% of them Muslims and the rest Christians. No Jews lived there. In Upper Nazareth - the topic of this post - there were 40,000 people, almost 20% of them Arabs (Muslim and Christian).
In 1956, at the time of today's document, Nazareth's population stood at 24,000, most of them Christian (Arabs). It was the largest Arab town in Israel. A few years earlier, Ben Gurion had ordered the creation of a Jewish presence in Nazareth. Using what the Americans call Eminent Domain, the government had earmarked an area to the north-east of town, and had begun the construction of hundreds of housing units. Now, in August 1956, the first families were soon to move in, and the Ministers' Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defense was convened to discuss a question which probably ought to have been decided earlier, but hadn't: what would the municipality be? There were two main alternatives:
1. The Jewish neighborhood would be part of the municipality of Nazareth, even though about half of its area lay outside the municipal line;
2. The part that lay inside the municipal lines of Nazareth would be detached from the municipal area (in return for other land to the south or west), and the entire Jewish neighborhood would incorporate a new municipality.
Israel Bar-Yehuda, the Minister of the Interior, needed a decision on this so as to launch the appropriate legal process.
Foreign Minister Golda Meir had a complication: the UN General Assembly would convene in November, and Israel's decision on the internal matter of municipal lines between its towns was expected to be an issue there - so she needed the "right" decision.
In 1956, at the time of today's document, Nazareth's population stood at 24,000, most of them Christian (Arabs). It was the largest Arab town in Israel. A few years earlier, Ben Gurion had ordered the creation of a Jewish presence in Nazareth. Using what the Americans call Eminent Domain, the government had earmarked an area to the north-east of town, and had begun the construction of hundreds of housing units. Now, in August 1956, the first families were soon to move in, and the Ministers' Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defense was convened to discuss a question which probably ought to have been decided earlier, but hadn't: what would the municipality be? There were two main alternatives:
1. The Jewish neighborhood would be part of the municipality of Nazareth, even though about half of its area lay outside the municipal line;
2. The part that lay inside the municipal lines of Nazareth would be detached from the municipal area (in return for other land to the south or west), and the entire Jewish neighborhood would incorporate a new municipality.
Israel Bar-Yehuda, the Minister of the Interior, needed a decision on this so as to launch the appropriate legal process.
Foreign Minister Golda Meir had a complication: the UN General Assembly would convene in November, and Israel's decision on the internal matter of municipal lines between its towns was expected to be an issue there - so she needed the "right" decision.
Golda Meir: The whole idea was to have Jews move in. If the new neighborhood is part of Nazareth, the progressive city council will do everything to ensure it doesn't grow. There will be taxation but no services. If we set out on the legal track to detach the neighborhood from Nazareth, it will take a number of months, and maybe we can keep the process under wraps until after the UNGA. I understand the first families will move in sooner, September or October, but we'll tell them what's going to happen.Since a majority was in favor of creating two municipalities, the committee decided not to decide until after the UNGA in November. The fear of international opinion was strong enough in 1956 to interfere with internal policies of unquestionable Israeli sovereignty.
Minister of Religious Affairs and Welfare Moshe Haim Shapira: I'm against. The whole idea was to have a Jewish presence in Nazareth; if we create a separate town it will be separate. Also, the UN will say that not only are Jews moving into a city which is holy to the Christians, they're also reducing its size. On the other hand, if the Jews live in Nazareth, perhaps better relations will arise between the groups. I'm not worried the municipality will prevent the neighborhood from growing: it will be part of their town, and anyway, the municipality needs all sorts of things from the Ministry of Interior. It's not like what we had in Tel Aviv and Jaffa [Jewish TA was set up outside of mostly-Arab Jaffa], because now we've got a state and a government.
Golda Meir: No way. The municipality has hundreds of ways to prevent the growth of a Jewish presence... Part of the plan is to locate government offices in the Jewish neighborhood. If it's part of Nazareth, the employees will all be hired through the Nazareth labor bureau, and they'll make sure they hire only Arabs.... If we don't make the right decision here, I'll take the subject back to the full cabinet for a second discussion.
Minister of Health Israel Barzilai: I agree with Shapira. If we want a mixed city it has to be one city, not two. And if we make two, the Christian world will be furious at us for reducing the size of their holy city, even if we're not reducing its size because we're adding on elsewhere. Perhaps had we expropriated the area and detached it all at once, we would have had two accomplishments for the price of one international outcry. But now that we've already built some of the units, and they're inside the municipality line, it's too late to extract them. This is hindsight, I know... Ah. I've just been handed a note that says it was the decision of the Planning Department in the Ministry of the Interior. OK, but the staff of the planning department are professionals, not politicians, and they didn't think about the political aspects.
