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XII. THE WAR OF ATTRITION AND CEASE FIRE
9. Statement by Secretary of State Rogers, 9
December 1969:
By the end of 1969, the Jarring
Mission has reached an impasse. The Arab States would not negotiate with Israel directly or indirectly. There was
heavy fighting along the Suez Canal. Arab-Palestinian terrorists were engaged in
sabotage actions against Israel from Jordan and Syria, assisted by the armed forces of
those two countries. Prime Minister Golda Meir visited the United States in late September 1969, and met
with President Nixon in Washington on 25 and 26 September. While no
formal announcement was made, it was assumed that a good understanding had
been reached. But, on 9 December, Secretary of State Rogers, addressing an
Adult Education Conference in Washington, made a number of proposals for a
Middle
East
settlement, going into details on the future borders of Israel and other issues. The section
dealing with the Middle East follows:
Following the third Arab-Israeli
war in twenty years, there was an upsurge of hope that a lasting peace could
be achieved. That hope has unfortunately not been realized. There is no area
of the world today that is more important, because it could easily again be
the source of another serious conflagration.
When this Administration took
office, one of our first actions in foreign affairs was to examine carefully
the entire situation in the Middle East. It was obvious that a continuation of the
unresolved conflict there would be extremely dangerous; that the parties to
the conflict alone would not be able to overcome their legacy of suspicion to
achieve a political settlement; and those international efforts to help
needed support.
The United States decided it had a responsibility
to play a direct role in seeking a solution.
Thus, we accepted a suggestion put
forward both by the French Government and the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. We agreed that the major Powers - the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France - should cooperate to
assist the Secretary-General's representative, Ambassador Jarring, in working
out a settlement in accordance with the Resolution of the Security Council of
the United Nations of November 1967. We also decided to consult directly with
the Soviet
Union,
hoping to achieve as wide an area of agreement as possible between us.
These decisions were made in full
recognition of the following important factors.
First, we knew that nations not
directly involved could not make a durable peace for the peoples and
Governments involved. Peace rests with the parties to the conflict. The
efforts of major Powers can help; they can provide a catalyst; they can help
define a realistic framework for agreement; but an agreement among other
Powers cannot be a substitute for agreement among the parties themselves.
Second, we knew that a durable
peace must meet the legitimate concerns of both sides.
Third, we were clear that the only
framework for a negotiated settlement was one in accordance with the entire
text of the UN Security Council Resolution. That Resolution was agreed upon
after long and arduous negotiations; it is carefully balanced; it provides
the basis for a just and lasting peace - a final settlement - not merely an
interlude between wars.
Fourth, we believed that a
protracted period of war, no peace, recurrent violence and spreading chaos
would serve the interests of no nation, in or out of the Middle East.
For eight months we have pursued
these consultations, in Four Power talks at the United Nations, and in
bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union.
In our talks with the Soviets, we
have proceeded in the belief that the stakes are so high that we have a
responsibility to determine whether we can achieve parallel views which would
encourage the parties to work out a stable and equitable solution. We are
under no illusions; we are fully conscious of past difficulties and present
realities. Our talks with the Soviets have brought a measure of
understanding, but very substantial differences remain. We regret that the
Soviets have delayed in responding to new formulations submitted to them on
28 October. However, we will continue to discuss these problems with the
Soviet Union as long as there is any realistic hope that such discussion
might further the cause of peace.
The substances of the talks that
we have had with the Soviet Union have been conveyed to the interested parties through
diplomatic channels. This process has served to highlight the main roadblocks
to the initiation of useful negotiations among the parties.
On the one hand, the Arab leaders
fear that Israel is not in fact prepared to
withdraw from Arab territory occupied in the 1967 war.
Now on the other hand, Israeli
leaders fear that the Arab States are not in fact prepared to live in peace
with Israel.
Each side can cite from its
viewpoint considerable evidence to support its fears. Each side has permitted
its attention to be focused solidly and to some extent solely on these fears.