Minister of Justice Pinchas Rosenne: First, I must say I never liked the slogan of Judaizing Nazareth. It's a Christian holy city, and if we want Jews to live there, fine, but why do we need that slogan?
Golda Meir: It's first and foremost a Communist city, run by MAKI (Israel's Communist party).
Rosenne: The reality on the ground will be the same, but I think it's better not to push Jews into Christian Nazareth. The psychological effect will be better if there are two separate municipalities.
Minister of Education Zalman Aran: Inserting Jews into Nazareth will only cause hatred; and the tense relations between the locals and the Jews will make life for the Jews unbearable. There should be two separate municipalities.
Minister of Transport Moshe Carmel: The Jews of Nazareth should live in Nazareth, not in a separate township. I'm not in favor of mixed cities in general; Jews shouldn't move into Taibe, and Arabs shouldn't move into Ein Harod. But Nazareth is different. It's a big Arab city, in the middle of the Galilee, and there have to be Jews there for security reasons. [Carmel had been a general in the War of Independence.] It may end up less pleasant, but the Jews need to be in Nazareth.
Minister of Labor Mordechai Namir: Nazareth isn't a Christian city. A third of its population are Muslims. I see nothing wrong with individual Jews moving into Nazareth. Arabs can and Jews can't? Yet there has already been tension, and there will be more, and putting the Jews in a separate section is less likely to cause tension.
Barzilai: What you're essentially saying is that we can't move Jews into the city because the Communist world will get angry, and the Christian world too. You're saying we should leave the city as a bastion of the Communists, and accept that nothing good can come out of Jews and Arabs sharing a city.
Golda Meir: The Prime Minister (Ben Gurion) wrote months ago that he's in favor of having two municipalities.
Tuesday, January 8, 2013
February 1956: Ben Gurion Demands a New Miltary Doctrine
Today we're publishing an important document about Israel's military doctrine in the run-up to its second war in 1956. The document is a 40-page stenogram from the Ministers' Committee for Foreign Relations and Security, on February 19, 1956. We've looked at some earlier meetings of this committee, and heard how its members often kvetched that they were not taken seriously enough, and that their main job was the worthy but unexciting task of appointing Israeli diplomats to far-flung outposts. For whatever reason, on February 19, 1956, the committee suddenly found itself precisely where it wished to be: in the center of strategic planning, at a time when war with Egypt seemed a distinct possibility.
The beginning of the meeting reflected Ben Gurion's impatience with having to report at all. True, he brought with him Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff Haim Laskov, Dayan's deputy, and a colonel from near the top of Military Intelligence. Yet he opened the meeting with ill grace: "OK, fellows, I hear you want to have a report. What is it you wish to hear? I'll bet each of you wants to hear about his village and its role in the case of war? Everyone likes to see his name in print. Some people prepare themselves a visiting card, others want a book; they (he seems to have been talking to the generals) want a whole book."
So the generals launched into a detailed report about the size of the IDF, how many tanks and cannons it had, how many airplanes it had and how many had been ordered from France, and so on. Back then, lots of folks in lots of countries would have given their right hand for a time machine to read the ISA blog on Israel's military capabilities; but most of those people are long since dead, and when we submitted this document to the declassifiers and their ilk, they didn't bat an eyelash. 1956 is a long time ago, and there's not much of present value in knowing how many fighter-bombers Israel had at the time and how much it wished it had. Though it is interesting to hear the confidence in the voices of the generals and the doubt in the voices of the civilians ministers: "Are you sure that's enough equipment? Really?"
Then the discussion went off to the section Ben Gurion had suspected was anyway the real point of the exercise: The ministers wished to know how many men would remain in each agricultural settlement, and why the ones important to each of them were being categorized wrongly. A word of explanation: as Dayan explained, each village was catalogued as category A, B or C. Category A villages would see a largish number of men (39) remain at home even in a time of full mobilization, while the reserve of unmobilized men in the other categories would be smaller. The categories had recently been updated, so that some places which had previously been regarded as really important were now degraded - and the ministers were peeved. They went back and forth about the criteria, the considerations, and - while always presenting their positions as principled, not personal - the reader may join Ben Gurion in suspecting otherwise.