What can the United States do to help overcome these
roadblocks?
Our policy is and will continue to
be a balanced one.
We have friendly ties with both
Arabs and Israelis. To call for Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the UN
Resolution without achieving an agreement on peace would be partisan towards
the Arabs. To call on the Arabs to accept peace without Israeli withdrawal
would be partisan towards Israel. Therefore, our policy is to
encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement
and to urge the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territory when their
territorial integrity is assured as envisaged by the Security Council
Resolution.
In an effort to broaden the scope
of discussion, we have recently resumed Four Power negotiations at the United
Nations.
Let me outline our policy on
various elements of the Security Council Resolution. The basic and related
issues might be described as peace, security, withdrawal and territory. Peace
between the parties: - the Resolution of the Security Council makes clear
that the goal is the establishment of a state of peace between the parties
instead of the state of belligerency which has characterized relations for
over 20 years. We believe that the conditions and obligations of peace must
be defined in specific terms. For example, navigation rights in the Suez Canal and in the Straits of Tiran
should be spelled out. Respect for sovereignty and obligations of the parties
to each other must be made specific.
But peace, of course, involves
much more than this. It is also a matter of the attitudes and intentions of
the parties. Are they ready to co-exist with one another? Can a
live-and-let-live attitude replace suspicion, mistrust and hate? A peace
agreement between the parties must be based on clear and stated intentions
and a willingness to bring about basic changes in the attitudes and
conditions which are characteristic of the Middle East today.
Security: - a lasting peace must
be sustained by a sense of security on both sides. To this end, as envisaged
in the Security Council Resolution, there should be demilitarized zones and
related security arrangements more reliable than those which existed in the
area in the past. The parties themselves, with Ambassador Jarring's help, are
in the best position to work out the nature and the details of such security
arrangements. It is, after all, their interests which are at stake and their
territory which is involved. They must live with the results.
Withdrawal and territory: - the
Security Council Resolution endorses the principle of the non-acquisition of
territory by war and calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
territories occupied in the 1967 war. We support this part of the Resolution,
including withdrawal, just as we do its other elements.
The boundaries from
which the 1967 war began were established in the 1949 Armistice Agreements
and have defined the areas of national jurisdiction in the Middle East for 20 years. Those
boundaries were armistice lines, not final political borders. The rights,
claims and positions of the parties in an ultimate peaceful settlement were
reserved by the Armistice Agreements.
The Security Council
Resolution neither endorses nor-precludes these armistice lines as the
definitive political boundaries. However, it calls for withdrawal from
occupied territories, the non-acquisition of territory by war, and for the
establishment of secure and recognized boundaries.
We believe that while
recognized political boundaries must be established, and agreed upon by the
parties, any change in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight
of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for
mutual security. We do not support expansionism. We believe troops must be
withdrawn as the Resolution provides. We support Israel's security and the
security of the Arab States as well. We are for a lasting peace that requires
security for both.
By emphasizing the key issues of
peace, security, withdrawal and territory, I do not want to leave the
impression that other issues are not equally important. Two in particular
deserve special mention - the questions of refugees and of Jerusalem.
There can be no lasting peace
without a just settlement of the problem of those Arab-Palestinians whom the
wars of 1948 and 1967 made homeless (It must also include the Jewish refugees
from Arab lands). This human dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been
of special concern to the United States for over 20 years. During this
period, the United States has contributed about 500 million
dollars for the support and education of the Arab-Palestine refugees. We are
prepared to contribute generously, along with others, to solve this problem.
We believe its just settlement must take into account the desires and
aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the Governments in
the area.
The problem posed by the refugees
will become increasingly serious if their future is not resolved. There is a
new consciousness among the young Arab-Palestinians who have grown up since
1948, which needs to be channeled away from bitterness and frustration
towards hope and justice.