The interesting thing is that Ben Gurion had mostly been very quiet so far (more than halfway through the meeting). He had introduced the generals, and since then had said nothing except once, when he muttered that he thought the generals were being far too generous in handing out exemptions.
Then (on page 22 of 40) he suddenly joined the discussion, and changed its entire structure. The problem with everything that has been said here, he said, is that you're all thinking about the previous war [of 1947-49]. That time there were battles over lots of villages, and we protected each and every village, often by arming the villagers and supporting their local efforts. Next time, it wouldn't be like that. Next time, the enemy wouldn't waste its time on little kibbutzes on the road to Tel Aviv: the enemy would aim for Tel Aviv, and Haifa, and Jerusalem. And Israel would protect itself and its cities with a modern mobile army, not a ragtag militia spread out over hundreds of settlements. This army would need mobility, and armaments, but mostly, it would need fighters. And the reserve fighters would be drawn from all over, and they would defend their village on the road to Tel Aviv as soldiers in the army, not armed yeomen in their own front yard. Which is why he was dissatisfied with some of what the generals had been saying, but from the opposite side of the discussion: they were willing to leave too many capable men at home, when they would be more effective in the army.
The funny thing, or sad thing, is that once Ben Gurion finished presenting his position, everyone professed to agree with him, but then they went back to the previous discussion as if they hadn't been listening. "Yes, of course, but what about Kibbutz Mishmar Haemek? And Meggido?"
The beginning of the meeting reflected Ben Gurion's impatience with having to report at all. True, he brought with him Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff Haim Laskov, Dayan's deputy, and a colonel from near the top of Military Intelligence. Yet he opened the meeting with ill grace: "OK, fellows, I hear you want to have a report. What is it you wish to hear? I'll bet each of you wants to hear about his village and its role in the case of war? Everyone likes to see his name in print. Some people prepare themselves a visiting card, others want a book; they (he seems to have been talking to the generals) want a whole book."
So the generals launched into a detailed report about the size of the IDF, how many tanks and cannons it had, how many airplanes it had and how many had been ordered from France, and so on. Back then, lots of folks in lots of countries would have given their right hand for a time machine to read the ISA blog on Israel's military capabilities; but most of those people are long since dead, and when we submitted this document to the declassifiers and their ilk, they didn't bat an eyelash. 1956 is a long time ago, and there's not much of present value in knowing how many fighter-bombers Israel had at the time and how much it wished it had. Though it is interesting to hear the confidence in the voices of the generals and the doubt in the voices of the civilians ministers: "Are you sure that's enough equipment? Really?"
Then the discussion went off to the section Ben Gurion had suspected was anyway the real point of the exercise: The ministers wished to know how many men would remain in each agricultural settlement, and why the ones important to each of them were being categorized wrongly. A word of explanation: as Dayan explained, each village was catalogued as category A, B or C. Category A villages would see a largish number of men (39) remain at home even in a time of full mobilization, while the reserve of unmobilized men in the other categories would be smaller. The categories had recently been updated, so that some places which had previously been regarded as really important were now degraded - and the ministers were peeved. They went back and forth about the criteria, the considerations, and - while always presenting their positions as principled, not personal - the reader may join Ben Gurion in suspecting otherwise.
The interesting thing is that Ben Gurion had mostly been very quiet so far (more than halfway through the meeting). He had introduced the generals, and since then had said nothing except once, when he muttered that he thought the generals were being far too generous in handing out exemptions.
Then (on page 22 of 40) he suddenly joined the discussion, and changed its entire structure. The problem with everything that has been said here, he said, is that you're all thinking about the previous war [of 1947-49]. That time there were battles over lots of villages, and we protected each and every village, often by arming the villagers and supporting their local efforts. Next time, it wouldn't be like that. Next time, the enemy wouldn't waste its time on little kibbutzes on the road to Tel Aviv: the enemy would aim for Tel Aviv, and Haifa, and Jerusalem. And Israel would protect itself and its cities with a modern mobile army, not a ragtag militia spread out over hundreds of settlements. This army would need mobility, and armaments, but mostly, it would need fighters. And the reserve fighters would be drawn from all over, and they would defend their village on the road to Tel Aviv as soldiers in the army, not armed yeomen in their own front yard. Which is why he was dissatisfied with some of what the generals had been saying, but from the opposite side of the discussion: they were willing to leave too many capable men at home, when they would be more effective in the army.
The funny thing, or sad thing, is that once Ben Gurion finished presenting his position, everyone professed to agree with him, but then they went back to the previous discussion as if they hadn't been listening. "Yes, of course, but what about Kibbutz Mishmar Haemek? And Meggido?"
Is it Important that American Jews Identify with Israel?
On the margins of the discussion described in the previous post, Pinchas Rosenne told of a recent public lecture given by Hillel Kook. Kook, also known by his alias Peter Bergson, was a very colorful figure who emigrated to Israel three times and left twice, joined the Irgun but quarrelled with Menachem Begin, worked with Ben Hecht but quarrelled with the leaders or American Jewry during World War II, was elected to the first Knesset but left politics in disgust, and generally didn't fit in. He also came from an illustrious rabbinic family. In 1957, he was once again living in the US, visiting Israel, and generally being critical. Yet his particular criticism, assuming Rosenne was quoting him accurately, has a timeless ring to it[p.12]:
He had expected us to create a normal country here. Instead we're doing all sorts of things that are inexplicable to America's Jews. First, we've set up a theocracy so the Americans hate us. He personally had been in favor of setting up a "Vatican-Sanhedrin" but only on a limited area. Instead the whole country has become a theocracy. Second, we're not assisting the refugees, nor do we care about them. The world can't accept that. This country has become totalitarian and fascist... We must be a normal country, and comprehensible to the world. Just as the individual Jew wasn't comprehensible to his environment and therefore was hated, so the Jewish State is also not comprehensible to the world.To which Minister of the Interior Israel Bar Yehuda responded sharply:
If we must choose being understood or being the owners of our home, I prefer us to be the owners of our home. Of course, if we can have both that would be best.1957, yes?
1957: The UN Gnaws at Israeli Sovereignty
As noted earlier this week, only once between 1956 and 1958 was there a discussion of any real interest in the Ministers' Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security - but it was very interesting. The most interesting part of all was when Foreign Minister Golda Meir reported about tensions with the United Nations.
Background: in those early years of the UN, it seems to have played a larger role in war-zone mediation than it does today, as can be seen, for example, by the short official biography of the UN General Secretary of the day, Dag Hammarskjöld. Moreover, in the Mideast, the UN Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine (UNTSO) seems to have had a significantly weightier status than its present-day descendants. Its acting chief of staff in 1958, the American Colonel Byron V. Leary, was assumed, at least by the Israelis, to be acting on direct and frequent orders of Hammerskjold. Finally, the armistice agreements of 1949 had left some patches of territory inside Israel's borders as demilitarized zones.
Golda and her colleagues were convinced that the UN was trying to undermine Israeli sovereignty in those areas (which were within the 1967 borders, of course). So, August 11th 1957:
Background: in those early years of the UN, it seems to have played a larger role in war-zone mediation than it does today, as can be seen, for example, by the short official biography of the UN General Secretary of the day, Dag Hammarskjöld. Moreover, in the Mideast, the UN Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine (UNTSO) seems to have had a significantly weightier status than its present-day descendants. Its acting chief of staff in 1958, the American Colonel Byron V. Leary, was assumed, at least by the Israelis, to be acting on direct and frequent orders of Hammerskjold. Finally, the armistice agreements of 1949 had left some patches of territory inside Israel's borders as demilitarized zones.
Golda and her colleagues were convinced that the UN was trying to undermine Israeli sovereignty in those areas (which were within the 1967 borders, of course). So, August 11th 1957:
Golda Meir: For a while now there's been tension and a sort of struggle with the UN officials including with Mr. Hammarskjold. Recently however, Hammarskjold has stepped back a bit and he operates through Leary. General [Eedson] Burns [Leary's predecessor, whom we've already met here] fulfiled Hammarskjold's orders, but he did so with charm. Leary doesn't know how to do that.
It's clear that Hammarskjold intends to demonstrate with facts that the demilitarized zones are not the same as the rest of Israel. His position is that these areas have a special status, and the UN has enhanced authority in them. He's never said so openly, nor has he asked us to agree with him, but his actions make clear that he sees it that way, for example when he insists that UN observers enjoy greater independence in those areas and need not liaise with IDF officers.