The question of the future status
of Jerusalem, because it touches deep emotional, historical and
religious well-springs, is particularly complicated. We have made clear
repeatedly in the past two and a half years that we cannot accept unilateral
actions by any party to decide the final status of the city. We believe its
status can be determined only through the agreement of the parties concerned,
which in practical terms means primarily the Governments of Israel and
Jordan, taking into account the interests of other countries in the area and
the international community. We do, however, support certain principles which
we believe would provide an equitable framework for a Jerusalem settlement.
Specifically, we believe Jerusalem should be a unified city within
which there would no longer be restrictions on the movement of persons and
goods. There should be open access to the unified city for persons of all
faiths and nationalities. Arrangements for the administration of the unified
city should take into account the interests of all its inhabitants and of the
Jewish, Islamic and Christian communities. And there should be roles for both
Israel and Jordan in the civic, economic and
religious life of the City.
It is our hope that agreement on
the key issues of peace, security, withdrawal and territory will create a
climate in which these questions of refugees and of Jerusalem, as well as
other aspects of the conflict, can be resolved as part of the overall
settlement.
During the first weeks of the
current United Nations General Assembly, the efforts to move matters towards
a settlement entered a particularly intensive phase. Those efforts continue
today.
I have already referred to our
talks with the Soviet Union. In connection with those talks there have been
allegations that we have been seeking to divide the Arab States by urging the
UAR to make a separate peace. These allegations are false. It is a fact that
we and the Soviets have been concentrating on the questions of a settlement
between Israel and the United Arab Republic. We have been doing this in the
full understanding on both our parts that, before there can be a settlement
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there must be agreement between the parties on
other aspects of the settlement - not only those related to the United Arab
Republic but also those related to Jordan and other States which accept the
Security Council Resolution of November 1967.
We started with the Israeli-United Arab Republic aspect because of its inherent
importance for future stability in the area and because one must start
somewhere.
We are also ready to pursue the
Jordanian aspects of a settlement - in fact the Four Powers in New York have begun such discussions. Let
me make it perfectly clear that the US position is that implementation
of the overall settlement would begin only after complete agreement had been
reached on related aspects of the problem.
In our recent meetings with the
Soviets, we have discussed some new formulas in an attempt to find common
positions. They consist of three principal elements:
First, there should be a binding
commitment by Israel and the United Arab Republic to peace with each other, with
all the specific obligations of peace spelled out, including the obligation
to prevent hostile acts originating from their respective territories.
Second, the detailed provisions of
peace relating to security safeguards on the ground should be worked out
between the parties, under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, utilizing the
procedures followed in negotiating the Armistice Agreements under Ralph
Bunche in 1949 at Rhodes. His formula has been previously used with success in
negotiations between the parties on Middle Eastern problems. A principal
objective of the Four Power talks, we believe, should be to help Ambassador
Jarring engage the parties in a negotiating process under the Rhodes formula.
So far as a settlement between Israel and the United Arab Republic goes, these safeguards relate
primarily to the area of Sharm el-Sheikh controlling access to the Gulf of Aqaba, the need for demilitarized zones
as foreseen in the Security Council Resolution, and final arrangements in the
Gaza Strip.
Third, in the context of peace and
agreement on specific security safeguards, withdrawal of Israeli forces from
Egyptian territory would be required.
Such an approach directly
addresses the principal national concerns of both Israel and the UAR. It would require the
UAR to agree to a binding and specific commitment to peace. It would require
withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from UAR territory to the international
border between Israel and Egypt which has been in existence for
over half a century. It would also require the parties themselves to
negotiate the practical security arrangements to safeguard the peace.
We believe that this approach is
balanced and fair.
We remain interested in good
relations with all States in the area. Whenever and wherever Arab States
which have broken off diplomatic relations with the United States are prepared to restore them, we
shall respond in the same spirit.
Meanwhile, we will not be deterred
from continuing to pursue the paths of patient diplomacy in our search for
peace in the Middle East. We will not shrink from advocating necessary compromises,
even though they may and probably will be unpalatable to both sides. We
remain prepared to work with others - in the area and throughout the world -
so long as they sincerely seek the end we seek: a just and lasting peace.
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