Recently he [Leary] wanted to station observers above the [B'not Yaacov] Bridge [over the Jordan River on the Syrian border]. We said: no, there's no need. He said, OK, so there will be visits of observers. We agreed to visits. So what did he do? He came one day and announced he'd put an observer there. Joseph Tekoa, of the Foreign Ministry, responded: What do you mean you're announcing. You must ask. He [Leary] said it's demilitarized and he was announcing, not asking. Tekoa told him that wouldn't work and brought the matter to me. Of course we told [Leary] there was no such option: no observers and no special authority in that area. He went back to saying observers would visit. I said OK. What's he doing now? First an observer stood there an hour then left. A bit later, another one came and stood there an hour. Now he has them standing there four hours, to be replaced by someone else for four hours. We told him again we would not allow it to become an observer's position.
Our problem is that no outsider will understand what we're quarreling with them for. Possibly even some Israelis won't understand.
Justice Minister Pinchas Rosenne: I'm one of those.
Golda Meir: I'm surprised at you. At a different place, we quarreled with them about another little detail. They wanted to raise the UN flag over one of the positions. One of our officers was positioned there too. We said it's Israeli territory, there's an IDF officer there, there's no way you're going to fly the UN flag. There's no precedent for such behavior. If you insist on a UN flag, there will be an Israeli flag above it. They said no, that would anger the Syrians. We said Fine, so no flag at all. So they raised the UN flag, and when we saw that we raised our flag above it. He was angry and reported to Hammarskjold, who must also have been angry. They took their flag down, and then we took ours down, too. Then he wanted his observers to spend the night there. We said we don't see any sense in that but if they wish, fine. Leary then said the overnight observers must be armed. We said none of them are armed anywhere else in the country and they won't be armed there either... What Hammarskjold is trying to achieve is that the demilitarized zone isn't under full Israeli sovereignty, and once he succeeds at that he'll apply the same reasoning to the demilitarized zone on the Egyptian border.File א-7903/5
Sunday, December 16, 2012
Purchasing Jews From the Communists
We recently spent four entire posts on the single stenogram of the December 1955 meeting of the Ministers' Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security. Israel had attacked Syrian military positions on the shore of the Sea of Galilee, in response to a Syrian campaign to disrupt fishing on the lake, and post factum the ministers had various comments to make (here here here and here). In one of the posts, I commented on the difference between the committee as it appeared in the 1955 document and its greater significance these days.
Following up on a comment by one of our most veteran staffers, whereby the committee only became active and important after Levi Eshkol became Prime Minister in the mid-1960s, I called up file א-7903/5 which contains all the stenograms of the committee between late 1956 and the summer of 1958, all in one rather slim folder: a convincing demonstration on its own that not much was happening in the committee. It was chaired by Moshe Haim Shapira, the Minister of Religious Affairs and a member of the National Religious Party, another indication that it couldn't have been very important. It convened about once a month, apparently irrespective of events, and most of its time was spent on authorizing diplomatic posts: the General Consul to Yugoslavia, or the one in Montreal.
Riveting stuff. So riveting that at the meeting of July 7, 1957 the ministers interrupted themselves to kvetch - there's no better word - that theirs was a demeaning job. Not only did no-one ever tell them anything, but their lower-ranking colleagues who were mere Members of Knesset were better informed than they were.
Whether it was the compaints, or pure coincidence, the following meeting on the 11th of August 1957, was by far the most interesting in the entire file.
The first topic was presented by Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, who prefaced her report with the swoon-inducing compliment that what she was about to report she would not repeat in the full cabinet "because I'm afraid of telling it there. I trust that none of it will leak from here." She then launched into a description of negotiations with Hungary. Apparently the Hungarians had let it be known that they were interested in a payment of $2,500,000 or $3,500,000 to facilitate the immigration of Jews to Israel, and Israel had refused to comply. Recently, however, while Jews with passports were still being allowed out of Hungary, no new passports were being issued. One of Israel's diplomats had tried to investigate, and had been told that Hungary was interested in negotiating a new trade agreement. This, Golda mused, might indeed be the way to tansfer the funds without the unfortunate appearances. "The Hungarians, in any case, said they'd not be issuing any new passports until the negotiations began" [p.4-5].
If the Hungarians were openly hinting, the Romanians were being explicit.
Following up on a comment by one of our most veteran staffers, whereby the committee only became active and important after Levi Eshkol became Prime Minister in the mid-1960s, I called up file א-7903/5 which contains all the stenograms of the committee between late 1956 and the summer of 1958, all in one rather slim folder: a convincing demonstration on its own that not much was happening in the committee. It was chaired by Moshe Haim Shapira, the Minister of Religious Affairs and a member of the National Religious Party, another indication that it couldn't have been very important. It convened about once a month, apparently irrespective of events, and most of its time was spent on authorizing diplomatic posts: the General Consul to Yugoslavia, or the one in Montreal.
Riveting stuff. So riveting that at the meeting of July 7, 1957 the ministers interrupted themselves to kvetch - there's no better word - that theirs was a demeaning job. Not only did no-one ever tell them anything, but their lower-ranking colleagues who were mere Members of Knesset were better informed than they were.
Whether it was the compaints, or pure coincidence, the following meeting on the 11th of August 1957, was by far the most interesting in the entire file.
The first topic was presented by Golda Meir, the Foreign Minister, who prefaced her report with the swoon-inducing compliment that what she was about to report she would not repeat in the full cabinet "because I'm afraid of telling it there. I trust that none of it will leak from here." She then launched into a description of negotiations with Hungary. Apparently the Hungarians had let it be known that they were interested in a payment of $2,500,000 or $3,500,000 to facilitate the immigration of Jews to Israel, and Israel had refused to comply. Recently, however, while Jews with passports were still being allowed out of Hungary, no new passports were being issued. One of Israel's diplomats had tried to investigate, and had been told that Hungary was interested in negotiating a new trade agreement. This, Golda mused, might indeed be the way to tansfer the funds without the unfortunate appearances. "The Hungarians, in any case, said they'd not be issuing any new passports until the negotiations began" [p.4-5].
If the Hungarians were openly hinting, the Romanians were being explicit.
Regarding Romania, I invited the attache to a talk. It was rather fantastic. He's new here, and we began by talking about Zionism. So long as we spoke in generalities, about the Jewish connection to Israel and Hebrew, he understood and everything was fine. But when I got to the specific parts, regarding the unification of families and aliya in general, the conversation took a turn I've never seen before. The attache requested permission to speak, and he took out a paper. "I knew you were going to get to this, so I prepared a written response to ensure accuracy." And then he read a four-page response.
Immigration from Romania is made of two parts. The first, reunification of families, is fine. The Romanian policy is that each case must be investigated individually, but if Jews wishing to leave fall into the right catagories they'll be let out; if there are any delays they must be purely technical. Immigration in general, however, is an Israeli intervention in Romanian sovereignty. This demand is an affront to Romania.It was clear, Golda summed up, that he was acting on orders from above.
Idiotic Journalists
At one point during Golda Meir's report to the ministers on August 11th 1957 (see the previous post), she and they were congratulating themselves on a successful visit of an Israeli acting troupe to the Soviet Union.
Golda: It was a great event. We've got idiotic journalists, if they presented it the way they did.
Minister of Interior Israel Bar-Yehuda: We've got a newspaper called Yediot Acharonot which publishes articles by a fellow from MAKI (the Israeli Communist Party), he went there as part of their delegation, and he always tries to see things from their perspective.
Minister of Health Israel Barzilai: Sadly, our paper isn't any better, and they also reported with no brains. They didn't even mention the meeting with the local Jews.
Labels: 1957
The current debate in Israel on extending the draft to yeshiva students has raised the question whether the traditional concept of the IDF as a "citizens' army" is outdated. Some observers are even advocating a professional army.
Israel's Citizens Army
In the 1950s and 1960s things were very different. Almost all sections of society were mobilised for the defence of the young state, and service was seen as a privilege rather than a duty. For a historical perspective on how things used to be, we present this film from the Ministry of Tourism collection in the Israel State Archives. The film is in English and shows the achievements of the Israel Defence Forces during the period of Chief of Staff Haim Laskov (1958-1961).
You can see manouevres by an armoured unit, attended by Laskov and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, reservists coming to get their equipment and training, girl recruits doing their basic training and serving in a variety of units, NAHAL service on the borders, Air Force Day with the commander of the Israel Air Force Ezer Weizmann, paratroopers and the Navy.
Ben Gurion, the Negev, and the Vision Thing
In his magnificent autobiographical novel A Tale of Love and Darkness
, Amos Oz tells the story of his dawn meeting with Ben Gurion, after a short story he had written as an aspiring young author had caught the eye of the father of the nation. It's one of the best portraits around of Ben Gurion in action--the prime minster and minister of defense and literary critic. Afterwards, Oz summed it up to himself: Ben Gurion had decided in his youth that the Jews needed a state, and that he would be its leader. He may have asked himself what the cost of implementing these two decisions might be, but had answered himself that whatever the price, both decisions had to be realized.
Probably as plausible a summary of Ben Gurion's life as any 500,000-word biography.
The man had The Vision Thing, in spades.
Yet not all his visions came to be realized; only those two main ones. The broad flow of human history is stronger even than the most capable of visionaries, and some things they imagine turn out very different.
Yesterday we took a quick look at Ben Gurion's fascination with the Negev; today we're offering a slightly closer look. Everyone knows how in 1954 he abruptly resigned his post as prime minister and went to join the newly founded kibbutz of Sdeh Boker deep in the Negev, to prove that settling the Negev was more important even than leading the government. (He returned the following year, though when he finally did retire, it was back to Sdeh Boker.) So all Israelis knew about his ideas about the Negev, but they didn't necessarily agree.
One of our staff recently dug up a short summary of the idea, from a three-page set of responses Ben Gurion wrote for a journalist in 1959, anticipating the conditions in 1968, which would be Israel's 20th anniversary:
The government recently put together a program to promote the Negev by 2015. Some of the ideas were formulated by Ben Gurion 60 years ago, but now they've got a modern terminology: The government needs to build infrastructures so as to attract private investors; the fields the planners hope to develop are hi-tech, tourism, solar energy and so on. The program explictly includes the Beduin poulation.
, Amos Oz tells the story of his dawn meeting with Ben Gurion, after a short story he had written as an aspiring young author had caught the eye of the father of the nation. It's one of the best portraits around of Ben Gurion in action--the prime minster and minister of defense and literary critic. Afterwards, Oz summed it up to himself: Ben Gurion had decided in his youth that the Jews needed a state, and that he would be its leader. He may have asked himself what the cost of implementing these two decisions might be, but had answered himself that whatever the price, both decisions had to be realized.Probably as plausible a summary of Ben Gurion's life as any 500,000-word biography.
The man had The Vision Thing, in spades.
Yet not all his visions came to be realized; only those two main ones. The broad flow of human history is stronger even than the most capable of visionaries, and some things they imagine turn out very different.
Yesterday we took a quick look at Ben Gurion's fascination with the Negev; today we're offering a slightly closer look. Everyone knows how in 1954 he abruptly resigned his post as prime minister and went to join the newly founded kibbutz of Sdeh Boker deep in the Negev, to prove that settling the Negev was more important even than leading the government. (He returned the following year, though when he finally did retire, it was back to Sdeh Boker.) So all Israelis knew about his ideas about the Negev, but they didn't necessarily agree.
One of our staff recently dug up a short summary of the idea, from a three-page set of responses Ben Gurion wrote for a journalist in 1959, anticipating the conditions in 1968, which would be Israel's 20th anniversary:
In 1968, 500,000 people will live in the Negev. There will be four urban centers: Beer Sheva, Dimona, [Mitspe] Ramon and Eilat. 20,000 families will make their living from agriculture, once we complete the National Water Carrier and develop desalination capabilities. Another 20,000 will work in the mining industries, producing phosphates, copper, iron and other minerals. We'll develop a chemical industry and in the cities there will be additional industry, and 50,000 heads of family will be employed there. Thousands will be employed in the port of Eilat, and perhaps 10,000 in transportation. 80% of the people will be immigrants, and 20% will be haluzim from existing settlements, and university trained teachers and doctors. We'll pave a new road the length of the Arava, since the present narrow road to Eilat isn't sufficient; the geologists think we might find oil south of the Dead Sea.Well, no. If in 1959 there were fewer than 2 million Israelis, there are now 8 million, yet the population of the Negev reached 500,000 only in 2003. Dimona has remained a small town, Mitspeh Ramon is tiny, Eilat is a major tourism town but its port is marginal. No-one ever found that oil. One of the most significant sources of population growth came from the Beduin communities, who seem not to have been in BG's focus at all. There is agriculture in the Negev, here and there, but it doesn't support 20,000 families, not remotely. There's a large-ish mining industry based on phosphates, but no copper or iron.
The government recently put together a program to promote the Negev by 2015. Some of the ideas were formulated by Ben Gurion 60 years ago, but now they've got a modern terminology: The government needs to build infrastructures so as to attract private investors; the fields the planners hope to develop are hi-tech, tourism, solar energy and so on. The program explictly includes the Beduin poulation.
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